[8] These are perhaps the “strategical considerations which tempted the Romans beyond [the Rhine and the Danube], as the English have been tempted across the Indus”, to which Lord Curzon (The Romanes Lecture: Frontiers, Oxford, 1908, p. 21) refers. His interesting discussion of the problems of imperial boundaries calls occasional attention to the similarity between the conditions faced by the Roman Empire, and by those of the great modern empires in Asia and Africa; e. g., pp. 8, 32, 38f., and 54. Upon one point, however, Lord Curzon’s generalization is not quite satisfactory. It is that of the difference between the policy in the East, where protectorates were freely established, and that in the West, where, to use his own words: “protectorates, strictly so-called, were not required because the enemy with whom contact was to be avoided was the barbarian, formidable not from his organization, but from his numbers; and against this danger purely military barriers, whether in Britain, Gaul, Germany, or Africa, required to be employed” (p. 38). Organized states long since accustomed to the rule of a monarch did not exist in the West, and of course the Romans could not be expected to create them, but their nearest equivalent under the circumstances, tribes closely bound to Rome by treaties of friendship and alliance, did exist, at all events in the earlier period of the empire. Certainly this was the situation in Germany, where at one time all the tribes between the Rhine, and the Weser seem to have been socii of Rome, and it was the case in Gaul before the advent of Caesar, where the Haedui had long been allies (called actually “fratres”) of the Romans (at least since 121 B. C., cf. Kraner-Dittenberger-Meusel on Caesar, Bell. Gall., I, 11, 3 and 33, 2), and even the newcomer Ariovistus, as a possible source of danger, had been solemnly recognized as rex and amicus in 59 B. C. That Ariovistus had made overtures for this recognition, having attempted to ingratiate himself with the proconsul of Gaul as early as 62 B. C., is no doubt to be admitted, as M. Bang (Die Germanen im römischen Dienst bis zum Regierungsantritt Constantins I., Berlin, 1906, p. 2f.) has convincingly argued (cf. also T. Rice Holmes, Caesar’s Conquest of Gaul, 2nd ed., 1911, p. 40), but the Romans were apparently even more eager to give than was Ariovistus to receive, in order to secure his neutrality before the impending Helvetian invasion, no doubt—nothing else would excuse the abandonment of their old allies the Haedui in the face of the outrageous treatment which Ariovistus had accorded them. A certain case of the establishment of a buffer state in Africa will be noted below. To a later period, when the Romans put all their faith in palisade and trench, Lord Curzon’s statement is no doubt perfectly applicable. But that was the time of marked decadence, when the vigorous offensive-defensive of the early period had changed to a defensive pure and simple, and when, instead of foreseeing and preventing invasion, men merely clung despairingly to a wall, and prayed that the barbarian might dash himself to pieces against it.
[9] A good example of the way in which such affairs might be managed, is Caesar’s treatment of Indutiomarus and Cingetorix, rivals among the Treveri (Bell. Gall., V, 3 f.).
[10] Tacitus, Ann., II, 26: “Se noviens a divo Augusto in Germaniam missum plura consilio quam vi perfecisse”.
[11] Ibid.: “internis discordiis relinqui.” Cf. above p. 34. An example of such diplomacy on the part of the Romans is the way in which a special territory (that of the Ubii) had been assigned to the Chatti, who, for a time at least, were thereby prevented from joining the Sugambri and the national cause (Dio, 54, 36, 3; Gardthausen, Augustus, I, p. 1085). Similarly the Frisii were treated with marked friendliness, and cordial relations were maintained for more than a generation (Gardthausen, Augustus, I, p. 1076). A party friendly to Rome was long supported against great obstacles among the Cherusci. Domitius experienced a humiliating diplomatic reverse in an effort to compel their return from exile in 2 B. C. (Dio, 55, 10ᵃ, 3), but later commanders were more successful. Only after it became impossible to support them in their own land were the leaders of this party transferred to a position of safety within the empire.
[12] The Ubii had made a treaty of friendship and given hostages even before Caesar crossed the Rhine in 55 B. C. (Bell. Gall., IV, 16, 5).
[13] Compare Caesar’s admirable characterization of the Gauls (Bell. Gall., IV, 5), who in this respect are typical of many, if not most, primitive peoples.
[14] Compare the remark of Tiberius noted above (Ch. IV, n. 10). In his two expeditions into Germany Caesar fought nothing that he could dignify with the appellation of a battle (cf. Florus, I, 45, 15: “fuga rursus in silvas et paludes, et quod acerbissimum Caesari fuit, non fuere qui vincerentur”). The same is true of Agrippa in 37—“he crossed the Rhine for the purpose of making war”, says Dio (48, 49, 2), not that he actually fought a battle; and such is the case with the other German campaigns, always the vaguest terms, never any details of a severe engagement; a few skirmishes undoubtedly took place, and there was plenty of ravaging and burning, but pitched battles must have been very rare. Even the disgraceful defeat of Lollius was not followed by any battle (Dio, 54, 20, 6). The tumultuous assault on Drusus in 11 B. C. (Dio, 54, 33, 3) was hardly more than a skirmish, as the enemy remained in the field, and is represented merely as growing more cautious thenceforward. This was hardly a “decisive, brilliant victory” as Gardthausen (Augustus, I, p. 1083) calls it. Indeed the defeat of Varus, and the two engagements of Germanicus, which Tacitus describes, are the only certain “battles” that were fought in more than 50 years of intermittent campaigning.
[15] Roman traders were active far beyond the limits of the empire. They constitute a familiar feature of Caesar’s campaigns in Gaul. For example, they were present in such numbers and with such equipment at the surrendering of the Aduatuci (Bell. Gall., II, 33) as to purchase and take over at once 53,000 captives, and a small campaign in the Alps was undertaken upon one occasion merely to open up a trade route for them (Ibid., III, 1). They mingled with the Suebi under Ariovistus (Ibid., I, 49, 1) and had frequently entered Germany, where they exerted a marked influence upon the Ubii (Ibid., IV, 3, 3) long before Caesar’s advent into Gaul. In later years we hear of them occasionally in Germany (Dio, 53, 26, 4; 54, 20, 4 etc.). Varus’ army had a large tross (Dio, 56, 20, 2), which must have been in part at least composed of traders. A. C. Redderoth (Der Angrivarierwall und die letzten Römerschlachten des Jahres 16 p. C., Toronto, 1912, p. 10 f.) is doubtless correct in emphasizing the importance of commercial considerations at this time in Germany, although our sources (like ancient historians in general) give only the scantiest indications of the influence of economic interests upon history. See [Appendix, Chapter IV, note 16.]