And what good came of it all? It may be regarded as a regrettable necessity due to the weakness of Spain. Spain was too feeble and the other Powers were too alien in every way to control this great Empire. It was necessary to act; but who will say that the consequences of the action were wholly beneficial? Argentina exchanged a benevolent, if unenterprising, Government for a long period of anarchy, alternating with despotism, but she was less unfortunate than most of the sister Republics. The men who fought and laboured for the cause of South American independence had no illusion on the subject. General Bolivar, the Liberator, when his task was over, said: "This country will inevitably fall into the hands of the unbridled rabble, and little by little become a prey to petty tyrants of all colours and races. If it were possible for any part of the world to return to a state of primitive chaos, that would be the fate of South America."

South America was in every respect most unfortunate. The weakness and misfortunes of Spain followed closely upon the growth of the revolutionary spirit which disturbed the whole world, and though the Continent was for a long time comparatively little affected by it, vigorous intrigues in Europe kept it alive, and when the time was ripe the revolutionists set to work. Equally unfortunate was it that the Revolution took place at a time when unchecked democracy was considered a practicable form of government. Experience has shown that it is beset with difficulties in all States; but where a portion of the people have political instincts and capacity, public affairs may go on, even if to some extent hampered by professions of a belief in ochlocracy, without serious disaster. Few people in the world could have been found less suited to direct democratic institutions than the Spanish Creole was at the time of the War of Independence. Little town communities, paternally governed groups of villages, all with complete local self-government and united only by common loyalty to a King or Viceroy—such was the form of government under which the Indo-Spaniards might have lived and prospered; but the constitutions which they attempted to formulate were altogether incongruous under the circumstances. Political theorising has cost South America very dear.

Canning's oft-quoted sentence about the "New World which was called into existence to redress the balance of the Old" is, in the sense in which it is often quoted, a piece of cheap rhetoric. But, in fact, he was arguing that it was not worth while to go to war with France on account of the marching of French troops into Spain; the present Spain, he said, was not the country of which our ancestors were jealous; the Spain over the waters is independent, and the fact has entirely changed the balance of power.

To suppose, as those who quote the phrase often suppose, that South America was initiating a happy age in contrast to the wrongs and oppressions of the Old World, is too extravagant a belief to require refutation. In the nineteenth century the countries of Europe made steady progress, and even their internal troubles were generally fruitful in improved conditions. In South America most of the countries retrograded, and the whole continent was drenched with blood uselessly shed. Comparative tranquillity now prevails, but this is due to the general progress of the peoples—a progress which it would be rash to say was furthered by their political institutions. The heroics which have been uttered over the Spanish-America War of Independence are discounted by the facts of South American history. For a long time bloodshed and tyranny were its results; the people were as yet unfitted for full emancipation, and so little advantage has been taken of the experiences of three-quarters of a century that the promise of the future is by no means serene, and its chief hope is that material prosperity may counterbalance defective political conditions. These are still unsound, and until rulers and subjects advance in civic capacity the good of Argentina will be the effects rather of the industry and enterprise of private individuals than of assemblies and statesmen.

CHAPTER VIII
ANARCHY AND DESPOTISM—THE WAR WITH PARAGUAY

The rule of Rivadavia was of great value to the country. He reformed the laws and administration, introduced wide and somewhat drastic ecclesiastical changes, established the University of Buenos Aires, and, in general, pursued an enlightened and progressive policy.[49] But the country was divided into two hostile parties, and neither being prepared to tolerate the triumph of the opposing system, the position of Rivadavia was rendered very difficult. He belonged to the Unitarian party, and its members have succeeded in maintaining their system, which aimed at a Republic with merely municipal local government. Buenos Aires was to be the administrative centre and to control every province, and thus to hold the position which Paris occupied in France. But the propertied classes in the interior belonged chiefly to the Federalist party. They viewed with suspicion the oligarchy of office at the capital, and advocated a federation on the model of the United States. At first Rivadavia held his ground against his active opponents, led by Manuel Dorrego, who were eagerly looking for an occasion against him; and this was speedily found in a foreign war.

Uruguay has been united to Brazil, but in 1825 it revolted against the Emperor, and, as might have been expected, Argentina took the part of her neighbour, and Brazil declared war. Assisted by Admiral Brown, an Irishman, the Argentines inflicted great loss upon Brazilian shipping, and Alvear took command of a large army, which invaded Rio Grande do Sul and completely defeated the Brazilians at Ituzaingo on February 20, 1827. This blow was decisive, and a treaty was made by which Rivadavia, distracted by domestic troubles and anxious to secure peace at any price, agreed that Uruguay should still remain a part of Brazil. His enemies had already spared no efforts to rouse prejudice and inflame public resentment against him. Appeals had been made to provincial jealousies, the issue of paper-money was alleged to be draining the country of the precious metals, and even his statesmanlike efforts to encourage immigration and the hospitality he offered to foreigners were matters of accusation against him. The treaty raised a storm of indignation, and had to be annulled. Rivadavia was so completely discredited by this transaction that on July 7, 1827, he was forced to resign, and thus the country lost probably the best constructive statesman she has produced—a loss which she could ill afford.

Dorrego succeeded him, but in reality the Republic was showing a strong tendency to split up, and Lopez in Santa Fé, Ibarra in Santiago, Bustos in Cordoba, and Quiroga in Cuyo, possessed almost as much power as Dorrego at Buenos Aires. However, with the help of several of these men, he succeeded in ending the war by a compromise which left Uruguay an independent state. Argentina was thus free to devote herself to domestic warfare.

Lavalle was now the head of the Unitarians, and he succeeded in expelling Dorrego from Buenos Aires. The latter fled to his estates and raised a body of adherents, but was captured and shot by Lavalle. The death of Dorrego cleared the way for a man who was destined to have a much longer political life than is usual in South America, and also to fill a much larger space in the eyes of the world. That man was Juan Manuel Rosas.