[51] Ibid., II, 23-24.
[52] Ibid., II, 25.
[53] Ibid., II, 26.
[54] Ann., II, 26: “se noviens a divo Augusto in Germaniam missum plura consilio quam vi perfecisse; sic Sugambros in deditionem acceptos, sic Suebos, regemque Maroboduum pace obstrictum; posse et Cheruscos ceterasque rebellium gentes, quoniam Romanae ultioni consultum esset, internis discordiis relinqui,” i. e. that the Romans were acting from diplomatic considerations, and in accordance with this policy he himself, sent nine times into Germany by Augustus, had by diplomacy brought the Sugambri, the Suebi and Maroboduus into peaceful relations; that the Cherusci also, and other hostile tribes, now that enough had been done to satisfy Roman honor, might be left to their own internal dissensions. See also Jäger (l. c.): “die Politik des Tiberius, die Germanen ihrer eigenen Zwietracht zu überlassen, bewährte sich.” Lang (Beiträge zur Geschichte des Kaisers Tiberius, Diss. Jena, 1911, p. 56) says that Germanicus was not recalled through envy; that Tiberius avoided all wars except such as were immediately necessary: “Aus diesem Grunde (nihil aeque Tiberium anxium habebat quam ne composita turbarentur, Ann., II, 65), suchte er alle Kriege zu vermeiden, die nicht unbedingt im Interesse des Reiches lagen. Den Abbruch der Germanenfeldzüge veranlasste nicht Angst oder Neid gegen Germanicus, wie kurzsichtige Schriftsteller jener Zeit vermuten, sondern die Tatsache, dass wenig dabei erreicht, den Provinzen jedoch grosse Lasten aufgebürdet wurden.”
[55] Ibid., II, 44.
[56] Ibid., II, 88.
CHAPTER III
Criticism of The Accepted View
Examination has already been given to the sources on which historians base their accounts of the Varus disaster. The influences under which these sources were written—ancient accounts repeated for the most part without question by later writers—and their availability for sound historical conclusions have also been discussed. We now advance to a general consideration of facts which are in contradiction to the accepted view as to the effect of Varus’ defeat.
The great importance usually attributed to this defeat is surprising to the student of history, in the light of several significant facts revealed by a study of the battle. Varus at that time had three legions, which, if complete, comprised not more, or scarcely more, than 20,000 troops.[1] The battle was not a regular contest, but one in which the Romans were hemmed in, we are told[2], by woods, lakes, and bodies of the enemy in ambush. Our authorities are agreed that swamps, forests, a running contest, and the elements were factors that contributed to the Roman defeat.[3] Further, in the encounter the Romans were directed by a leader very generally represented[4] as indolent, rash, and self-confident, and they were pitted against far superior numbers.[5]