Sweden stood alone in her struggle with Russia. The old alliance with England and Holland was no longer in existence. The continental powers were too busily engaged in the West to assist in checking the rising power of the Eastern giant. For the limited resources of Sweden he was too big already. Charles XII. had with him a stately and well-equipped army of 44,000, which, by contemporary authors, was pronounced to have consisted of the finest soldiers of the world. Charles was to attack Russia from Poland, for the devastated Baltic provinces could no longer support an army with the necessary provisions. General Lewenhaupt was to join him from Livonia with an army of 12,000 men and ample provisions. Another Swedish commander, General Lybecker, was to attack and destroy St. Petersburg, with an army of the same size, from his headquarters in Finland. The total of Swedish troops distributed in various directions amounted to 100,000, the largest regular army Sweden ever had put up. Charles had concluded to engage semi-barbarous allies in a battle against a semi-barbarous enemy. In 1707 he entered into an alliance with Turkey, and, about the same time, another with Mazeppa, an old ambitious Cossack leader who wanted to establish his supremacy over the steppes of Russia. The plans of Charles XII. for the invasion of Russia have often been severely criticised, but competent judges of our day have declared that they were not only elaborate but highly ingenious. They miscarried on account of arrangements which could not be made according to expectations, and on account of Czar Peter’s practice of laying bare and waste the parts of his own country through which the invaders were to pass. Furthermore, Charles had sent home to Sweden several of his best generals, such as Arvid Horn and Magnus Stenbock. This was done after the successes in Poland, and was a good thing in itself, for the men mentioned were exactly those who were destined to save the very existence and honor of a country which was deprived of its political grandeur through the heedlessness of King Charles. But without them he was surrounded by inexperienced men only. Charles Gustavus Rehnskiold was the most conspicuous of these, a valiant but reckless man, who only understood certain details of the elaborate expedition.
When the Swedes were approaching Russian territory, Czar Peter made offers of peace which the French ambassador urged Charles to accept. Charles answered: “He does not mean it. He wishes the world to believe that he wants peace and I war.” Czar Peter had organized his army through a wonderful exertion of energy, built new fortresses and strengthened the old ones, enforced discipline and gathered ammunition. Able officers had been trained in the repeated conflicts with the Swedes. These took the lead of the army movements.
Charles left Poland with somewhat more than 30,000 men, entering Lithuania and chasing the Russians before him. A last great victory was won by Charles XII. at Holovzin in Lithuania, in 1708. The Swedish army crossed the Dniepr and marched to Mohilev. Charles lingered in this place for a month, anxiously awaiting the arrival of General Lewenhaupt. The latter remained in Livonia during all this time, the letter ordering him to join the central army not reaching him in due time. The march was continued toward Smolensk, but King Charles thought that he could only reach Moscow over that route with the greatest difficulty, and changed his course, marching toward the Ukraine to join Mazeppa and the Tartars. Mazeppa had been vexed by the long delay, and was, besides, not able to gather the forces which he had promised. Czar Peter captured his stronghold, and Mazeppa reached the Swedish army more like a fugitive than an ally. The expedition of General Lybecker against St. Petersburg proved a failure. Lewenhaupt, who had at last received his order, moved into Russia. At Liesna he met a hostile army considerably larger than his own. After a fierce battle, which involved a great loss of life, Lewenhaupt broke through the Russian lines. He had been forced to destroy the great amount of provisions which he had gathered, and reached the army of King Charles in a very different state than was anticipated. The king found himself in a difficult position, being cut off from all connections with his country and in want of provisions.
The battle of Pultowa, which was fought June 28, 1709, decided for centuries the contest over the political supremacy of Northern Europe. Charles XII., with his army, which had been reduced to 18,000 men, laid siege to the important town of Pultowa, by the river Vorskla. The Russian army, 50,000 strong, under the command of Czar Peter, hastened toward the enemy. The fear of the terrible Swedes was as yet so strong in them that they did not risk an attack, but built a strongly fortified camp. King Charles, with his army in distress, further reduced to only 12,000 men, and in want even of ammunition, saw no other way than to fight. He was himself wounded in the foot and unable to take command in person. General Rehnskiold, who led the cavalry, acted as general commander during the battle, which position he was not able to fill; Lewenhaupt commanded the right wing with decided success. He forced the enemy to abandon three of its seven forts, and saw it once inclined to leave in flight. The left wing of the Swedish army was brought into disorder and receded. King Charles, who suffered greatly from his wounded foot, was carried on a litter between the lines, encouraging his soldiers and dealing out new orders. The litter was soon shattered, and the horse which the king mounted was shot under him. He saved himself by accepting the horse of one of his officers. Rehnskiold, who appeared nervous and confused, offered only a lame assistance with the cavalry. While riding back and forth in his heedless anxiety to be useful, without obtaining his object, he rode into the Russian lines and was made a prisoner. The same fate befell Count Piper, the aged adviser of King Charles. Lewenhaupt kept up his heroic struggle on the right wing, but his forces were greatly reduced by the fire of the Russian artillery. The Swedes had lost the battle. Their infantry had especially suffered great losses. A great number of the ablest officers were killed or made prisoners. As an illustration may be quoted the fact that among the killed were twenty-two officers of the Wrangel family. The Russians made no fierce pursuit, and the remnants of the Swedish army were given time to recede to the shore of the Dniepr where this river is joined by the Vorskla. The change of route toward the Ukraine had been made contrary to the advice of Count Piper; the march to the Dniepr was made contrary to that of Count Lewenhaupt. The Swedish troops were in fact shut in between the mighty rivers, which they lacked the means to cross, and the surrounding mountains, lined with Russian artillery. Charles was unwilling to leave his army, but Lewenhaupt persuaded him to save his life. Mazeppa had crossed the Dniepr with his troops. Charles followed in the night of July 1st with 1,000 of his men. With 500 Swedes Charles reached the Turkish town of Bender, where he was at first resolved to remain only until his wound was healed. Lewenhaupt, who now was in command, surrendered to the Russians the following morning, with all the rest of the army. This course was inevitable; another battle would only have caused new and useless sacrifices of human lives.
A sad fate awaited the Swedes in Russian captivity. Only a few saw their homes again, after years of suffering. Rehnskiold was among these. The majority, like Lewenhaupt and Piper, died in captivity. Considerable information about the experiences of the Swedish prisoners in Russia is found in their memoirs and note-books, preserved to this day. It appears that the treatment which they received varied greatly, according to circumstances. Czar Peter wished to keep the Swedish captives in the country as long as possible, with the object of favorably influencing his barbarous subjects by their superior abilities and culture. He had commanded clemency in their treatment; but his orders must have been disobeyed, for many Swedish soldiers are known to have perished in the sulphur mines. In Tobolsk and other towns of Siberia, Swedish majors and captains were in great numbers occupied in the humble pursuits of teachers, barbers, tailors, painters and blacksmiths. Some kept shops and others made articles of the Swedish sloyd, in which there was no competition in the market. The pastimes were music and theatricals. There were, among these thousands of prisoners, 9 generals, 17 colonels, 27 lieutenant-colonels, 38 majors, 494 captains, 975 lieutenants, 67 ministers of the Gospel, etc. A good many of these were Swedish subjects of German descent, or foreigners in Swedish service. The prisoners tried their best to make it as pleasant for themselves as possible. They formed a little community of their own in Moscow, with Piper and Rehnskiold as their highest officials. Georg Nordberg, pastor of the body-guards, was made the president of a chapter-house, which held church conferences, issued texts for special services, examined and consecrated ministers. Czar Peter tried to attract some of the ablest officers to him by promises of liberty and remunerative positions. Many of the captives, seeing no prospect of freedom, decided to remain in the country, entered the Greek church and married Russian women. Some who could not endure captivity made a revolt at Kasan, killing the armed troops, and making an attempt to reach their own beloved country. The plot was frustrated and was of sinister consequences, for the Swedish captives commenced from that time, 1711, to be transported to Siberia in great numbers. This was only to move the important work of civilization eastward. The captives, instead of succumbing to the severe climate, unfolded the great energy of their race, cheerfully accommodating their lives to the new requirements and devoting their time to travels for scientific research, or mercantile purposes, in Russian service, or on their own responsibility. They made accounts and maps of undiscovered and unexplored parts of Siberia, gathering results which have been of great importance to later explorers, geologists and ethnographers. Principal among these scientists are Philip John von Strahlenberg, whose great book on Siberia was published in Leipsic in 1730, and John Anton Matérn and Peter Schœnstrœm, his collaborators; John Gustavus Renat, made a prisoner by the Kalmucks, whom he taught the secrets of manufacturing cannon and bombs, and of printing books with movable types; Lorenz Lange, who was secretary of several Russian embassies to the imperial court of China, about which country he has given valuable information; John B. Muller, John Schnitscher and Ambjœrn Molin. Tobolsk was the centre of the Swedish colonies in Siberia, where a peculiar sect grew up among those of deep religious sentiment. A sectarian school, with more than 100 pupils, was established, and the German pietist, Aug. Herrman Francke, for some time supported the movement. Governor Gagarin, who wanted to make himself ruling sovereign of Siberia, arranged a formidable conspiracy. It was discovered, the governor was hanged, and the Swedish captives who were involved in it were sent still further away to Nerschinsk.
If Charles XII., up to the date of the terrible battle of Pultowa, has deserved our sympathy, in spite of his faults and mistakes, it is impossible to look upon him in the same charitable light for the rest of his career. The great defeat and the loss of his army he described in letters to his sister, Ulrica Eleonore, and the state council, as small misfortunes, without consequence, which he was soon to repair. Instead of trying his utmost to obtain peace on the best possible conditions for his poor country, and instead of saving his unhappy army from the miseries of captivity, he made plans for new campaigns and demands for a new army. Czar Peter expressed more correct views of the situation. A few hours after the battle of Pultowa he wrote to Admiral Apraxin: “Now rests at last secure our city on the Neva.” And he was right. The period of the political grandeur of Sweden was at an end.
Great was the renowned heroism of Charles XII. and his warriors. Still greater, although less renowned, the heroism with which his poor and neglected country suffered the disasters which these glorious deeds brought upon it. The regular troops of the army created by Charles XI. had not been sufficient. New regiments were, one after the other, created by means of increased taxes and repeated enlistments, until it appeared as if the whole male population was to be sent out in the endless wars, to be killed or imprisoned, and the distressed country doomed to inevitable destruction. Plague, hunger and emigration threatened to make away with those spared from military service. Swedes of the nineteenth century have difficulty in apprehending how the country was able to endure such terrible hardships.
The consequences of the defeat at Pultowa soon became manifest. The enemies of Sweden had formed a better idea of the resources of the country than had its own ruler, and were resolved to profit by it. King August at once declared the treaty of Alt-Ranstædt to be null and void, and entered Poland, where he in a short time recovered his lost authority. Stanislav fled and sought a refuge on Swedish territory. King Charles later gave him his little hereditary land of Palatinate-Zweibrucken. King Frederic of Denmark declared war upon untenable grounds and had an army of 16,000 men invade Scania. Helsingborg was captured without difficulty. Great consternation was caused by this assault upon the unhappy and apparently defenceless country. The state council was brought to despair. The situation was saved by Count Magnus Stenbock, the able general. After having served as quartermaster-general of the Swedish army in Poland, he was sent back to Sweden, being governor-general of Scania at the time when this province was invaded. He had not with him the necessary troops to meet the enemy, but left for Smaland, where he gathered an army of peasants, chiefly consisting of inexperienced but sturdy youths in wooden shoes and coats of goatskins. From Vexio, where he had met his new mustered troops, Stenbock returned to Scania, in February, 1710, obtaining the reinforcements of a few additional regiments, which swelled his army to the number of 14,000 men. The well-equipped Danish force, which, after an expedition into Bleking, returned to Scania, made a good deal of fun of the “Stenbuk og hands Gededrenge” (the mountain buck and his goatherds). Governor Stenbock understood how to gain the confidence and rouse the patriotism of his “goatherds.” He was soon sufficiently sure of their ability to risk a battle, which was fought at Helsingborg, February 28, 1710. The Danes, commanded by George Rantzau, were routed, and sought a refuge behind the walls of the town. The Danish losses were 4,000 killed and wounded and 3,000 prisoners, with their camp, artillery and baggage. A few days later the Danes evacuated Scania, returning to Seeland. The victory of Helsingborg was the most glorious of the battles fought by Magnus Stenbock. It saved Sweden in the hour of direst distress, rekindling the hope which the battle of Pultowa had extinguished. It was the last time in Swedish history that the Danes entered Scania as enemies.
The victory at Helsingborg was only one bright star in a night of darkness. In the Baltic provinces the disasters followed close upon each other. Count Nils Stromberg, the governor-general of Livonia, was forced to surrender the town of Riga, July 1, 1710, after having fought the Russians for months with great bravery. The enemies which forced the able Stromberg to give up his cause were hunger and plagues. Not less than 40,000 Russians had lost their lives outside the walls of Riga. Within a few months Duenamuende, Pernau and Reval also surrendered. This made complete the Russian conquest of the Swedish empire in the Baltic provinces. The operations against Finland, begun earlier, were continued with success. The town and fortress of Viborg, which never had been occupied by foreign troops, were captured in June, and Kexholm in September. The country was unmercifully devastated, in spite of solemn promises to the contrary.
That under such circumstances discontent against the absolute ruler was fostered seems only natural. During the first few years of the Carolinian campaign the noise of the great victories was stronger than the voices of discontent and complaint. When the glorious battles were not followed by treaties of peace, the grumbling voices grew louder. The king was at first not the object of the growing discontent, but the state council, which was considered to make greater demands than were necessary. The king was supposed to fight for a righteous cause against treacherous enemies, but the truth dawned on a good many that a government invested with absolute power was the cause of the misery. The battle of Pultowa brought to a mature state the thoughts of a change in the constitution, thoughts which for years had occupied the ablest men of the country. The double government was to a great extent responsible for the bad state of affairs. The king tried to rule with absolute power from his headquarters in Saxony, Poland and the Ukraine, with Piper as his adviser. At home the state council held the reins of government and sometimes acted in direct opposition to the instructions or intentions of the king. Charles XII. was very jealous of his power, and the state council, foremost in which were a few men of the very highest ability, like Count Arvid Horn, was on this account sometimes unable to carry out its best endeavors. Charles by his methods brought confusion and uncertainty into the deliberations and acts of the government, injuring the commonwealth and the principles of an absolute monarchy as well. The king was not able to supervise the details of his administration, and unrighteous officers profited thereby, by their unlawful collections of taxes, causing open revolts of the suffering population in various parts of the country.