Sec. 2.—“The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens of the several States.”
Sec. 8.—“That Congress shall have power to provide for the general welfare of the United States,” which last is tantamount to saying, the general welfare of the people as a whole.
It seems from these quotations, made in inverse order, that it was the intention of the framers of the Constitution, to make such provisions as would permit and compel harmonious action throughout the States, but that subsequently it became a part of party policy to maintain that the States had rights reserved, and while not defining what these rights were, to declare that such as were not distinctly and positively delegated constituted this reservation.
Under this interpretation it is possible for serious difficulties to arise between the general government and the States, as they have. It seems from the general tenor of the original Constitution that these amendments are nugatory, because the inference to be drawn from them is inconsistent therewith. One of the most prominent, as well as the first declaration, is to the effect that nothing shall exist in any State injurious to the general welfare of the whole. While it is within the scope of Congress to determine what is for or against the general welfare of the whole, no State can set up its rights against such judgment. When it is further made the duty of the United States to guarantee a republican form of government to every State, and to protect each State in such against all others, there can be no limit set upon the general powers of Congress.
The only fault, if fault it may be called, in the original Constitution, lies in this—that while the power to do is vested in the United States, it is not made an imperative duty to perform, though the duty is to be inferred by the vesture of the power. In failing to exercise this power in its fullest sense and to perform this inferred duty, lies the cause of all the disturbances within the limits of the country.
We can now proceed to the consideration of what duties Congress is invested with the power to perform, which have not been exercised, and which, being exercised, would contribute to the general welfare of the people, and thereby promote the public good. It will also be considered whether there are any additional powers Congress should possess which can be conferred, and which the Constitution neither directly nor inferentially vests. This consideration will proceed without regard being given to separating what comes within the limits already possessed from that which should be conferred.
First in importance, because of general application, stand the common laws of the country. Of these it is asserted, with the utmost directness and force, that when a general condition is to be provided for in the country, it should be the sphere of the government to make the same law applicable everywhere, so that the citizens of the United States shall, at all times and places within its limits, be subject to the same controlling and guiding rule. There should be no such possibility as an Indiana divorce under Indiana law, differing so much from those of other States as not to be recognizable by them. There should be only United States divorces, under a general law that could not be questioned anywhere, and by which the parties to it, should stand in the same relations to each other, in whatever part of it they might chance to be, also in such relations to every one, that they may remarry without becoming liable to the charge of bigamy.
Within the last few years, many States have found it necessary to so reconstruct their general systems of law as to cut off all special legislation. This course is eminently judicious in every respect it can be viewed, and has proved excellent in practice, by relieving legislation and procuring uniformity. If this is a desirable result, so far as a State is concerned, why should not the application be made general for the United States, with prospect of proportional benefit? All people would then be subject to the same rule of action and responsibility. To illustrate: A State has a general law under which joint stock and other companies can become incorporate. Before this, each proposed company was obliged to make direct application to the State government for an act of incorporation. After it, any proposed organization could become incorporated by conforming to the regulations prescribed, and thereby obtain all the power that could be conferred by the Legislature direct.
No one having knowledge of the tedious processes of legislation will question the advantage of this general law, both as regards legislation and the people. This admitted, it must be further admitted, that the advantage would be still greater, were this a general law of the United States, applying in every State, instead of a mere State law, with the probabilities that each State having it would provide different steps and regulations, so that a person familiar with that of one State, finds he knows nothing of it in the State he removes to.
The same line of reasoning applies with more or less force to every branch of legislation. Especially is it pointed regarding the Criminal Code, for here very great distinction exists in the several States. The penalty for a specified crime is scarcely the same in any two States; while some have abolished the taking of life for life, others still imprison for debt, which shows a degree of divergence entirely incompatible in a country that professes unity of purpose and practice. In civil practice it is utterly impossible for the most studious and profound jurist to acquire and retain accurate knowledge of it, in even a small proportion of the States. Every lawyer can testify to the difficulties he encounters at every turn when the laws of another State have any bearing in the case he is engaged upon.