Emboldened by this success, the Portuguese ever kept in view the design of extending their dominions still further southward. In 1680 the Governor of Rio de Janeiro sent an expedition by sea and built a fort, which he named Nova Colonia, opposite the city of Buenos Aires. Thus the disputed territory of Uruguay was for the first time occupied by Europeans. The establishment of this hostile post caused great annoyance to the Governor of Buenos Aires, and he succeeded in capturing it upon several occasions, but the Home Government, in view of European politics, had no wish to offend Portugal, nor did it consider that the possession of almost uninhabited tracts was worth the risk of complications. It thus happened that Nova Colonia was always restored to the Portuguese eventually. It became a most prosperous port, for it was the seat of the contraband trade, and by its means the Argentines were able to export hides to Brazil. Doubtless it was beneficial to them, however much it may have interfered with the illicit gains of Spanish Governors. It remained in the possession of the Portuguese until 1777.
The contraband trade was indeed the chief feature of the domestic history of Argentina in the sixteenth century, and its tendency was to raise important international questions. The fight against the Spanish monopoly became every year keener as the various countries of Europe became more settled and secure and began to devote their energies to trade. In 1616 the monopoly received a heavy blow by the discovery of a way into the Pacific without passing through the guarded Straits of Magellan. This was made by the Dutchman, Schouten,[28] who named Cape Horn after Hoorn, his birthplace. Immediately numerous Dutch and English ships took advantage of the new route and a great trade sprang up. As we have seen, the Governors of Buenos Aires played a prominent part in this trade, and no earthly power was able to prevent the economic law from taking effect. The case of Villacorta, a Governor who was discovered to have sent away three million dollars' worth of prohibited goods to Flanders, illustrates the helplessness of the artificial law. He was dismissed at the moment, but not long after he reappears as Governor of Tucuman. But, however illegally, trade went on and Argentina flourished. A traveller[29] who visited Buenos Aires in 1769 says that its chief trade was with Chile and Peru, and that it sent to them "cotton, mules, some skins, and about 400,000 Spanish pounds' weight of the Paraguay herb, or South Sea tea, every year." In fact Argentina, like the other Spanish colonies, advanced steadily in wealth and population during the eighteenth century, until progress was abruptly checked by the Revolution. But her history from the founding of Nova Colonia to the appearance of the English before Buenos Aires is remarkably barren in incident.
It was, of course, the fate of colonies to be pawns in the wars between powerful European States. Spain was a principal in the great war of the Spanish Succession, which was ended in 1713 by the Peace of Utrecht. Two of the articles were of importance to the Spanish possessions. By the Asiento de Negros England obtained the right to send yearly to the Spanish colonies twelve hundred negro slaves, and Buenos Aires was named as one of the establishments for that traffic, while by the Navio de Permiso she was permitted to send out yearly to the South Seas a ship with 650 tons of merchandise. These concessions, of course, greatly stimulated the contraband trade, for the colonists were as eager to buy as the English merchants were to sell, nor had the Spanish officials the will or the power to prevent many interlopers following in the wake of the privileged ships. Parish[30] remarks that it was "a trade which supplied the most pressing wants of the colony, and the profits of which were shared by the native capitalists. If they (the officials) did occasionally make a show of exercising their right to visit the ships, it was an empty threat, little heeded by men who were looked upon with almost as much dread as the buccaneers who had so long been the terror of all that part of the world."
Under the Bourbons and under the skilful administration of Alberoni, the fortune of Spain revived, and the colonies benefited in a corresponding degree.
In 1726 the Spaniards seized and fortified Montevideo which had been founded by the Portuguese a few years previously; this was an important step, for it declared that, in spite of Nova Colonia, the territory now known as Uruguay should be Spanish. The new town rapidly became wealthy and second only to Buenos Aires.
There can be little doubt that historians have considerably exaggerated the weakness and decay of Spain during the eighteenth century. Her comparative strength is proved by the fact that she maintained her trade regulations which were only contravened surreptitiously. The attempt of England to overthrow them by force shows how great was the resistive power of this unenterprising but still formidable empire. The War of Jenkins's Ear may be considered as a rehearsal of the struggle for the New World which occupied a great part of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and which is still unfinished.
Therefore, although the war is in itself trivial and ineffective, its purport is not so; it was the battle of the new spirit against the old, of the trader against the official, of the active against the passive. If here and elsewhere the latter had conquered, we might have had, in place of our modern hives of industry, vast thinly populated regions dotted with little, self-sufficient villages, which possibly were destined to be overrun by a more restless and energetic yellow race.[31]
Undoubtedly the English had not a shadow of right on their side; they were encouraging the breaking of treaties and flagrant political dishonesty. But under the brutal economic codes of the time there was no law but the law of the stronger; England might take if she had the power and Spain might keep if she could. The turbulent English mobs, clamouring for war, were shrewder than Walpole, shrewder than Burke, for they knew that to an island and trading people outlets for their commerce were matters of sheer necessity.
The Spaniards strongly disliked the Asiento Treaty, and, as is well known, English merchants, under cover of the privilege, carried on extensive smuggling operations against which the Spanish guarda costas retaliated vigorously. It was in 1731 that they perpetrated upon Captain Jenkins the outrage which was to make so great a stir some years later. It may be added that Jenkins did really lose his ear on the high seas, and that the insinuations that the whole affair was a fabrication are themselves quite without foundation.[32] However, not for nearly seven years was there any attempt to make political capital out of it, although the smuggling question remained a constant source of irritation between the two countries. It was at the beginning of 1738 that circumstances were favourable for an outbreak, for a powerful opposition was longing to bring about the fall of Walpole, and his position was weakened by the death of Queen Caroline. No weapon could be more effectual than the accusation of being insensible to the claims of national honour and of tamely suffering insults from Spain. On March 30th Carteret, in the House of Commons, carried an address against the right of search, and Walpole, who was anxious on all grounds to settle the matter, expedited the negotiations which had been for some time proceeding with Spain on the subject of compensation. In January, 1739, the terms of the agreement were published to the following effect. The Spaniards were willing that damages against themselves should be assessed to the amount of £200,000, but, on the other hand, the English Government acknowledged a counterclaim of £60,000, on account of the destruction of the Spanish fleet by Byng in 1718. With this and other possible deductions and abatements, the compensation seemed rather meagre, and the whole question of right of search being left to a Commission's decision, there was nothing in the findings that could be agreeable to Englishmen. A storm at once rose. The Prince of Wales voted against the Government. Young Pitt thundered against Walpole. The Prime Minister had to give way. His colleagues were in favour of war, and, as often happened in such struggles, Admiral Vernon was despatched, long before a declaration of war, "to destroy the Spanish settlements and to distress their shipping." The national feeling continued to rise, and great were the manifestations of popular joy on the occasion of the formal declaration of war on October 23rd. "They now ring the bells," said Walpole, "they will soon ring their hands."
Meanwhile Vernon, though his force was small, lost no time, and having appeared off Porto Bello with six ships on November 20th, he captured it the next day, and the news of this success (which did not reach London till March, 1740), was received with extravagant demonstrations of rejoicing. In the spring Vernon was menacing Cartagena, and on March 24, 1740, captured Chagre. The home authorities appear to have been extremely dilatory, for it took them a whole year to send effectual reinforcements, and then their value was seriously discounted by the fact that General Wentworth had succeeded to the command of the land forces. This officer was thoroughly incompetent, and no exhortations of Vernon could rouse him to energy, and owing to his mismanagement the assault upon Cartagena of April 9th was a complete failure. The armament departed about a week later, having lost at least eight thousand men, and in July an attempt upon Santiago in Cuba failed likewise, owing to Wentworth's incompetence. Little more of note occurred on that side, and it is here proper to mention that Vernon was in nowise to blame for the unfortunate results, and that, with an efficient colleague, there seems no reason to doubt that he would have made a great name for himself in the annals of the British Navy. Nor should Smollett, because he happens to be a famous novelist, be accepted as a judge of the strategy of the expedition. He had, in fact, infinitely less materials for forming a judgment than a private at Waterloo had for criticising Wellington's dispositions.