[43] Delbrück, Preuss. Jahrb., p. 428, note, and Geschichte der Kriegskunst, I, 2nd ed. (1909), p. 14.
[44] Deutsches Wirtschaftsleben im Mittelalter, Leipzig, 1886, I, p. 148 ff., esp. 161 ff.
[45] Assuming that the region occupied by the Germans in the time of Augustus was approximately as large as the modern German empire. Agrippa’s imperfect calculation, even including Raetia and Noricum, was to be sure much smaller, i. e., 686 × 248 m.; Pliny, Nat. Hist., IV, 98.
[46] See Beloch, Rh. Mus., LIV (1899), pp. 418, 423, 428. In his Bevölkerung, p. 457, he had estimated one in ten, which was too large a fraction.
[47] Tac., Ann., I, 56.
[48] Tac., Ann., II, 16. This was the force later kept at the Rhine. Tacitus, Ann., IV, 5; Josephus, II, 16, 4.
[49] Delbrück, Preuss. Jahrb., p. 481 f., has well refuted the Roman claims of great numerical superiority on the part of the Germans, and concludes that the forces on both sides were about equal. Judging from the campaign against Maroboduus, which it may be noted, is the only one in which we have apparently reliable information regarding the strength of both sides, one might safely infer that, at least under Tiberius, the Romans enjoyed actual numerical superiority.
[50] Delbrück, Preuss. Jahrb., p. 481, exaggerates somewhat the advantage in cavalry which the Germans enjoyed.
[51] Velleius, II, 106.
[52] The overwhelmingly superior force of Rome is specifically admitted by some historians, but hardly seems as yet to be generally accepted. See especially Fustel de Coulanges, Histoire des institutions politiques de l’ancienne France, vol. II, 2nd ed. (by C. Jullian), Paris, 1891, p. 328; Ed. Meyer, Kl. Schr., p. 486; von Domaszewski, Geschichte der römischen Kaiser, Leipzig, 1909, p. 245. The same thing is meant also by J. Beloch where he observes that the Romans recognized “dass die Eroberung grössere Anstrengungen kosten würde als das Objekt wert war” (Griechische Geschichte, 2nd ed., vol. I, 1 (1912), p. 14).