In the recent movement for election reforms, four lines of advance are marked: (1)—To secure the voter, by protecting him from evil influences, as is the object of the various “corrupt practices acts” and kindred laws; by guarding him against fraud, intimidation and overawing, by means of an absolutely secret ballot, as under the Australian system; and by preventing, as with voting-machines, any manipulation of ballots or count. (2)—To extend the franchise by reducing the qualifications of Electors, and so making suffrage more nearly universal, as in the 15th Amendment, and the laws enabling women to vote. (3)—To increase popular control over officials and their acts, over law-making, and over the initial steps in making nominations, as in making offices elective instead of appointive, in adopting the initiative, the referendum, and the recall, and in prescribing legal forms for primary elections and making nominations. (4)—To secure more equitable representation of every individual, class, party or interest; to avoid the despotism of a majority, or worse yet, a plurality; and to prevent the practical effacement of minorities.
(1) To preserve the purity of elections, many states have “Corrupt Practices acts” forbidding the purchase of votes, directly or indirectly, by candidates, committees or others, with money, intoxicating liquors, cigars, promise of office, or otherwise. Some limit the amount of expenditures of candidates; others require detailed sworn statements of campaign outlays to be publicly filed. President Roosevelt in at least his last two messages urged Congress to enact stringent laws to prevent bribery and corruption in Federal elections, and to secure publicity of the expenses of candidates, parties and committees, and of the source of contributions.
Voting was doubtless at first viva voce. In some States, particularly in the South, elections were so conducted for many years, and in Kentucky this was in accordance with a constitutional provision. For a number of reasons, however, voting by ballot was adopted in all the States, either originally, or superseding the viva voce method.
The written or printed ballot was gradually perverted to such degree that in 1857 the legislature of South Australia adopted an official secret ballot, printed and paid for by the public, and wholly controlled and handled by public officers. The idea was speedily carried to England, spread over Continental Europe, and at a somewhat later date reached the United States, where in some form, almost everywhere modified, it has become part of the electoral machinery in every State, under the name of Australian ballot. On first test in American courts, the system was held to be unconstitutional, but it has later been sustained almost everywhere as being merely regulative. The tendency of these laws has been to make elections more formal, and less flexible. Changes on the ballot and “scratching” are no longer possible with the ease of the old private ballot system. But in general the voter’s choice is not restricted to the names printed on the ballot. Constitutional guarantees of secrecy are not impaired by those clauses which permit aid by election officers, to the disabled or illiterate, in marking the ballot. In some States, as Tennessee and Maryland, illiterates are indirectly or partially disfranchised by laws which permit aid only to persons “that by reason of blindness or other physical disability” are unable to mark their ballots.
These laws have been sustained in the highest courts. Regulations, if not too difficult in the opinion of the court, are upheld, and likewise provisions that require a party to have cast a certain percentage of the vote at the last preceding election, before it may be entitled to an official ballot. Even forcing a citizen to choose between voting under an obnoxious party heading, or not at all, is, at least in New Jersey, viewed as no deprivation of his rights.
In a number of States, voting machines which automatically register the voter’s choice have been authorized, and to some extent used.
At this point mention may be made of compulsory voting, which has been seriously discussed as advisable to bring out otherwise good citizens who are apathetic as to their civic responsibilities. In 1898 the people of North Dakota adopted a constitutional amendment, permitting the Legislature to impose a penalty for failure to vote.
(2) Although the theory of the Declaration of Independence is broad, the practice as to the “consent of the governed” was decidedly limited at the time of the Revolution, and the ruling power in at least some of the States was vested in so few persons as to be oligarchic rather than popular. Property qualifications were often essential to the right of suffrage. These no longer exist in any State. Also age, race, sex, citizenship, residence and payment of taxes determined a person’s eligibility either to vote, or to hold office, or both. A higher age is set generally in Europe, but in America twenty-one years is universally accepted as marking maturity for voting purposes. Race distinctions were wiped out by the fifteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Religious tests were always few, and are probably wholly abolished—the last effort being to bar Mormons in Nevada about twenty years ago, but held unconstitutional. Sex is no longer considered in Wyoming, Idaho, Utah and Colorado. While only males are fully enfranchised in the other States, suffrage has been given to females in many matters, particularly municipal and school. Only American citizens may vote in a large number of States, but in others aliens also, who have declared their intentions to become citizens by naturalization, have full rights. In an anomalous position are Porto Ricans and Filipinos, who are neither citizens nor aliens. Residence where the elector offers to vote is always required, usually a year or more in the State, but sometimes less; and a shorter time in the county and voting precinct, or city and ward.
The extreme mobility of our population, so different from conditions in the Old World, or even earlier America, has led to a feeling that, in some way, the good citizen should be enabled to express his choice in National elections, though for any reason he may have moved from one State to another shortly before election; likewise that he save his vote for State and district officers and measures, though crossing county lines; and on county matters, though removing from precinct to precinct. An effort to avert this temporary disfranchisement was made in Kansas, by a law permitting railroad employees to vote where their occupation happens to take them on election day. The payment of taxes has long been a pre-requisite to casting a ballot in Pennsylvania and other Eastern States. In the South, this requirement, as well as educational qualifications, appears to gain ground.
(3) The extension of the subjects of popular decision has been most marked, and the drift is increasingly in that direction. A further innovation, rapidly growing, is the expression of a wish or preference by the electorate where such vote is merely advisory and not binding. Office after office, once appointive, is made elective, and when so gained by the people is never surrendered again. In 1776-1783 only Georgia, among the Colonies elected judges. Today thirty-one States elect them. Then scarcely a governor was chosen by the people. At first presidential electors were named in a variety of ways. But by 1832, the right had everywhere been yielded to the people. The very many resolutions of amendment offered in Congress, providing for the election of United States Senators by direct vote, the passage of such measures repeatedly by the House, and the persistent, reiterated requests for this reform by various Legislatures, all show a deep-seated popular desire.