This really claims the advisability of verbal prohibition, which is absolutely useless, unless supported by the second class of safeguard, periodic "inspection." Major Davies suggests "all arsenals and munition factories would be open to inspection by the General Staff, who would use them, when necessary, for arming the quota of a nation other than that in whose territory they were situated." We know of no practical method by which inspection could be relied upon to give satisfactory warning of the conversion of the plants of the I.G. for war purposes. A distinction must be made between those weapons whose production can and cannot be practically controlled by inspection. In attempting such a classification, Major Davies claims, "It is difficult to prevent the secret manufacture of rifles, but it is easy to prevent the manufacture of tanks, aeroplanes, gas, or submarines." No one having witnessed the large scale operations of assembling tanks and heavy guns, and aware, at the same time, of the German methods of producing mustard gas or Blue Cross compounds, could make such an elementary mistake in classification, and any international disarmament arrangements based on such an error can only produce a false security. *Gas is the outstanding case of a weapon whose manufacture it is difficult to prevent.
"Vested Interests."—With regard to the vested interests in the new method of warfare, the most striking example is again the I.G. We find Ludendorff consulting Krupp and the I.G. representative when formulating his plans for a vast munition programme. Few people have realised the existence of another Krupp in the I.G. It would, indeed, be a revelation to find Germany sharing in these schemes of disarmament to the extent of voluntarily abandoning her dye monopoly. For such a situation is the only one consistent with safety. While the sole big source of production of these substances exists in Germany or in any one country for that matter, no scheme of disarmament is on sure ground.
"Handing Over" Inventions.—Certain disarmament advocates have ingenuous ideas with regard to new war inventions, and their "handing over" to the League. How can an invention be handed over? If every country informed the League of its new scientific war developments, those countries would still be aware of them. It is possible, commercially, to hand over any invention by assigning a patent, but this is of no use for war purposes. What country would regard patent law as a barrier to the use of a valuable war invention? Secondly, the cession of an invention to the League depends entirely on the goodwill of the nation concerned. No country can be sufficiently inspected to root out its new inventions. Suppose a gas ten times more useful, from a military point of view, than mustard gas were discovered in the laboratories of the I.G. An inspector, or "Secret Service" agent, at the next bench in the laboratory might never know that the research was not aimed at the discovery of a new dye. World equilibrium may at this moment be threatened by the discoveries of some absorbed scientist working, say, in a greenhouse in St. John's Wood.
We come back to the same point, that the crux of the situation lies in the possession of the means of production. There is hope of controlling this for a weapon like a tank, but it cannot be controlled for chemical warfare. If the League requires these weapons it cannot rely on obtaining them from a monopoly source so complete as the I.G. Further, with or without a League the mere existence of this monopoly is a permanent menace to peace.
Neglect of Chemical Disarmament in the Treaty.—Let us face the facts. Our treatment of chemical industry during the Treaty negotiations and in the Treaty itself persistently ignored its chameleon nature. We knew that the nitrogen plants at Oppau and Merseburg were the most menacing munition plants in existence. We knew the grave dangers of leaving Germany, a guilty country, in possession of the poison gas monopoly. Yet, deaf to such arguments, the Treaty opportunity was ignored. Even now the lesson is only half learnt by those whom it vitally concerns.
Here is a new weapon whose exploitation demands research and large scale production. The former cannot be checked, and the latter cannot be destroyed or suitably controlled to prevent conversion for war purposes. Yet three distinct features of this weapon make the disarmament need imperative.
In the first place, everything points to "chemical disarmament" as a key measure to control the large scale use of all other weapons. The aggressive agent in war is the chemical. All weapons, except the bayonet, depend upon it.
In the second place, chemical warfare is itself so overwhelmingly important that it is farcical to con-template any disarmament scheme which does not, first and foremost, tackle this question.
Thirdly, no nation ever held a more complete monopoly for any weapon than did Germany for chemical warfare. Yet the levelling up process which occurred during the war, tending towards armament equilibrium, towards removal of enormous disparity, failed to touch the chemical arm. Germany through her guilty exercise of the new weapon, has still further increased her enormous manufacturing superiority for war.
This age has witnessed the growth of an industry critical for war and disarmament. Others will follow as science progresses. Without them, the possibility of sudden decisions, and therefore war incentive will be removed. Sir Oliver Lodge prophesies the war use of the newly controlled atomic energy. The fulfilment depends on the growth of another critical war industry whose nature it would be difficult to foretell. It is these critical industries which rational disarmament must harness. At present the chemical industry holds the field.