(4) It was contrary in the first place to the well-known character of Augustus to attempt this war of conquest, and in the second place, after having begun it, to abandon the undertaking.
(5) It was also contrary to the well-recognized peace policy of Rome at this period.
(6) It was highly unlike Rome to give up this conquest on account of a single setback.
(7) Whatever may have been the ultimate intentions of Augustus, certainly the methods followed were utterly unlike those of any conquest ever undertaken, and a rational criticism will try to explain the facts rather than to twist them so as to fit a preconceived theory.
(8) There was certainly no “provincia” to abandon, under any circumstances.
(9) If there was any change of policy it was under Tiberius, and to be explained by circumstances peculiar to that time. Augustus, after the defeat of Varus, went on quite as he had after the defeat of Lollius.
The cumulative effect of these objections is overwhelming, and causes the student of history not only to feel sceptical about the significance of Varus’ defeat, but strongly convinced that it played no such part in the determination of Augustus’ Germanic policy as is generally supposed. And since the current theory as to this defeat can be maintained only after disregarding these several and serious objections, some interpretation of Augustus’ purpose must be offered which will obviate these difficulties, and still be consistent with his known policies and acknowledged acts. In the following chapter it will be made clear that Augustus had no other purpose in his operations in Germany than to make repeated demonstrations of Rome’s power, in order to impress the barbarians[138], and to make the frontier defense effective by pacifying and bringing into friendly relations with Rome large parts of the bordering territory; that it was not at any time his intention to conquer Germany, and organize it as a subject province.
FOOTNOTES
[1] Mommsen, Röm. Gesch., V, p. 41; 51; Idem, Die Oertlichkeit der Varusschlacht, p. 207; Gardthausen, I, p. 1199. Ch. Gailly de Taurines (Les Légions de Varus, Paris, 1911, p. 73) places the number as probably 22,000.
[2] Vell., II, 119.