Colonists and the settlement.
"I felt at one time that in the case of the Transvaal this would be unworkable," he adds, "but my present opinion is strongly to the effect that we should seize the opportunity of the present improved feeling between the Dutch and British in the new colonies to commence co-operation between them in the conduct of public business."
To this proposal Mr. Chamberlain gives his approval in a brief telegram of July 7th.[321]
Bare and jejune as are these telegrams, they tell us something of the spirit of relentless vigour by which Lord Milner drove the cumbrous wheels of Downing Street into quicker revolutions at the shifting of the scenes from war to peace. Within six weeks of the surrender of Vereeniging he was fully engaged in what he afterwards called "the tremendous effort, wise or unwise in various particulars, made after the war, not only to repair its ravages, but also to re-start the new colonies on a far higher plane of civilisation than they had ever previously attained."[322] The story of this "tremendous effort," with its economic problems and its political agitations, must be reserved for a separate volume. It only remains, therefore, to relate the part which Lord Milner played in determining the conditions under which the republican Dutch were incorporated into the system of British South Africa.
Before we approach the actual circumstances which accompanied the surrender of the Boer forces in the field, it is necessary to recall the exchange of views on the subject of the settlement of the new colonies which took place between the Imperial authorities and the Governments of the Cape and Natal in the early months of the preceding year (1901). In these communications—the origin of which has been mentioned previously[323]—the significance attached by loyalist opinion in South Africa to certain questions, necessarily left undetermined in Mr. Chamberlain's pronouncements of the general policy of the British Government, was fully disclosed. The Cape ministers, while recognising that full representative self-government should be conferred at an early date, unhesitatingly affirmed the necessity of maintaining a system of Crown Colony government until "such time as it was certain that representative institutions could be established, due regard being had to the paramount necessity of maintaining and strengthening British supremacy in the colonies in question." And as, in their opinion, "this consummation would be ultimately assured and materially strengthened by a large influx of immigrants favourably disposed to British rule," they expressed the hope that "no time would be lost after the conclusion of the war in putting into effect a large scheme of land settlement." More than this, with the object-lesson of the actual breakdown of representative government in their own Colony before their eyes, they added a recommendation that this British immigration should not be confined to the new colonies, but that a portion of the funds to be provided by the Imperial Government for this purpose should be allocated to the Cape Colony.
The language question.
In the minute furnished by the Natal Ministry the question of the settlement of the new colonies was discussed in greater detail, and in particular attention was drawn to the opportunities for the promotion of a federal union of British South Africa, which the establishment of British government in the former Republics would afford. The settlement of the new colonies, in their opinion, should be so treated as to become a preliminary stage in the creation of a federal administration which "should be accomplished, if possible, before intercolonial jealousies and animosities should have had time to crystallise and become formidable." The Natal ministers, therefore, insisted upon the importance of measures calculated to secure the predominance of the English language in the new colonies. In support of this recommendation they pointed out that the preservation of the "Taal" is purely a matter of sentiment. The Boer vernacular, so called, "has neither a literature nor a grammar"; it is distinct from "the Dutch language used in public offices and official documents." No one acquainted with the conditions of Boer life will dispute the truth of this contention. The Boer child, if he is to receive an education sufficient to qualify him for the public services, or for a professional or commercial career, must in any case learn a second language; and since to learn the Dutch of Holland is no less difficult—probably more difficult—to him than to learn English, the desire to have Dutch taught in schools in preference to English becomes a matter of political sentiment, and not of practical convenience. On the other hand, the strongest reasons exist for making English the common language of both races. Apart from its superiority to Dutch as the literary vehicle of the Anglo-Saxon world and the language of commerce, the predominance of the English language is a matter which vitally affects the success of British policy in South Africa.
"The general good of the new colonies and of South Africa generally," the Natal ministers wrote, "requires the predominance of the English language. The language question has done more, probably, than anything else to separate the races and to provoke racial animosity."
They, therefore, recommend that—