D. The appeal to customs and tradition.
The popular appeal to “let well enough alone,” “what has been should be,” and other conservative arguments of this class entirely ignore the question at issue. If the world had followed these precepts we should be no farther advanced to-day than at the beginning of time. To follow them now would mean that all progress must cease. A hundred years ago no argument could have convinced the average individual that man would be able to travel a mile a minute or that one man could hear another talk at a distance of one thousand miles, or that a machine could be made which would talk. Twenty years ago few people could have been convinced that one could see through solid matter or that a man could fly, or that a wireless telegraph was a possibility. Nevertheless all of these seemingly impossible things have come to pass. Similar things are constantly happening in the less material world of education, politics, and religion. Therefore small weight attaches to the argument which relies solely upon an appeal to custom and tradition.
E. Shifting ground.
This fallacy usually arises from using a word in a double capacity. For instance, “Every American citizen should be democratic in his conduct; therefore he should vote the Democratic ticket,” is an example of this fallacy. Here the term democratic is used in more than one sense. It is first used to indicate an attitude of kindly sympathy towards one’s fellow men; then it is used to designate a political party. Likewise we might argue in an equally fallacious manner that because this country is a republic, every man should vote the Republican ticket. The cause of this fallacy is usually a failure on the part of the arguer to define exactly his own position and to state the meaning of vital words used in the proposition. An unscrupulous debater will take advantage of this fallacy as soon as he is cornered by shifting to a different meaning of the words employed. Whenever a debater begins to prove one proposition and ends by upholding another proposition he has shifted ground. This fallacy is usually so concealed in a maze of words that its detection is difficult.
F. Refuting an argument which has not been advanced.
This form of ignoring the question may arise from a deliberate attempt to misrepresent the opposition or from an honest mistake as to just what argument has been advanced. In either case it ignores the question at issue and is a useless expenditure of time and effort. Sometimes a debater cannot refute the arguments advanced by his opponents and he therefore seeks to occupy his time by arguing against contentions which he thought would be advanced but which in reality have not been mentioned. It is far better not to argue at all than to ignore the real points at issue in this manner.
G. Arguing on a related proposition.
This is a very common way of ignoring the question. For example, in support of prohibition, a debater often proves that temperance is a benefit to the community. The real question is whether prohibition is advisable as a means of dealing with the liquor traffic. The question as to whether temperance benefits the community is only related. Therefore to argue in support of the related question is to ignore the real one. In a debate on the proposition “Resolved, that the compulsory arbitration of strikes is practicable in the United States” the affirmative devoted its efforts to proving that the system would be of great advantage to the country and that it had worked well in New Zealand. The question, whether compulsory arbitration is practicable in the United States, was entirely ignored by its advocates arguing in support of two related propositions which might be stated as follows: “Resolved, that the compulsory arbitration of strikes would be of great advantage to the United States,” and “Resolved, that compulsory arbitration of strikes has worked well in New Zealand.” The real question at issue was entirely ignored.
(4). Begging the question.
To beg the question is to assume its truth or falsity without proof. This does not mean a direct assumption of truth or falsity but an indirect assumption reached in a circuitous manner by an appearance of logical reasoning. In logic this error is called petitio principi. It may appear in many different forms but the following are the most frequently encountered: