HOHENZOLLERN REDOUBT
October 1st, 1915.— October 17th, 1915.
We packed up during the afternoon of October 1st, and in the evening marched to Abeele, where we entrained for a destination unknown to most of us, but presumed to be somewhere in the far South. We made ourselves as comfortable as we could for the expected long journey, only to be rudely awakened after what seemed to be a five minutes' sleep, and turned out into the cold dark night at Fouquereuil, a suburb of Béthune. The remainder of the night was spent at a somewhat elusive Orphanage in the town itself. On the following day we moved into billets at the Northern end of the town on the banks of the La Bassée Canal, where we were joined by the Transport which had come from Ouderdom by road. October 3rd saw us once more on the move to Mont Bernenchon, a clean, attractive little village, a few miles N.W. of Béthune. Our hopes of spending a day or two in peace were soon shattered, for on the following day we made what seemed to be another emergency move to Béthune, where we embussed for regions unknown. Shortly after dark we arrived at Vermelles, and picked up guides, who led us as only guides can, to what proved to be a portion of the German front line system captured in the fighting a few days before. The trenches, which were near the "Lone Tree," and within sight of the famous "Tower Bridge" at Loos, were little damaged, and seemed to have been captured without a great deal of fighting, but the incessant rain and scarcity of habitable dug-outs made our stay as uncomfortable as the most hardened stoic could have desired. Our work consisted of reversing portions of the original German support trench to form a fire trench facing the other way. Owing to the distance to the then German line (1,000 to 1,500 yards) and the low visibility, we were able to work openly and practically unmolested. Our only casualties were the result of an unlucky shell which fell on the morning of October 5th, amongst a party of Signallers, killing L.-Sergt. C. E. Harrison, Signalling Sergeant, and three men, whilst another man died of wounds a few days later.
The same evening we got orders to leave the trenches, and after a thoroughly unpleasant tramp, in heavy rain and thick darkness over the slippery chalk tracks, which were guess-work to most of us, we arrived soon after midnight at Mazingarbe, which for dirt, damp, and general cheerlessness, almost rivalled our never-to-be-forgotten billets at Bac-St. Maur. So ended a beastly, tiring, and, for all we ever learned, quite purposeless expedition.
After a short meal and much needed rest we felt fit for anything, and made light of the trek on the early morning of October 6th, to our rest billets, which we found at Fouquières, a nice clean little village about a mile west of Béthune. Here we found ourselves, for a short time, in peace and something approaching luxury.
Our move South had brought us into the First Army (General Haig) and XI Corps. (Lt.-General Haking), which had been busy in the recent fighting, and we now learned definitely for the first time that in the further fighting that was shortly to take place we were to play a prominent part. On Saturday, October 9th, preliminary orders and plans were issued, and we learned that our task was to be the capture of the "Hohenzollern Redoubt" and "Fosse 8," an admirably constructed scale model of which had been made on the ground outside Divisional Headquarters at Gosnay, where Officers and N.C.O.'s (and stray inhabitants) spent some time in a careful and interested examination of it.
In addition, a somewhat hurried reconnaissance of the position itself was made by Col. Fowler and the Company Commanders from our trenches in front of Vermelles, from which the attack was to be made. In the short space of a couple of hours they endeavoured to get a working knowledge of the maze of communication trenches, and the hostile ground over which, if all went well, we should have to advance. Sunday was spent in Church Parade, and in going again through the preliminary orders and plans, and in the afternoon the Corps Commander interviewed the Officers of the Division at Divisional Headquarters. We were then told something more as to the reason and general plan of the attack, and were informed that we should be supported by the heaviest concentration of artillery yet known in the war—400 guns of all calibres,—that all contingencies had been provided for, and that in spite of the strength of the position, we should probably encounter very little opposition before reaching our objective.
The object of the attack, which was to be undertaken by the XI Corps, was to establish the left flank of the First Army, and to render possible a further advance in conjunction with the French on the South. The objective included the "Quarries" and Fosse 8, the 46th Division being allotted the task of capturing the Hohenzollern Redoubt and Fosse 8, whilst the 12th Division was to attack on our right, and be responsible for the Quarries. The Fosse and surroundings had already been in our hands once, having been attacked and captured during the last week in September by the 9th Division, who unfortunately, however, had been compelled to withdraw, and a subsequent attempt by the 28th Division to recapture it had also proved a dismal failure. What, we wondered, was in store for the 46th Division?
Fosse 8 is, or rather was, a typical colliery pit, with the usual winding and head gear and other plant, and pit-head pile of slag (called in this case "The Dump"), which like its neighbour, the famous Tower of Wingles, overlooked the whole position, whilst in rear there were the usual rows of miners' cottages. These cottages (called "Corons") had cellars, and were thus very easy to defend with machine guns, which could fire with great effect, and comparative safety, from ground level. In front of the Fosse and protecting it lay the Hohenzollern Redoubt, consisting of a salient trench system shaped rather like a big bean, and projecting well in front of the German main system, to which it was connected by communication trenches, and by two flank trenches known as "Big Willie" and "Little Willie." The importance of the position lay in the fact that it was on the top of a gentle rise, giving command and good observation of our position on either side. Its capture was rendered difficult by the fact that the ground in front of it was level, and almost devoid of cover, affording a very fine field of fire, which could be swept from practically every direction. From our trenches very little could be seen except the Dump, and the roof of the manager's house.
The attack was to be carried out by the 137th Brigade on the right under Brigadier-General E. Feetham, C.B., and the 138th Brigade on the left under Brigadier-General G. C. Kemp, whilst the 139th Brigade were to be in Divisional Reserve under Brigadier-General C. T. Shipley. To the 137th Brigade were attached 100 Grenadiers from the 139th Brigade, two sections Divisional Cyclist Company, and the 1/2nd Field Company, Royal Engineers (less one section), and to the 138th Brigade, the 1st Monmouthshire Regiment (Divisional Pioneer Battalion), 125 Grenadiers from the 139th Brigade, two sections Divisional Cyclist Company, and the 1/1st Field Company, Royal Engineers (less one section), whilst General Shipley's Divisional Reserve consisted of the 139th Brigade (less 225 Grenadiers), one Platoon Divisional Cyclist Company, and two Troops Yorkshire Hussars. The covering Artillery consisted of three groups of heavy Artillery under the Corps Commander, and one group of Divisional Artillery (six Brigades of 18-pounders, and one Brigade of 4.5 Howitzers).