Then followed a period of anxious waiting, and the only information we got was to the effect that the 138th Brigade on the left had practically gained their portion of the Redoubt.
Soon after 3 o'clock, we received orders to move forward, and began to proceed by way of "Inverness Trench," "Bomb Alley" and "Left Boyau" to "Reserve Trench." Movement was very slow, owing to the congestion of the traffic, and the narrowness of the trenches, and took a long time to complete. There we were destined to remain for several hours, and suffered a few casualties from shell fire, apparently directed at the junctions of the trench with "Central" and "Right Boyaux." We were now nominally at the disposal of General Officer Commanding 137th Brigade, but never received any orders from him, and eventually drifted to the command of General Officer Commanding 138th Brigade.
Traffic became more and more congested by the stream of wounded which was now pouring down Central Boyau and "Barts Alley," and by carrying parties and supports endeavouring to get along the Reserve Trench up to the Redoubt.
Soon we began to gather scraps of information from those who were coming down, and to realise that things were going far from well. The usual answer was "Don't ask me, all I know is it's Hell up there!" It was now getting too dark to see, and we could only gather that at any rate we were holding the West Face and having a pretty bad time in doing so; also that our Grenadiers attached to the 138th Brigade, had suffered heavily. Sergt. G. F. Foster was carried down dying from wounds in the body, and Hemingway was reported to be dangerously wounded, if not already dead.
Things had not gone well. As we learned afterwards the attack of the Staffords on the right had been held up almost immediately by machine gun fire, and very little ground had been made. On the left, the Lincolns and Leicesters at first were more fortunate, and reaching West Face with comparatively few casualties, began to make their way up to Fosse Trench. But the further they advanced, the more heavy became their losses, until eventually the advance came to a standstill, the furthest point reached being about 100 yards from Fosse Trench. From these more advanced positions they were gradually forced back, until only the West Face was in our hands. It is abundantly clear that the effect of our bombardment did not come up to expectations, and that many machine guns were untouched, and, worst of all, that the Dump, on which "heavy shell need not be wasted, as it could be made untenable by either side," proved to be a miniature Gibraltar, honeycombed with shafts and galleries leading to concealed machine gun emplacements. Small wonder that little ground could be made or held in the face of such defences.
The news that things were going badly induced a Battalion Commander of another Brigade, whose Battalion had been taken from him piecemeal and scattered to the four winds of heaven, to order A Company, in the absence of Col. Fowler, to go across to the Redoubt to reinforce the troops there. Information, however, was brought by L.-Corpl. Simpson of A Company (killed a few hours later), who made a rapid and courageous journey over the open to West Face, to the effect that that trench was already overcrowded, and that the troops there required thinning, rather than reinforcing.
It was now getting late and things seemed to be in a very unsatisfactory state, when orders were issued by Col. Fowler, who had met General Kemp in the trenches, and received verbal instructions to be prepared to carry out an attack at short notice on the right portion of the Redoubt, for Companies (except B who were detached for other work) to begin to move up in readiness to our front line trenches. This movement began about 9.0 p.m. very slowly along Reserve Trench and "Hayward's Heath." The difficulty of moving a Battalion at night, in single file, through a maze of unfamiliar trenches without losing touch, may be better imagined than described, and it was after midnight before we had covered the 400 or 500 yards, which was all we had to do.
Whilst this was going on Col. Fowler and the Adjutant, accompanied by the Staff Captain, Major Wordsworth, made a hasty reconnaissance of the position, and found that elements of the 138th Brigade and Monmouths were holding the North-Western portion of West Face, whilst the Eastern portion of Big Willie was held by the 6th Battalion. Except for a short distance near the barricade on each flank, the trench between these points was held by the enemy.
At 2.45 a.m. on October 14th, we received from General Officer Commanding 138th Brigade, written orders to attack and consolidate "as soon as possible" the South-Eastern portion of West Face, the junction of South Face and Big Willie (shewn on the map as Point 60), and if possible the "Chord" of the Redoubt. The order stated that the 6th Battalion in Big Willie would co-operate by a bombing attack along that trench "at the same time." Owing to the difficulty of getting messages to and fro, in the maze of unknown trenches in the dark, it was quite impossible to get in touch with the 6th Battalion so as to give them any idea when our attack would begin, so that we were not able to rely on getting much help from them. The Commanding Officer decided that two Companies would be sufficient for the attack, which was of course going to be without artillery support, and A Company (Major A. L. Ashwell), and D Company (Capt. B. W. Vann), were detailed. A hasty conference was arranged at a small dug-out at which Col. Fowler, who intended himself to lead the attack, gave the few orders that were possible in the circumstances:—"A quiet advance, no firing, and in with the bayonet."
Owing to the darkness and the unfamiliar ground, it was necessary to make some arrangement for keeping direction. Major Becher was, therefore, sent across to the West Face, with instructions to stay at the extreme right flank of the 138th Brigade position, and there to show a light from a flash lamp on which the left flank of our attack would be directed.