The naval efficiency of Argentina is a matter of equal moment. Her Atlantic sea-board extends for 1,000 miles and her southern ports are increasing in size and number. In South America sea-power is of vital importance; on the Pacific coast the ocean is the only highway, and on the eastern coast also journeys from north to south must be almost invariably made by sea. If Peru had possessed one or two more efficient warships, she might have defeated Chile, and the Paraguayan war was decided by the fact that the allies commanded the rivers. Indeed, the whole history of South America affords the clearest proof of the capital importance of sea-power. It is, therefore, necessary that Argentina should have a navy; but in forming it there are serious obstacles to be encountered. Her sons are not sea-faring men; they have ever found the vast plains of the interior too tempting, and have avoided the coasts. There are no fishing villages and no natural nurseries of sailors. It seems strange that the Government, which is only too ready to attempt to create industries, suitable or unsuitable, has not attempted to bring into being a maritime population which would serve for defence as well as opulence. There is, in fact, little interest in any such matters on the part of the population, and the President is now lamenting the disinclination to a sea-faring life, and of recent years steps have been taken to obtain more satisfactory results; but the total mercantile marine, as yet, amounts to barely 100,000 tons. There is, however, a College for training officers, and also engineers and stokers for the mercantile marine, and there is a Pilot School, and various measures show that the authorities are alive to the importance of the question. In his last Message to Congress the President said: "One of the principal reasons for granting privileges to ships flying the Argentine flag is the employment of native crews, so that the nation's sons may find a new path of life, and the navy a fresh source from which to draw sailors in case of an emergency." The Argentine sailor is a land-conscript, laboriously taught an unfamiliar art, which he learns wonderfully well. It is quite possible to create an efficient navy out of landsmen, but the lack of natural seamen will always be a great handicap, which, doubtless, the Government will do its best to remove. It will thus be gathered that Argentina, in spite of her geographical position, is not by nature a sea Power, and indeed she appears to devote attention to the navy only under external pressure. It was apprehension of war with Chile during the boundary dispute that induced the Government to buy the Buenos Aires in 1896, the Garribaldi in 1897, and in 1898 the San Martin, the Puerryedon, and the Belgrano. Again, the present naval programme is due to the activity of the Brazilian naval preparations. The following table gives the strength of the fleet:—
| Date. | Battleships. | Displacement in Tons. | Speed in Knots. |
| 1879 | Almirante Brown | 4,267 | 14 |
| 1889 | Independencia Libertad | 2,336 | 14 |
| Armoured Cruisers. | |||
| 1894 | Garribaldi | 6,840 | 20 |
| " | San Martin | 6,840 | 20 |
| 1896 | Puerryedon | 7,000 | 20 |
| " | Belgrano | 7,000 | 20 |
| Protected Cruisers. | |||
| 1889 | 25 de Maio | 3,200 | 22 |
| 1891 | de Juilio | 3,500 | 22·5 |
| 1894 | Buenos Aires | 4,500 | 24 |
CRUISER, SAN MARTIN.
In 1908 the naval officers numbered 493 and the petty officers and seamen nearly 6,000. There has been constructed at Belgrano, about 27 miles from Bahia Blanca, a naval port which will admit of the docking of vessels of 12,000 tons. In 1908 the cost of the army and fleet was £1,849,300. But in the future Argentina, like most other countries, will have to bear a heavier burden, for a scheme is being carried out which, it is hoped, will be completed in five years and will cost about seven million sterling. The new vessels will consist of three battleships of 15,000 tons each, nine destroyers, and twenty-one torpedo boats, as well as several vessels for harbour defence. In the course of a few years, therefore, Argentina will have a fairly powerful fleet. That there is any risk of a conflict between Brazil and Argentina no one believes. In both countries the same opinion is invariably expressed that as one country is building warships, it is necessary for the other to follow suit, and that though there is some jealousy there is little animosity and no material whatever for quarrel or any probability of war. It may be added that Argentina, at any rate, is well able to bear the extra burden, that it is for many reasons desirable that the principal South American States should possess some naval strength, and that an adequate fleet will add to the weight and dignity of Argentina in the councils of South America. For example, the decision of Argentina in the recent Peruvian-Bolivian arbitration case might have been repudiated by Bolivia and the insult to the Argentine Legation at La Paz might have been condoned, had Argentina been weak; and thus it was proved once more that it is strength and not weakness that preserves peace. In this case, of course, the fleet does not enter into the question, as Bolivia, like Bohemia, has no sea-coast, but the people of Argentina deserve every credit for the efforts and sacrifices which they are making to secure an efficient army and navy, and, in all probability, the money will be handsomely repaid merely in the matter of preservation from costly wars.
In foreign affairs the present policy of the Republic is creditable as, on the whole, the past has been.
The Government has shown itself honourably desirous of resorting to arbitration for the settlement of its disputes and of encouraging the other Republics to do the same. In all external relations a dignified and conciliatory attitude is maintained and every effort is made to encourage foreigners to visit the country and settle, and the statesmen of the Republic are zealous to maintain the Republic in a reputation worthy of her great prospects in the eyes of other nations. It is in domestic politics that the outlook is unsatisfactory, and here it must be acknowledged that although Argentina, owing to her wealth and the energetic character of her inhabitants, does not appear to the world in the same deplorable light as several South American Republics almost habitually exhibit themselves, she is nevertheless an extremely ill-governed country. The subject of South American politics is a commonplace with all writers; the hot-blooded Creole, who for centuries had been subject to a paternal government, was altogether unfitted for Parliamentary institutions.
It has been seen that Argentina, on the whole, shows a considerably better state of affairs in the nineteenth century than most of its neighbours, and had she not fallen under the malign influence of Rosas, the Plate District might have been the one bright spot in Latin America. But all the faults of inexperience, ignorance, and passion marred the political history, and the complaint ever is that the government is carried on in the interests of the official few at the expense of the hard-working many.