Watching on the Rhine

by Violet R. Markham

Shortly after the meeting began, a blind gentleman, venerable in appearance and with a large white beard, was shepherded with ostentatious care on to the platform. I suspected a trophy, judging by the exaggerated marks of respect with which he was received by Father Kastert and his friends. He was, in fact, a leading supporter of the Zentrum, who had seceded to the new party. The old gentleman was propped up, and when he began to speak, despite his tottering steps and shaking hands, proved a veritable Bull of Bashan. The Sermon on the Mount and the Temptation in the Wilderness formed part of a political pot-pourri mixed up with the misdeeds of the Social Democrats. I was sitting by chance among a nest of zealots, who greeted these remarks with hysterical applause. A youth, still wearing field grey, suddenly jumped up in emphatic protest. General uproar resulted. “Aus mit dem Kerl!” shouted several ladies round me. My spirits rose at the prospect of seeing some one turned out with German thoroughness, but the young man thought better of it, and sat down again hastily. The chairman rang his bell, and after a time the meeting proceeded. Among this curious company of hypocrites applauding principles clearly remote from their practice I was struck by one working-man candidate, who spoke with obvious sincerity as well as simplicity. No workman, he said, could look for joy in his work unless that work were grounded in Christ. Christ was the root, Christ was the foundation, Christ was the workman’s stay and support. Happily in England we do not discuss the Founder of Christianity on political platforms after the manner of this meeting. But in this solitary case the note of sincerity rang true, and I was grateful for it.

The candidates said their say, and then the real “turn” of the evening began with a lengthy discourse from Father Kastert. Father Kastert, despite all disclaimers to the contrary, is regarded as the protagonist of the Rhineland Republic, a matter about which there are many mutterings and murmurings in the Occupied Area. As such he is an object of abhorrence to all patriotic Germans. Various elements enter into the Rhineland Republic intrigue. The annexationist party in France are naturally in favour of it; good Catholics are told that self-determination for the Rhineland means getting rid of Prussian Protestant officials; clericals are promised more power in a State dominated by clerical influences; greedy financiers are heartened by the prospect of escaping any way from the full burdens of the indemnity. Every decent German looks on the movement as one of supreme treachery to the Fatherland in its hour of defeat and overthrow, and on Father Kastert as the arch-traitor.

That Father Kastert and his following are violently assailed is only natural. His lengthy speech on this occasion took the form of an apologia. His visit to General Mangin was only concerned with securing a greater measure of liberty for the Rhineland during the Occupation, and in hastening the close of the Occupation itself; away with the abominable lie that he was in French pay and serving French ends; all that he sought was to free the Rhineland from the Jewish influences rampant both in Prussia and Berlin and to secure the fullest measure of self-determination. On the whole the Father, though like all priests a good speaker, proved less of a personality than I expected. I am quite unable to judge how far the charges brought against him are just. The Christliche Volkspartei is the political instrument formed by him for carrying out his projects, whatever they may be. Father Kastert would appear to draw his support from singularly unworthy elements in German public life; people who are ready to traffic with the enemies of yesterday for the sake of such bread-and-butter advantages as may be obtained from the intercourse. A bad peace opens the door to intrigues of many kinds. But the security of Europe or France is not to be achieved by buffer states of the type contemplated by the supporters of the Rhineland Republic.

The French Chauvinists who air schemes for the annexation of the left bank of the Rhine are mischievous people. It is hard to believe that one French person endowed with a grain of good sense could lend an ear to so mad a proposal. Where Germany failed ignominiously in Alsace-Lorraine, the French are hardly likely to succeed in the Rhineland. But foolish talk of this character tends very appreciably to exasperate and embitter German public opinion, and brings new elements of hatred and unrest into a situation which was bad enough already. Many Germans are convinced that France intends to spring some annexationist coup upon them, and is only waiting for an opportunity to strike again. Suspicions of this kind destroy any hope of improved relations between the two countries. Goodwill can be at the best a plant of very slow and painful growth between the nations. Intrigue makes its existence impossible. The Rhine is German to the core in race, language, and sentiment. Even a whisper as to the possibility of detaching it from the rest of the country is a premium on a fresh outbreak of anger and exasperation. The unhappy situation existing in the Saar Basin may have its compensations if it provides an anti-annexationist moral too strong to be disregarded.

IV

Polling day came and went. Despite a certain amount of nervous chatter beforehand of disturbances and riots, the elections took place in complete tranquillity. Not a dog barked through the length and breadth of Germany. In Cologne, at least, no one would have suspected that any event of importance was taking place. The ordinary Sunday crowds promenaded peacefully, as is their habit, to and fro along the Rhine. The Independent Socialists, with singular delicacy and nice feeling, plastered the outer walls of the cathedral during the night with their electioneering placards, and in gigantic red letters painted the words “Wahlt Liste Fries” on the threshold of the west door. Otherwise everything about the town was quiet and normal.

As for the result of the Election, it was very much what was to be expected under the circumstances—a result in the highest degree unsatisfactory, if they but knew it, to the British democracy. The reactionaries and the extreme Socialists gained at the expense of the moderate men. The Independent Socialists—the Unabhängige—negligible at the last election, increased their strength four-fold, and instead of twenty-two hold eighty-one seats in the new Reichstag. They swept the great industrial districts of the west, an ironical commentary on the hysterics of the English papers which insisted that the Ruhr disturbances were a put-up job by the German Government destined to veil a new attack on France. No less striking were the gains of the Deutsche Volkspartei, who increased their numbers from twenty-one to sixty-two seats. The Zentrum with sixty-eight instead of eighty-eight seats lost substantially, but while yielding ground was not routed. The Christliche Volkspartei was beaten off the field. The discomfiture of Father Kastert and the upholders of the Rhineland Republic was complete. The serious feature of the Elections was the downfall of the Social Democrats, the largest and most influential of the three parties forming the Müller Government. Their numbers fell from one hundred and sixty-three to one hundred and twelve. No less complete was the discomfiture of the Demokraten or Moderate Radicals—the left wing of the Bourgeois parties—who at the best lived cramped and uncomfortable lives between the Social Democrats on the one hand and the Conservative groups on the other. Their numbers fell from seventy-five to forty-five seats. Secrecy of the ballot does not in Germany prohibit analysis of the totals polled, and the women’s vote taken as a whole was clearly thrown on the reactionary side. Gratitude is not a factor which counts in political life, and the Social Democrats to whom the women owe their enfranchisement suffered severely at their hands.

On the morrow of the poll, therefore, the Müller Government then in power found that its majority had disappeared, and that the Bourgeois groups reckoned together were in a majority as compared with the two Socialist parties. In the good old days for which many Germans sigh, nothing would have happened in the seats of the mighty, whatever the complexion of a Reichstag returned at a General Election. But under the new constitution established by the revolution, a Government in power must hold its authority from the elected representatives of the people. Since, however, both the Zentrum and the Demokraten had been associated with the Müller Government, a political deadlock of great difficulty at once arose. For some days the hitherings and thitherings between the various groups kept political Germany on the tiptoe of excitement. The Independent Socialists held aloof and refused entirely to be associated in any Government with the Majority Socialists. The Majority Socialists refused with equal firmness to have anything to do with a Cabinet in which their deadly enemies the Volkspartei would necessarily play a leading part. The Zentrum with its sixty-eight seats and Liberal leanings clearly held the balance of power between the conflicting parties. The political crisis lasted for a fortnight, during which period Germany was practically without a Government. This state of affairs was considerably aggravated by the approach of the Spa Conference and the necessity to have a German Cabinet in existence with whom negotiations could be carried on. Finally, after many days of uncertainty, a new Coalition Government emerged with Herr Fehrenbach, the Zentrum leader, as Chancellor. The new Government is largely Zentrum with a dash of Demokraten, but the sinister influence of the Volkspartei is dominant in its counsels. The Government can command no clear majority. It is confronted with a solid block of Socialist opposition. The Social Democrats, whatever the attitude of the Independents, are not likely to hamper the new Cabinet in vital questions of external politics. But in daily life it will be forced to lead the uneasy existence of playing off the various groups against each other. It is a weak Government at a moment when strength is essential, and such strength as it possesses is largely of the wrong kind.

This upshot, as I see it, is wholly devoid of comfort to any one who desires the rehabilitation of Germany on right lines. The election is the writing on the wall which even at the eleventh hour should command the attention of the little ring of politicians who control the Entente policy. This shifting of German opinion to the right and to the left is an ominous sign. The party standing for ordered democratic development has been knocked out. The British public should try to realise it has been killed by the Allied policy. That it was worth supporting is proved by the fact that, despite heavy losses, the Social Democrats still remain the largest individual group in the new Reichstag. We have refused to discriminate between the good and bad elements in political Germany. Our hand has rested as heavily on a democratic as it would rightly have done on a Junker Government. The shackles forged by the Allies have in the first place reduced the only administration to impotence to which they could look for the fulfilment of the just demands of a revised Treaty. Economic and political recovery has been made an impossibility owing to the policy pursued. As a result, hunger, despair, and general misery have driven large sections of the working-classes into the arms of the Communists. They have lost faith and hope in a constitutional party whose weakness has been so great. They are out for the short cut of violent means in order to better conditions which they regard as intolerable.

Meanwhile the Deutsche Volkspartei and all the wealthy and reactionary elements in the country have been no less eager to stamp upon the smoking flax of a democratic Germany. On the Friday and Saturday before the poll I attended meetings respectively of the Volkspartei and the Social Democrats. In each case speeches were made typical of the two sets of ideas at war in Germany to-day. On this occasion the Volkspartei speakers hardly took the trouble to camouflage their real opinions, though one pastor spoke eloquently of the “Liberalisms” of which they were the guardians—a claim which moved me to secret mirth. The arguments were developed on the same lines as those I have described above, only on this occasion the cloven hoof was still more obvious. The revolution and the Republic were the root causes of Germany’s present misery. The view of the Volkspartei that a Constitutional Monarchy was the best form of government was unchanged, though they “accepted” the Republic. Soon they hoped the old red and white and black colours would wave over them again—a remark which roused frantic applause from the large and enthusiastic audience. Internationalism and the League of Nations were condemned in unsparing terms. Who were the Allies to advance these principles? Let them cease to boycott Germans in all parts of the world, and let France bring to an end the scandal of her black troops in the Occupied Areas. Then they might begin to talk about internationalism. As for England, no country pursued its policy with more consistent and single-eyed devotion to its own interests. Germany could only be remade on the basis of a strong and efficient nationalism. A new spirit was abroad in the land and, granted the defeat of the Socialists and Social Democrats, all that had been lost might be regained.