Norberg seems to have known very little of the Turkish government, when he says, that 'the grand seignior was obliged to keep fair with Baltagi Mahomet, that vizier having rendered himself formidable.' The janissaries indeed have often rendered themselves formidable to their sultans; but there is not one example of a vizier, who has not been easily sacrificed to the will or orders of his sovereign, and Mahomet was in no condition to support himself by his own power. Besides, Norberg manifestly contradicts himself, by affirming in the same page, that the janissaries were irritated against Mahomet, and that the sultan stood in dread of his power.
The king of Sweden was now reduced to the necessity of forming cabals in the Ottoman court; and a monarch, who had so lately made kings by his own power, was now seen waiting for audience, and offering memorials and petitions which were refused.
Charles ran through all the ambages of intrigue, like a subject who endeavours to make a minister suspected by his master. In this manner he acted against Mahomet, and against those who succeeded him. At one time he addressed himself to the sultana Valide by means of a Jewess, who had admission into the seraglio; at another, he employed one of the eunuchs for the same purpose. At length he had recourse to a man who was to mingle among the grand seignior's guards, and, by counterfeiting a person out of his senses, to attract the attention of the sultan, and by that means deliver into his own hand a memorial from Charles. From all these various schemes, the king of Sweden drew only the mortification of seeing himself deprived of his thaim; that is to say, of the daily pension which the Porte of its generosity had assigned him for his subsistence, and which amounted to about one thousand five hundred French livres.[88] The grand vizier, instead of remitting this allowance to him as usual, sent him an order, in the form of a friendly advice, to quit the grand seignior's dominions.
Charles, however, was absolutely determined not to depart, still flattering himself with the vain hope, that he should once more re-enter Poland and Russia with a powerful army of Turks. Every one knows what was the issue of his inflexible boldness in the year 1714, and how he engaged an army of janissaries, Spahis, and Tartars, with only himself, his secretaries, his valet de chambre, cook, and stable men; that he was taken prisoner in that country, where he had been treated with the greatest hospitality; and that he at length got back to his own kingdom in the disguise of a courier, after having lived five years in Turkey: from all which it remains to be acknowledged, that if there was reason in the conduct of this extraordinary prince, it was a reason of a very different nature to that of other men.
[CHAP. XXI.]
Conclusion of the Affairs of Pruth.
It is necessary in this place to repeat an event already related in the History of Charles XII. It happened during the suspension of arms which preceded the treaty of Pruth, that two Tartarian soldiers surprised and took prisoners two Italian officers belonging to the czar's army, and sold them to an officer of the Turkish janissaries. The vizier being informed of this breach of public faith, punished the two Tartars with death. How are we to reconcile this severe delicacy with the violation of the law of nations in the person of Tolstoy, the czar's ambassador, whom this very vizier caused to be arrested in the streets of Constantinople, and afterwards imprisoned in the castle of the Seven Towers? There is always some reason for the contradictions we find in the actions of mankind. Baltagi Mahomet was incensed against the khan of Tartary, for having opposed the peace he had lately made, and was resolved to shew that chieftain that he was his master.
The treaty was no sooner concluded, than the czar quitted the borders of the Pruth, and returned towards his own dominions, followed by a body of eight thousand Turks, whom the vizier had sent as an army of observation to watch the motions of the Russian army during its march, and also to serve as an escort or safeguard to them against the wandering Tartars which infested those parts.
Peter instantly set about accomplishing the treaty, by demolishing the fortresses of Samara and Kamienska; but the restoring of Azoph, and the demolition of the port of Taganroc, met with some difficulties in the execution. According to the terms of the treaty it was necessary to distinguish the artillery and ammunition which belonged to the Turks in Azoph before that place was taken by the czar, from those which had been sent thither after it fell into his hands. The governor of the place spun out this affair to a tedious length, at which the Porte was greatly incensed, and not without reason: the sultan was impatient to receive the keys of Azoph. The vizier promised they should be sent from time to time, but the governor always found means to delay the delivery of them. Baltagi Mahomet lost the good graces of his master, and with them his place. The khan of Tartary and his other enemies made such good use of their interest with the sultan, that the grand vizier was deposed, several bashas were disgraced at the same time; but the grand seignior, well convinced of this minister's fidelity, did not deprive him either of his life or estate, but only sent him to Mytilene to take on him the command of that island. This simple removal from the helm of affairs (Nov. 1711,), and the continuing to him his fortunes, and above all the giving him the command in Mytilene, sufficiently contradicts all that Norberg has advanced, to induce us to believe that this vizier had been corrupted with the czar's money.