A new era in Swedish history opens up with the acceptance of the parliamentary reform. The constitution itself had suffered no change, except in points of contact with the new rules of the Riksdag. But the powers of state no longer held to each other the same position as of yore. The government hitherto had, in the very division into four Estates, a support against powerful class and party interests. An equally solid support was not to be expected from a Riksdag of only two Chambers, which in questions of state appropriations is practically one. For this reason many would have preferred the establishment of a system which, instead of abolishing the mediæval arrangement of four Estates, would have added as many classes as there are really extant in the modern state, to gain the desired equilibrium through a manifold and dynamically operating representation. As things shaped themselves after the two Chamber system, the government ought more than ever to have a conservative, retaining power in order to preserve the proper balance. But such was not the case, for the Riksdag had been placed in a position to watch and control the executive power much closer than before, thanks to its authority to fix for each year the appropriations and expenditures of the state. The stipulation that the members of the cabinet are to take part in the deliberations of the Chambers gives another pillar of strength to the Riksdag. If the ministers of state are to exert any influence upon the decisions of the Riksdag, it is requisite to have its full confidence. The king is forced to select for his cabinet such members as are supposed to have an influence with the representatives of the people. The influence of the Riksdag has been steadily increasing ever since 1867.
While the issue of a parliamentary reform occupied the attention of all public-spirited men, the interest in the political situation of Europe was hardly less intense. The sympathy with the unhappy Poles was almost feverish. In 1863 two motions were made at the Riksdag to petition the government to take an active part in the restoration of the kingdom of Poland, by means of diplomatic intervention. The position of the government was a difficult one. The complications between Denmark and Germany had recommenced, and it was important to stand in good relations to Russia. The Swedish public did everything to make these relations precarious, by demonstrations of various kinds in favor of Poland, warlike newspaper articles and subscriptions of money to the leaders of the revolt. Thanks to the sagacity and tactful demeanor of Manderstrœm and the common sense of the Riksdag the motions in question were defeated and a dangerous conflict avoided. Complications of a more serious nature arose on account of the reopened conflict between Denmark and Germany. The Danish government had failed in its efforts to make a satisfactory arrangement in the relations between the crown and the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein. The Germans repeatedly mixed themselves up in the interior affairs of Denmark, and the Danes themselves were divided into several parties. King Frederic VII. at last concluded to give up the idea of gathering in the duchies as integral parts of the kingdom, satisfied to sacrifice the ultimate connection of Holstein and Lauenburg with the crown, but resolved to connect the originally Danish Schleswig with Denmark. The purely German parts were, through the so-called “March Patent” of 1863, separated from the rest of the monarchy, while Schleswig was reunited with it, according to the constitution. This policy was approved by the Scandinavian party in Sweden and Norway, supported by Swedish diplomacy, and, in the first place, by Charles XV. himself. King Charles was inspired by general sympathy with the Scandinavian movement and by personal friendship for Frederic VII. to follow up the Scandinavian policy of his father. The two Scandinavian monarchs met twice during the summer of 1863 and influenced the Swedish-Norwegian and Danish cabinets to draw the outline of a treaty of defence on the basis of the river Eider as the Danish boundary to the south. The Danish government made the proposition for a new constitution according to which Schleswig was to be united to Denmark. This was contrary to the promise made by King Frederic to the German powers in 1852. The proposition for a new constitution was placed before the Danish Diet and accepted. Two days later, November 15, 1863, King Frederic suddenly died, before he had sanctioned the new law. This was a severe blow. The popular king left his beloved people in a most inopportune moment, fraught with peril and disastrous mistakes. The people of Schleswig and Holstein renewed an old contention in regard to the right of succession. The new Danish king, Christian IX., gave in to the pressure brought to bear on him by his cabinet and the inhabitants of Copenhagen. He signed the new constitution, which gave to the German powers a valid excuse to interfere. The Prussian and Austrian troops crossed the river Eider to make good the agreements of 1852.
The Swedish-Norwegian government was placed in an embarrassing position. The alliance of defence that was planned was to a great extent based upon the relations of personal friendship between Charles XV. and Frederic VII. Sweden was not legally pledged to shield Denmark as a consequence of the acceptance of the new constitution. But Sweden had taken a conspicuous part in the deliberations, for which reason a change of policy could not be made without considerable difficulty. The liberal organs of the Swedish press, headed by “Aftonbladet,” whose editor was August Sohlman, did everything in their power to make such a change an impossibility. But Sweden was not prepared to make war on two of the great powers of Europe, especially as no other power was willing to join in an alliance in behalf of Denmark. The change must be made; and was effected, principally because of the persuasive arguments and resolute demeanor of Gripenstedt. King Charles resolved to take the painful measures of a retreat. The standpoint of his government he gave to the Riksdag in the following words: “It cannot be expected from us that we should place our sword on the scale of justice without considering if the object can be attained with the resources at our command.” It was a supreme sacrifice that Charles XV. made when, for the safety of his countries, he was forced to draw back the hand of support and comradeship which he had offered a brother in distress. The noble-hearted king, in one of his poems, has given a touching expression of the sorrow he felt in being unable to assist Denmark in her hour of peril. King Charles might, with proper resources at his command, have proved a formidable enemy. He had given evidence of possessing all the qualities requisite for the make-up of a great general, without doubt an inheritance from his two grandfathers, Prince Bernadotte and Eugene Beauharnais. A few hundred Swedish and Norwegian volunteers took an honorable part in the Danish war, which was the only practical result of the Scandinavian policy. The Swedish press was violent in its attacks upon the government for its change of policy. In March, 1864, the mob of Stockholm assailed the residences of Manderstrœm, Gripenstedt and other cabinet members, breaking the windows with stones.
Poor Denmark was left alone. Napoleon III. made the mistake of not attempting to defeat Prussia before she had reached her climax of strength. He was tied up with his Mexican adventure and unwilling to help Denmark. Charles XV. could not endure to see Denmark thus deserted. Privately he offered Christian IX. an alliance which stipulated that the three Scandinavian kingdoms should be joined into a union with one common foreign policy and common defence. Charles was also willing to make the succession one, if necessary. This alliance was to embrace only such parts of Denmark which were not to enter the German union. Sweden-Norway would do their utmost to prohibit a separation between Denmark and Schleswig. Denmark refused to accept this offer. Her leading statesman, Monrad, held stubbornly to the idea of an undivided Danish monarchy. For this reason, Denmark was for a second time abandoned to fight out alone her uneven battle. It ended in the loss of Holstein, Lauenburg and the greater part of Schleswig, through the treaty of Vienna, October 30, 1864. In Denmark a hard feeling against the Swedes and Norwegians sprang up as a consequence of the disastrous war fought without allies; and the Scandinavian policy and enthusiasm had received a blow from which they have never fully recovered. Charles XV. did all in his power to revive them. He had the pleasure of uniting the efforts of Sweden, Norway and Denmark in a peaceful work of great significance, the first Scandinavian Exposition of Industry and Art, which was opened at Stockholm in June, 1866. The consequence was a perfect Norwegian conquest of Sweden, in a cultured sense. The painters Tidemand and Gude captured the prizes. The composers Kierulf and Nordraak took the lead in song and music. Ibsen and Bjornson became the craze in literature. The literary contact with Norway was begun in 1861, when Lorenz Dietriechson was appointed a docent at the University of Upsala, and for the first time made the contemporary Norwegian and Danish poets acquainted in Sweden. What Sweden received from Norway was a quaint, late-born Romanticism of a strong national flavor. When this Romanticism was changed into stern Realism its influence upon Swedish culture, especially her literature, was only increased, Swedish literature receiving strong realistic impulses from the neighboring Scandinavian countries. The Norwegian influence ceased, when the Swedes at last became aware that there was in it a deeply pessimistic trait, akin to the stern Norwegian and Scotch Christianity, which is incompatible with the Swedish national temperament, slightly inclined to melancholy, but of a robust and irrepressible desire to live and enjoy.
Charles XV. followed up his practical Scandinavian policy by marrying his only daughter Louise to Crown Prince Frederic of Denmark. King Charles was as unsuccessful in his noble efforts to unite more closely his two kingdoms as in his foreign policy. The king allowed some time to pass in order to let the ill-feeling, caused by the conflict of 1859 and 1860, die out. In February, 1865, he considered that the moment had arrived to institute the review of the Act of Union. He appointed a committee of Swedes and Norwegians to prepare the proposition of a new Act of Union, on the basis of perfect equality and right to decide separately all matters, except such pertaining to the Union. The committee performed the work, but their proposition was defeated at the Norwegian Storthing of 1871, at the instigation of John Sverdrup and K. Motzfeldt. The Swedish Riksdag for this reason also failed to accept it. At the close of the Riksdag, King Charles made the following utterance in regard to the defeated proposition: “What has now failed to attain success shall perhaps win out without difficulty when the two nations once have learned to place confidence in each other, as the result of a more intimate intercourse.” He saw with great satisfaction the completion of a railway which forever unites the Swedish and the Norwegian capitals with ties of steel.
The administration of Charles XV. persevered in its liberal policy concerning questions of economy and jurisprudence. This was particularly noticeable in commercial matters. The idea of free trade had won ascendency in Europe. Napoleon III. had entered a treaty of commerce with England, in strict opposition to the protective system. Other nations were one by one admitted into the free-trade system by means of new treaties. Sweden made a treaty of commerce and navigation in 1865. This step was severely criticised by the Riksdag of 1865-1866, both from a constitutional and financial point of view. Gripenstedt was accused of leading the way over demolished industries, but he defended his position with great eloquence. The treaty was ratified in spite of the powerful opposition in the Riksdag. The press condemned both the treaty and the government in the most violent language.
The first Riksdag of the new parliamentary system met January 19, 1867. The “Landstings” had sent to the First Chamber the most prominent men of the country. It was a truly representative gathering, a house of peers elected by the people. Lagerbielke, the landtmarshal of the preceding Riksdag, was appointed speaker. The Second Chamber counted a larger number of peasants as representatives than of any other class. Anton Nicolaus Sundberg, then bishop of Carlstad, now archbishop of Sweden, was made speaker of the Second Chamber. The power of the peasants made itself felt at once. There was formed a strong and influential party, the landtmanna, or countrymen’s party, consisting of small landowners. The peasants constituted the majority, but the party also counted many titled and untitled country gentlemen in interests united with them. The founder of the party was Count Arvid Rutger Posse, later minister of state. Emil Key and the peasants Charles Ifvarsson and Liss Olof Larsson were among the leaders of the party. The policy of the Landtmanna party demanded simplification of the administration, economy in the matter of appropriations and a solution of the questions of the defence and taxation in harmony with the interests of the owners of the soil. The party followed up its policy with stern consistency from Riksdag to Riksdag, until in perfect control of the whole government. The opposition consisted of “the Intelligence” or intellectual party, which, without a solid constitution or a fixed policy, has in vain fought the spreading influence and power of the Landtmanna party. The latter has gone almost too far in its endeavors for economical reform, but has also given evidence of appreciation of the material needs of a cultural development, appropriating large sums for the benefit of science and education.
The army question was the most important issue of Swedish politics. The events of 1866 had made it evident that a strengthening of the defences was necessary. King Charles was anxious to have the question solved in a satisfactory manner, finding therein the only reliable safeguard for the future independence of Sweden. It was apparent that any attempts to settle the question in accordance with the system adopted by Charles XI. would be devoid of result. It was based upon direct taxation of the soil and must be opposed by the strong majority of small landowners of the Landtmanna party. A compromise policy was for this reason begun in 1867, the question of an abolition of the land tax being connected with the army question, although the two ought to have had no connection. The question was started with promises of a reduction or exemption of the duties of the old army system as compensation for the acceptance of a new arrangement for the country’s defence. The government made an army proposition to the Riksdag of 1869, promising several reductions to the landowners who furnished soldiers according to the old system (indelningsverket). The proposition was prepared by a committee, of which the new minister of war, Gustavus Rudolph Abelin, was the chairman. It was based upon the preservation of the old system for the furnishing of the body force of officers and men. The larger force was to be provided for through militia. The militia was to be drilled in the neighborhood of their various homes during sixty days of the year. The proposition was not accepted. The militia compulsory service, as the duty of every citizen for the defence of his country, had nothing to do with the regular army as provided by the stipulations of the old system. But the majority of the Second Chamber confused the two and refused to allow the establishment of the former on a wider basis, because the offers made to reduce the burdens of the old system did not appear to them liberal enough. In 1871 another proposition was made by Abelin to the Riksdag. It was similar to the first one, and its cause was eloquently pleaded by Abelin, Axel Gustavus Adlercreutz, minister of justice, Peter Axel Bergstrœm, minister of civil service, and Gunnar Vennerberg, minister of ecclesiastics. They warned against the mistake of attaching impossible conditions to the acceptance of the proposition. The proposition for an extended militia service was accepted by both Chambers. But when the Second Chamber raised, as a condition for its acceptance, the suspension, for fifteen years, of the old system which provided for the regular army, the government found it impossible to grant this, and the proposition was dropped.
King Charles was grieved and vexed with the fate of the army bills. The Franco Prussian war made it, in his opinion, of added importance to Sweden to have her defences remodelled. He called an extraordinary session of the Riksdag, in the autumn of 1871, when Abelin brought out a third proposition. It was chiefly of the same contents as the preceding ones. But a remarkable change in the public opinion had now taken place, as to the advisability of retaining the old system. Men who looked upon the question more from a military than an economic point of view entertained doubts as to the practical value of the old regular army as the body force of a compulsory militia. Military officers commenced to attack the old system as the basis of a new army. The Landtmanna party persevered in the request for an abolition of the old system, and this killed the army bill at the extraordinary Riksdag.