On the other hand, many Czech troops succeeded in surrendering. The 35th Regiment of Pilsen went over to the Russians in a body half-an-hour after arriving at the front. Soon after, the 28th Regiment of Prague surrendered en masse, having been "fetched" by the Czechs fighting on the Russian side. Immediately afterwards the Austrian commander-in-chief issued an order of the day in which he declared.
"On April 3, 1915, almost the whole of the 28th Regiment surrendered without fighting to a single enemy battalion.... This disgraceful act not only destroys the reputation of this regiment, but necessitates its name being struck off the list of our army corps, until new deeds of heroism retrieve its character. His Apostolic Majesty has accordingly ordered the dissolution of this regiment, and the deposition of its banners in the army museum."
And indeed "new deeds of heroism" did follow. A fresh battalion was founded composed of Czech youths who were sent to the Isonzo front and exposed in a dangerous position to deadly artillery fire. Almost the whole battalion was thus unscrupulously wiped out. Only eighteen of them survived. This was followed by a new imperial order saying that the disgrace of the 28th Regiment was "atoned for" by the "sacrifice" of this regiment on the Isonzo.
As regards Italy, over 20,000 Czechs surrendered voluntarily on the Italian front up to 1917, and 7000 during the last offensive on the Piave in June, 1918. Of recent cases we need mention only the "treachery of Carzano," where, on September 18, 1917, some Czech officers went over to the Italians, communicated to them the Austrian plans of campaign and led them against the Austrians whose front was thus successfully broken through. This incident was not the only one of its kind. It has been repeated several times by Czech officers whenever they found an opportunity of going over to the Italians. During the offensive of June, 1918, the Austrian press openly attributed the Austrian failure to "Czech treachery," asserting that the plan of the offensive was communicated to the Italian headquarters staff by Czecho-Slovak officers. This the Austrian military authorities themselves admitted later, when they published the following official statement, which appeared in the German press on July 28:
"On the morning of June 15, we started a vigorous offensive on the whole front between the Tyrolese mountains and the Adriatic, with a power that can be attained only by complete co-operation of all the units and with an accurate execution and a common and uniform action. But, just at the beginning of the attack, it became apparent that the enemy were making a counter-attack according to a well-defined plan, as in the case of a projected vigorous offensive. It was also found out that the enemy was perfectly aware of the extent, the day and the hour of our attack. The intended surprise, so important for the success of an offensive, has thus failed. In due course Italy also obtained, from documents which some deserters handed to the Italian high command, information which gave her a sufficiently precise idea of our dispositions. English, French and Italian officers and men captured by us declare unanimously that their regiments were advised on the evening of June 14 that the Austrian offensive would start at two o'clock on the following morning.
"The exact time of the beginning of our offensive must have been betrayed by Yugoslav and Czech deserters. The enemy took steps against the bombardment by means of gas, which was expected. These steps later proved insufficient. As an example we may mention only the following facts: The battalion of bersaglieri received, at 3.20 on June 14, a quantity of ammunition at 72 to 240 cartridges per man. The Pinerolo Brigade took up fighting position at 2 o'clock at night. An order, captured late on July 14, said: 'According to reports received, the enemy will commence early on June 15 their bombardment preparations for attack. At midnight hot coffee and meat conserves will be distributed. The troops will remain awake, armed and prepared to use their gas-masks.'
"For some time now the Italian command have tried to disorganise our troops by high treasonable propaganda. In the Italian prisoners-of-war camps the Slavs are persuaded by promises and corruption to enlist in the Czecho-Slovak army. This is done in a way prohibited by law. Their ignorance of the international situation and their lack of news from home, partly caused by Italian censorship, are exploited by means of propaganda without scruples. An order of the 5th Italian Army Corps (1658 Prot. R. J.) of May 14, 1918, refers to active propaganda by Czecho-Slovak volunteers with the object of disorganising the Austro-Hungarian army. The Italian military authorities on their part deceive the Czecho-Slovaks by telling them of the continuous disorders and insurrections in Bohemia. In the above-mentioned order it is asserted that in the corps to which it is addressed, as well as in other corps, some attempts of the Czecho-Slovak elements have been successful in causing confusion among enemy ranks. Some of our Czecho-Slovak soldiers deserted and went over to the Italians. Others remained in touch with them and declared themselves ready to stay in our positions as a source of ferment for future insurrections. Although the high treason miscarried owing to the heroic resistance which our troops, without distinction of nationality, offered to the enemy, it is nevertheless true that some elements succumbed to the treacherous enemy propaganda.
"The gunner Rudolf Paprikar, of the machine gun section, according to reports of the 8th Army Corps jumped off the river bank into the Piave below Villa Jacur and swam across under danger of being drowned. He betrayed the position, strength and composition of his sector, and through observation and spying, he acquired some valuable information by which our projected attack against Montello was disclosed. Further, he revealed to the enemy some very secret preparations for the crossing of the river Piave, and also supplied him with plans of the organisation of troops, battery positions, etc.
"The principal part in the treachery is attributed by the Italian high command, not without reason, to Lieutenant Karel Stiny of an infantry regiment, who deserted near Narenta. It appears from the detailed Italian official report in which his statements are embodied, that he betrayed all our preparations on the Piave and provided the enemy with a great deal of most important information. Let us mention further that Stiny in his mendacious statements to the Italian command about the Austro-Hungarian situation at the front and in the interior, followed the line of all traitors in order to appear in a favourable light. It is characteristic that in his declaration about our offensive he said that many Austro-Hungarian troops would have surrendered if it had not been for the German and Bulgarian bayonets behind their backs.
"It is proved by various documents to what extent the Czechs have forgotten their honour and duty. By breaking their oath to Austria and her emperor and king, they have also forgotten all those who were with them at the front, and they are responsible for the blood of our patriots and the sufferings of our prisoners in Italy. The false glory which is attributed to them by the Italian command, who have lost all sense of the immorality of these proceedings, cannot efface the eternal crime which history always attaches to the names of traitors."