The form of attack practised was that ordered for the general attack, which we now knew was to take place about the end of June: this allowed each Battalion a frontage of 250 yards, with three Companies in front, and one in support, each Company having its four platoons echelonned in depth at distances of about 50 yards, thus forming four "waves," the men in each wave being extended to about four paces. In the attack the leading wave was to go through to the final objective, the other waves occupying and mopping up the trenches passed over by the leading wave.
A full size model of the German lines at Gommecourt that we were to attack, was made near Sus-St. Leger, the trenches being dug to a depth of about two feet. Tape lines were laid for the men to form up on, and the whole attack was practised time and again as a "drill," until eventually we were able to carry it out without losing direction, with a fair amount of success.
We were now stronger in Officers than we had ever been during the campaign, our strength being 38. This was due to the recent arrival of several reinforcements, including Capt. Piggford and Lieut. Hindley, rejoined, and 2nd Lieuts. H. de C. Martelli, J. B. White, C. J. Wells, A. G. T. Lomer, T. G. Day, E. A. Huskinson, H. I. Newton, and A. A. Field. We had, however, lost Capt. Lawson, who left for a tour of duty at home, and Major E. H. Heathcote, Capt. Gray, and 2nd Lieut. Hodgson invalided to England, also 2nd Lieut. Peerless, who unfortunately got badly hurt one day by accidentally kicking a live rifle grenade, which had been left lying on the bombing practice ground. His place as Battalion Grenade Officer was taken by 2nd Lieut. Duff. Lieut. Simonet had gone to hospital, and was succeeded as Lewis Gun Officer by 2nd Lieut. Tomlinson. Major G. S. Heathcote was attached to Headquarters, Third Army, and was succeeded in command of C Company by Capt. Piggford, whilst Major Ashwell became Second-in-Command. We were not particularly strong in other ranks, something less than 500 being available for the attack, though we had recently received over 100 reinforcements, including a very good draft of 61 from the 2nd Sherwood Foresters. Fortunately General Headquarters had taken an excellent step in laying down that certain Officers and other ranks known as "Battle Details," were now to be left out of every attack to form a nucleus for carrying on Battalions in the event of their suffering heavy casualties. This was a very wise precaution, and was adopted by us for the first time in the attack at Gommecourt.
| Regtl.-sergt.-major W. Mounteney, D.C.M. | Comp. Sergt.-major W. Stokes, D.C.M. and Sergeants Of C Company, 1917. |
On June 15th, we marched to Humbercamp, the Transport at the same time moving to lines at La Bazéque Farm. Capt. H. Kirby was now Transport Officer, having taken over from Capt. Davenport, who, after being attached for some time to XVII Corps Light Railway Company, Royal Engineers, went to Brigade Headquarters to learn Staff work. The transport vehicles had somewhat camouflaged themselves, having been decorated on all sides by wonderful and mystic signs, so as to show to the initiated to what unit they belonged. If you enquired you would be told that the dark blue square meant "First Line Transport," the narrow light green oblong edged with white placed on the left of this square was for the "8th Sherwood Foresters," whilst the square divided diagonally into red and green, and bordered with white, was the sign of the "46th Division." It was not an easy matter to arrange all these coloured patches clear of the odds and ends carried on the different vehicles, and this problem was still exercising the minds of those in authority nearly up to the Armistice—such an important part did it play in the ultimate winning of the war!
We now knew that in our Brigade we were to be the Battalion in reserve, the 5th and 7th Battalions having to carry out the assault, with the 6th Battalion in immediate support. As a consequence much of the "dirty" work during the final preparations for the attack fell to our lot. This consisted chiefly in holding the trenches during our preliminary bombardment, and putting up with such retaliation as the Hun might choose to carry out, and in completing the final arrangements in our own trenches. After three days at Humbercamp, during which we found large working parties for digging cable trenches, and putting up screens to conceal the approaches to trenches, we moved to Foncquevillers on June 18th, and took over part of the left sub-sector from the 5th Lincolns. An immense amount of work had been done whilst we had been away; the prospects seemed bright, and our hopes rose. Our Headquarters at Foncquevillers became a centre of attraction to all and sundry. At every hour of the day and night we had callers, from the Divisional Commander downwards. The Brigadier and his staff constantly paid us visits. Gunners galore came to sample what we kept, and incidentally to see about finding observation posts. Royal Engineer gentlemen requested our help at every turn and corner, usually wanting working parties rather larger than our total strength, whilst "Tock Emma" Officers were on our doorstep day and night. Indeed so great was the crowd that at one time we almost had to put Corpl. Cross on to regulate the queue, and all the time our poor stock of victuals and drinks was getting less and less.
All went well until the afternoon of June 23rd, when there was a violent thunderstorm, which practically undid the whole of the work we had carried out in the trenches, filling them in most cases to a depth of two feet or more with mud and water. This area was a difficult one to drain, and it was impossible to get the water away, so that all hands had to be got on as soon as possible to man trench pumps, and endeavour to clear the trenches in that way. This method was extremely laborious, and very little real progress was made, though every available man was put on to the work. Our poor dug-outs were knee deep in water, and the newly constructed bomb and other stores were too weak to stand such a storm, and in most cases collapsed. Our hopes sank, for we realised how much depended on all the careful preparations which had been made, and that the time left before the attack would be all too short for us to get the damage repaired.
It is impossible to give anything like an adequate idea of our plight for the next few days. The artillery scheme, including a six days' bombardment, began on the following day with wire cutting, causing a certain amount of retaliation, which added to our trouble. This got worse on the following days, doubtless owing partly to the fact that we dug a new advanced trench. This was in a deplorable mess, and our men who had to occupy it had a most distressing time. Casualties rose rapidly, especially in B Company, whose front line trench was enfiladed from Adinfer Wood. Our carrying parties, who had to take up Royal Engineer material, ammunition of all sorts, rations and other stores to various points in the line, mostly adopted the very suitable dress of a sandbag kilt and boots. They were objects of much interest, but it was the most workmanlike rig-out for our trenches, which in many cases remained knee deep in mud and water for several days. The carrying had to go on whatever happened, and continued night and day, assistance being got from the 6th and 7th Battalions, from the Machine Gun Company, and from the Transport men of all units, parties of whom marched up nightly for the purpose. With trenches in such a state, it is needless to say that it was impossible for men to hold the line for many days, and in order to give us a brief respite, we were relieved by the 5th Battalion on the night of June 27th, and moved back to Pommier.
The nine strenuous days during which we had held the line, had been a severe trial, and where everyone did so well it is difficult to single out any for special mention, but we feel we must say how much we owed to Capts. Turner, Vann and Hill, for the excellent way in which they worked to keep up the spirits of their men during those trying times, and to Sergts. Slater and Rawding, for the splendid way they kept their men together during several particularly unpleasant "straffs" by the Boche of our front trenches. During that time, too, much excellent patrolling was done by Marshall, who unfortunately was wounded one day when taking rather too great risks in observing the Boche lines, and Martelli, ably helped by L.-Corpl. Hickman, and Pvte. E. C. Bryan. Our casualties during those nine days included Capt. Vann, slightly wounded, Lieut. Hindley, who got a nasty splinter wound on the nose, 16 other ranks killed, and 44 wounded.
The chief incident during our two days' stay at Pommier, occurred on the afternoon of June 30th, when the Huns began shelling the church. John Turner, Michie and Harvey, were having tea in their mess, which was only a few yards from the church, when a 5.9 blew in the end of the house, practically bursting inside the room where they were sitting. Their escape was little short of a miracle. John Turner, however, as one would expect, came into Headquarters smiling and perfectly cool, though covered with dust and blood. Harvey and Michie were a bit shaken, the former having to go to hospital.