What then happened can be told in the words of Lord Kitchener's telegram to the Secretary for War:
"Lord Milner and I refused to accept these terms as a basis for negotiation, as they differ essentially from the principles laid down by His Majesty's Government. After a long discussion, nothing was decided, and it was determined to meet in the afternoon. The Commission met again at 4 p.m., when Lord Milner proposed a form of document that might be submitted to the burghers for a 'Yes' or 'No' vote. There was a good deal of objection to this, but it was agreed finally that Lord Milner should meet Smuts and Hertzog with a view of drafting, as far as possible, an acceptable document on the Botha lines.[331] They will meet to-morrow for that purpose. Lord Milner stipulated for the assistance of Sir Richard Solomon in the preparation of the draft document."[332]
The "long discussion" of May 19th, to which Lord Kitchener refers, is to be found in the minutes of the conferences held at Pretoria between May 19th and 28th. It affords an exhibition of gross disingenuousness on the part of the Boer commissioners. Almost in the same breath they allege that their proposal is "not necessarily in contradiction to"[333] the Middelburg terms; admit that there is a "fundamental difference" between the two proposals, but ask that their own may be accepted, nevertheless, as the basis of negotiation;[334] and finally maintain that, as it is "nearly equivalent"[335] to the Middelburg terms, they need not "insist so much" upon it.[336] To all this Lord Milner has but one answer: "It is impossible for us to take your proposal into consideration."
Payment of Boer war debts.
On May 21st the document drafted by Lord Milner and Sir R. Solomon in consultation with Mr. Smuts (General and ex-State Attorney of the Transvaal) and Mr. Hertzog (General and late Judge of the Free State High Court) on the preceding day, was read at a plenary meeting of the negotiators. In the main the document was accepted with little demur; but a long discussion arose on the question of the degree in which the the British Government would recognise the debts incurred by military and civil officers of the late Republics in the course of the war. The Boers desired that all Government notes and all receipts given by their officers for goods, whether commandeered or not, should be recognised to be part of the liabilities of the Republican Governments for which the new Government was to become responsible. Lord Milner, on the other hand, expressed the opinion that such a demand was very unreasonable. The British Government would take over, with the assets of the Republican Governments, all liabilities existing at the time when the war broke out, but it could not be expected to pay for expenses actually incurred by the Boer leaders in carrying on a war against itself, which was, in its later stages, at any rate, utterly indefensible. The British people, he said—
"would much prefer to pay a large sum at the conclusion of hostilities with the object of bettering the condition of the people who have been fighting against them, than to pay a much smaller sum to meet the costs incurred by the Republics during the war."
As, however, the principle of the recognition of these notes and receipts had been conceded in the Middelburg terms, he was willing, with Lord Kitchener's concurrence, to refer the matter to the Home Government, although he disapproved of the clause in question in the Middelburg terms.
This point was thus left to be settled by the Home Government, and the clause which they drafted to deal with it was that which ultimately became Article X. of the Terms of Surrender. That clause represented a compromise between the desire of the Boer leaders to have a definite sum allotted for the payment of debts contracted by them in the course of the war, and Lord Milner's desire to ignore these debts but to make a free grant for the relief of the Boer people. The British Government followed Lord Milner in making such a free grant—£3,000,000—and in rejecting the claim of the Boer leaders that this sum should be devoted to the payment of the promissory notes and receipts issued by them but it nevertheless allowed such notes and receipts to be submitted "as evidence of war losses" to the commissioners who were to be appointed to distribute the £3,000,000 grant.
The minutes of these discussions reveal very clearly the difference in the respective attitudes of the High Commissioner and the Commander-in-Chief. Lord Kitchener was the humane and successful general, anxious to bring the miseries of the war to an end, and anxious, too, to close a campaign which, in spite of its difficult and arduous character, had afforded little or no opportunity of reaping military honours commensurate to the skill and endurance of the army or the sacrifices of the nation. Lord Milner was the far-sighted statesman, responsible for the future well-being of British South Africa, and, above all, the jealous trustee of the rights and interests of the empire. At this meeting, when the draft terms are being discussed before they are telegraphed to London, Lord Milner is exceedingly careful to point out to the Boer commissioners that the actual text of the document, as expressed in English, when once accepted, must be regarded as the sole record of the terms of surrender. After reading the proposed draft, he says: "If we come to an agreement, it will be the English document which will be wired to England, on which His Majesty's Government will decide, and which will be signed." To Mr. Smuts' suggestion that it is not necessary to place a "formal clause" in the draft agreement, if the British Government is prepared to meet the Boer commissioners in a particular matter, he replies:
"As I look at the matter, the Government is making certain promises in this document, and I consider that all promises to which a reference may be made later should appear in it. Everything to which the Government is asked to bind itself should appear in this document, and nothing else. I do not object to clauses being added, but I wish to prevent any possible misunderstanding."