The History of Peter the Great, Emperor of Russia

by Voltaire

We must either suspect Peter the Great of having been mistaken, in his declaration at the crowning of the empress, when he acknowledges 'his obligations to her of having saved his army, which was reduced to twenty-two thousand men,' or accuse him of a falsity in his journal, wherein he says, that the day on which the above battle was fought, his army, exclusive of the succours he expected from the other side the Moldavian mountains, amounted to thirty-one thousand five hundred and fifty-four foot, and six thousand six hundred and ninety-two horse. According to this calculation, the battle of Pruth must have been by far more terrible than the historians or memorials have represented on either side. There must certainly be some mistake here, which is no uncommon thing in the relation of campaigns, especially when the writer enters into a minute detail of circumstances. The surest method, therefore, on these occasions, is to confine ourselves to the principal events, the victory and the defeat; as we can very seldom know, with any degree of certainty, the exact loss on either side.

But however here the Russian army might be reduced in point of numbers, there were still hopes that the grand vizier, deceived by their vigorous and obstinate resistance, might be induced to grant them peace, upon such terms as might be honourable to his master's arms, and at the same time not absolutely disgraceful to those of the czar. It was the great merit of Catherine to have perceived this possibility, at a time when her consort and his generals expected nothing less than inevitable destruction.

Norberg, in his History of Charles XII. quotes a letter, sent by the czar to the grand vizier, in which he expresses himself thus:—'If, contrary to my intentions, I have been so unhappy as to incur the displeasure of his highness, I am ready to make reparation for any cause of complaint he may have against me; I conjure you, most noble general, to prevent the further effusion of blood; give orders, I beseech you, to put a stop to the dreadful fire of your artillery, and accept the hostage I herewith send you.'

This letter carries all the marks of falsity with it, as do indeed most of the random pieces of Norberg: it is dated 11th July, N. S. whereas no letter was sent to Baltagi Mahomet till the 21st, N. S. neither was it the czar who wrote to the vizier, but his general Sheremeto: there were no such expressions made use of as—'if the czar has had the misfortune to incur the displeasure of his highness;' such terms being suitable only to a subject, who implores the pardon of his sovereign, whom he has offended. There was no mention made of any hostage, nor was any one sent. The letter was carried by an officer, in the midst of a furious cannonade on both sides. Sheremeto, in his letter, only reminded the vizier of certain overtures of peace that the Porte had made at the beginning of the campaign, through the mediation of the Dutch and English ministers, and by which the divan demanded that the fort and harbour of Taganroc should be given up, which were the real subjects of the war.

21st July, 1711.] Some hours elapsed before the messenger received an answer from the grand vizier, and it was apprehended that he had either been killed by the enemy's cannon, or that they detained him prisoner. A second courier was therefore dispatched, with duplicates of the former letters, and a council of war was immediately held, at which Catherine was present. At this council ten general officers signed the following resolution:—

'Resolved, If the enemy will not accept the conditions proposed, and should insist upon our laying down our arms, and surrendering at discretion, that all the ministers and general officers are unanimously of opinion, to cut their way through the enemy sword in hand.'

In consequence of this resolution, a line of intrenchments was thrown round the baggage, and the Russians marched some few paces out of their camp, towards the enemy, when the grand vizier caused a suspension of arms to be proclaimed between the two armies.

All the writers of the Swedish party have treated the grand vizier as a cowardly and infamous wretch, who had been bribed to sell the honour of his master's arms. In the same manner have several authors accused count Piper of receiving money from the duke of Marlborough, to persuade the king of Sweden to continue the war against the czar; and have laid to the charge of the French minister, that he purchased the peace of Seville for a stipulated sum. Such accusations ought never to be advanced but on very strong proofs. It is very seldom that a minister will stoop to such meannesses, which are always discovered, sooner or later, by those who have been entrusted with the payment of the money, or by the public registers, which never lie. A minister of state stands as a public object to the eyes of all Europe. His credit and influence depend wholly upon his character, and he is always sufficiently rich to be above the temptation of becoming a traitor.

The place of viceroy of the Turkish empire is so illustrious, and the profits annexed to it, in time of war, so immense, there was such a profusion of every thing necessary, and even luxurious, in the camp of Baltagi Mahomet, and, on the other hand, so much poverty and distress in that of the czar, that surely the grand vizier was rather in a condition to give than to receive. The trifling present of a woman, who had nothing to send but a few skins and some jewels, in compliance with the established custom of all courts, or rather those in particular of the East, can never be considered in the light of a bribe. The frank and open conduct of Baltagi Mahomet seems at once to give the lie to the black accusations with which so many writers have stained their relations. Vice chancellor Shaffiroff paid the vizier a public visit in his tent: every thing was transacted in the most open manner, on both sides; and indeed it could not be otherwise. The very first article of the negotiation was entered upon in the presence of a person wholly devoted to the king of Sweden, a domestic of count Poniatowsky, who was himself one of that monarch's generals. This man served as an interpreter, and the several articles were publicly reduced to writing by the vizier's chief secretary, Hummer Effendi. Moreover, count Poniatowsky was there in person. The present sent to the kiaia was offered probably in form, and every thing was transacted agreeable to the oriental customs. Other presents were made by the Turks in return; so that there was not the least appearance of treachery or contrivance. The motives which determined the vizier to consent to the proposals offered him, were, first that the body of troops under the command of general Renne, on the borders of the river Sireth, in Moldavia, had already crossed three rivers, and were actually in the neighbourhood of the Danube, where Renne had already made himself master of the town and castle of Brahila, defended by a numerous garrison, under the command of a basha. Secondly, the czar had likewise another body of troops advancing through the frontiers of Poland; and, lastly, it is more than probable that the vizier was not fully acquainted with the extreme scarcity that was felt in the Russian camp. One enemy seldom furnishes another with an exact account of his provisions and ammunition; on the contrary, either side are accustomed rather to make a parade of plenty, even at a time when they are in the greatest necessity. There can be no artifices practised to gain intelligence of the true state of an adversary's affairs, by means of spies, between the Turks and the Russians. The difference of their dress, of their religion, and of their language, will not permit it. They are, moreover, strangers to that desertion which prevails in most of our armies; and, consequently, the grand vizier could not be supposed to know the desperate condition to which the czar's army was reduced.