John Whitelocke,[46] the new commander, had served with moderate success in the West Indies, but he owed his advancement (chiefly in pacific appointments) to his brother-in-law, Matthew Lewis, the Deputy Secretary at War, and father of the well-known "Monk" Lewis. But his appointment to this important command remains a mystery. It appears from Windham's Diary that he wished to give the command to Sir John Stuart, while Leveson-Gower was in favour of Whitelocke, and the annotator to the Diary declares that the Duke of York decided in favour of Whitelocke. This does not seem very probable, and though Lord Holland, who was a member of the not very competent Cabinet, suggests more plausibly that Whitelocke as Inspector-General of Recruiting was opposed to an important scheme of Windham, who therefore wished to get rid of him, still this view seems untenable in face of Windham's positive statement. The appointment can only be considered as one of the many blunders which sometimes counteract England's usual good luck; and on this occasion the effect was complete.
However, until he arrived matters proceeded in brilliant fashion. The first officer of high rank to appear was Sir Samuel Auchmuty, a loyal American who had served the King, for whose sake his family had suffered ruin, in America, India, and Egypt. Although he had expected merely to assist in the task of completing the conquest of Argentina, he was not dismayed when he found that the work had to be begun over again. He promptly began the bombardment of Montevideo and within a few days, February 3, 1807, the breach was found to be practicable. The town, strongly fortified as it was, taken by storm with a loss to the English of six hundred men, and the General acting humanely and prudently, conciliated the inhabitants and established civil rule. Many adventurous English merchantmen, whose owners anticipated a boom, arrived and unloaded, and necessaries and luxuries were sold at prices hitherto unknown in Argentina.
Whitelocke arrived on May 10th and Crauford on June 15th. It was on June 28th that the expedition left Montevideo. It consisted of four brigades, of which three were commanded by Generals Crauford, Auchmuty, and Lumley, the fourth by Colonel Mahon. The transports left amidst the cheers of the fleet, and success might well have been anticipated, for an enterprise was being attempted which a year earlier had been easily accomplished by less than one-sixth of Whitelocke's army, which was ten thousand strong. But these proportions hardly represented the difference between the brother-in-law of Matthew Lewis and the future victor of Albuera, and, moreover, the spirit of the colonists had risen, and they rejected both the feeble restrictions of Spain and the new prosperity offered by England. The first mistake was made in landing at Ensenada, 48 miles south of Buenos Aires, and the troops had to make long marches through deep swamps. But Whitelocke arrived at Quilmes (where he ought to have landed) on July 1st without having seen an enemy, and all promised to go well.
On that day Liniers attempted to oppose the invaders in force, but Crauford, with a vigorous charge, beat down all resistance and pursued the enemy to the suburbs. There is little doubt that Crauford was correct in his belief that if he had been supported by the main body, Buenos Aires would have fallen on that very day. But Leveson-Gower, the second in command, who was as incompetent as Whitelocke and who was the moving spirit in the whole disaster, recalled the troops and gave the discouraged Spaniards a welcome delay. On July 2nd Whitelocke called upon them to surrender, and they refused. He himself was well aware of the difficulties of an assault. As soon as Crauford arrived at Montevideo the Commander-in-Chief had taken him round the works, pointed out the peculiar facilities which the flat-roofed South American houses afforded for street-fighting, and declared that he would never expose his troops to the risk of a general assault. In this resolve Crauford heartily concurred.
The General had two easy and certain means of attaining his object. He might blockade the town and so starve it into surrender, or he might bombard it. But unfortunately he was too unstable to persevere in his previous resolution, and he allowed Leveson-Gower to persuade him to adopt a preposterous scheme of assault. It was decided that on July 5th the troops should be divided into eight columns, and orders were actually issued that they should advance with their muskets unloaded, lest they should be tempted to waste time in returning the enemy's fire. The columns were to march through the town until each had arrived at the square nearest the river. Then they were to halt and, apparently, do nothing, for no further orders were issued.
The attack began at half-past six in the morning. When the English had entered the town a withering fire was poured upon them from innumerable houses. But they pushed gallantly on. Auchmuty, who was on the left, made his way to the Retiro and the Plaza de Toros, where he captured thirty-two guns and six hundred prisoners. The troops on the right seized the Residencia. But these successes were of no avail through lack of a competent guiding mind; the column leaders did not even know the whereabouts of the Commander-in-Chief, much less what he wished them to do, and further, the ill-judged scheme had borne its natural fruit in several serious disasters.
Crauford had seized the Convent of San Domingo, but he was surrounded by a very large force of the enemy who kept up a deadly fire of musketry and artillery, and by half-past four in the afternoon he was compelled to surrender. The same fate befell columns under Colonel Cadogan and Colonel Duff. In this day's fighting the English lost 70 officers and 1,130 men, killed and wounded, while prisoners amounted to 120 and 1,500.
Whitelocke and Auchmuty were now besieged in the Retiro. Their army had suffered severely, but they had still a large and efficient force, they had command of the sea, and the knowledge that the English Government would support them with all its available strength. Even if ordinary skill were out of the question, ordinary resolution would quickly have retrieved the initial reverses. But it was not to be.
Flushed by his success, General Liniers the next day sent a flag of truce to Whitelocke proposing to surrender all his prisoners if the English would evacuate Buenos Aires. He probably hardly expected anything but rejection of such terms, but the civilian Alzaga seemed to have had a better appreciation of the character of Whitelocke and insisted that Montevideo should be added to Buenos Aires. Nothing could be lost by making extravagant demands. The panic-stricken Whitelocke agreed to everything. At first he seems to have hesitated a little, but Liniers had added the menace that he could not be responsible for the safety of the prisoners if the attack were renewed. In any case such a threat should have been treated with contempt, but it was, as it happened, perfectly empty, for the life and property of every inhabitant of Montevideo were in Whitelocke's power.
Finally, he accepted the terms of surrender without raising the slightest objection to the inclusion of Montevideo, and taking great credit to himself for his humanity in yielding to Linier's threat, he wrote complacently: "Influenced by this consideration, which I knew to be founded in fact, and reflecting of how little advantage would be the possession of a country the inhabitants of which were so absolutely hostile, I resolved to forego the advantages which the bravery of the troops had obtained, and acceded to a treaty, which I trust will meet the approbation of his Majesty."