A. There is a reason. You see that you cannot will without a motive. I declare to you that you are free to marry, that is to say, that you have the power of signing the contract, keeping the wedding, and sleeping with your wife.
B. How! I cannot will without a motive? Then what will become of the other proverb—"Sit pro ratione voluntas"—my will is my reason—I will because I will?
A. It is an absurd one, my dear friend; you would then have an effect without a cause.
B. What! when I play at odd or even, have I a reason for choosing even rather than odd?
A. Undoubtedly.
B. And what is the reason, if you please?
A. It is, that the idea of even is presented to your mind rather than the opposite idea. It would be extraordinary if there were cases in which we will because there is a motive, and others in which we will without one. When you would marry, you evidently perceive the predominant reason for it; you perceive it not when you play at odd or even, and yet there must be one.
B. Therefore, once more, I am not free.
A. Your will is not free, but your actions are. You are free to act when you have the power of acting.
B. But all the books that I have read on the liberty of indifference—