Leaving a right flanking party to deal with the enemy in the railway cutting, the remainder of the Company, deploying from the cutting at Zero, 4.45 a.m., changed direction half-right and moved forward under a barrage of artillery and trench mortars. The preliminary bombardment had more or less destroyed the houses on the hill and cut good gaps in the wire, which the party had little difficulty in getting through. The right leading platoon under Lieut. Skinner got into one of the numerous trenches and at first met with little opposition, but being separated from the rest of the Company, were rapidly surrounded by large numbers of the enemy, and practically all were killed or captured. The left platoon, under 2nd Lieut. Hopkinson, reinforced by the remainder of the Company, were held up by machine gun fire, which caused many casualties, until Corpl. Fletcher managed to get a direct hit on one of the guns with a No. 23 grenade. A message was meanwhile taken by C Company runner, the redoubtable "Mungo" Marsh, to D Company, asking them to try and work a party round to the North side of the houses. Further attempts made to rush another gun which was doing much damage, were met now with bombs thrown from a trench just in front of the houses. The folly of attempting the attack with the Southern half of the cutting still in the hands of the enemy, now became apparent, for at this moment large parties of the enemy appeared on the right rear, with which the flanking party had apparently been quite unable to deal. Then from the cellars of the houses on top of the hill also emerged many of the enemy, and the now small remains of the Company were in imminent danger of being completely surrounded. Orders were given to withdraw, but few returned to tell the tale. Duff, one of the most heroic and stout-hearted Officers the Battalion ever possessed, was last seen firing his revolver amid a horde of the enemy. Hopkinson was never heard of again. Sergt. Cox died of wounds and Sergts. Curtis, Sansom and Chalk were amongst the 70 missing, whilst the wounded numbered 34. The highest praise is due to all ranks of C Company for their magnificent efforts and especially to Capt. A. Bedford, who throughout worked incessantly and led the attack with the utmost gallantry. It was only through a hard fate that his endeavours did not meet with the success they so well deserved. Very good work was also done by the mopping-up platoon of D Company, under Sergt. Painter, which helped to cover the withdrawal of the remnants of C Company.
The 6th Battalion fared no better, and the attack produced, what was suspected by those who knew the ground, exactly nothing except a total of casualties which are felt to have been sacrificed on the altar of faulty intelligence.
It is easy, perhaps, to be wise after the event. All information received by Corps Intelligence indicated an imminent retreat by the enemy. On no other premises could an attack by so small a force on so strong a position have been justified. One further principle of warfare, by no means new, was justified to the hilt—no frontal attack should ever be attempted unless all counter attack from a flank is impossible, or unless sufficient forces are available to render such an attack an impracticability. The ultimate capture of the Hill necessitated nearly two months' artillery preparation and the employment at intervals of two Brigades. Perhaps there is one further illustration of the uncertainty of modern warfare in the history of Hill 65. With that Hill in our hands, and later on the dominating position of Hill 70, all the tenets of war would conclude that Lens would be completely untenable, and yet it was not until more than a year afterwards that the enemy, in the last stages of the war, evacuated a town which will, in the history of the Battalion and of the 46th Division, be for ever associated with the fortunes of Hill 65.
On April 24th we went back into Brigade Support with Battalion Headquarters at the Red Mill, and Companies billeted in cellars. Some readjustments had to be made the following day, when Battalion Headquarters moved to cellars on the Lens Road. This spot seemed to be a favourite target for a Whizz-bang, which fired straight down the road, and was responsible for many sprints and much language at different times on the part of various members of Battalion Headquarters.
Three days later the Brigade was relieved by the 137th Brigade and moved into Divisional Reserve, the Battalion proceeding to a delightful little spot known as Marqueffles Farm, nestling under the wooded slopes of the Lorette Ridge. Here we were extremely comfortable, and on this and a future occasion spent a most agreeable time, being especially fortunate in the matter of weather. It was a stiff climb to the top of the ridge, at the Eastern edge of which were the remains of Notre Dame de Lorette. This was the favourite spot of the Gipsy bomber, whose story was told in Punch a few years ago:—
"But most he loved to lie upon Lorette
And, couched on cornflowers, gaze across the lines
On Vimy Ridge—we had not Vimy yet—
Pale Souchez's bones, and Lens among the mines.
Till, eagle-like, with hoarse indignant shrieks.
Gunners arose from some deep-delved lair.
To chase the intruder from their sacred peaks
And cast him down to Ablain-St. Nazaire."
Torrance on one occasion climbed the ridge with Col. Blackwall, and can testify that the view from the top was worth the walk! It formed a perfectly ideal observation post, and we now understood why the Hun had fought so strenuously to maintain a footing on the ridge.
The chief item whilst at rest was the reorganisation of C Company, which was practically non-existent. Each of the other three Companies contributed a quota, the transfers including Sergt. Stokes, from A Company, who was appointed Comp.-Sergt. Major. A little later Sergt. H. J. Wilson, who for a long period had ably superintended the Battalion cooking arrangements, was appointed Comp. Quarter-Master-Sergt., and was succeeded as Sergt.-Cook by Corpl. Bateman. In addition to other casualties we had lost Lieut. G. Wright, who injured his knee up in the Riaumont sector and was now invalided to England, whilst 2nd Lieut. White went to England for temporary duty as a Bombing Instructor, and 2nd Lieut. Mitchell was appointed Adjutant of I Corps School. Our strength was thus considerably reduced, whilst reinforcements at the moment were exactly nil.
On May 6th we relieved the 5th Lincolns in the left sub-sector of the left Brigade sector, with Battalion Headquarters in the remnants of some mine galleries at the back of Hart's Crater, just in front of Loos. There were only two Brigades of the Division in the line at this period, and each Brigade went to each sector in turn. We always went into the left sub-sector of each sector, relieving with the 7th Battalion. The trenches here were very bad, so shallow that it was almost impossible to get round by day, and considerably overlooked by the enemy, particularly from the tower of Fosse 14. Their names began with the letter N, the best known being "Nero," "Novel," "Netley," and "Nash." They were old Boche trenches taken in the recent advance. The whole sector had a very desolate appearance and life was not pleasant there. The discomfort was increased by the enormous number of wing bombs and rifle grenades and occasional deluges of gas bombs and shells fired by the enemy, which in our first six-day tour there, caused us 39 casualties. This was followed by six days in support, when we lived in dug-outs in some trenches between Loos and the famous Colliery slag heap, known as the "Double Crassier." Battalion Headquarters were at an exceptionally fine dug-out known as "Elvaston Castle," which had been dug by the 2nd Sherwood Foresters. Here, in addition to ordinary work, we amused ourselves at times by cutting the vetches which were thriving on some parts of the area, and sending them back for the transport animals. It was here also that a certain Padre was overheard one day by the I-Tok, arranging for a funeral at Maroc, with the result that he was requested to attend at Brigade Headquarters to explain his indiscretions.
After a short rest at Noeux-les-Mines, we went back to the Liévin sector again on May 25th and took over the line from Fosse 9 and Cité-St. Théodore to just South of the Liévin-Lens Road. Battalion Headquarters were at the corner house near the "Marble Arch" in Liévin. Here the monotony of trench life was varied by long distance patrols, and an enemy raid on the night of May 29/30th on our post at the junction of "Crocodile" Trench and the railway cutting, when we lost two men captured, three killed and seven wounded. Casualties during the whole of this period unfortunately were heavy and reinforcements few, one Officer, 2nd Lieut. H. C. Orton and 36 men who joined in May, being our sole additions. We also lost Sergt. Burton, who had done much excellent work as Signalling-Sergeant. He went for a Commission, and was succeeded by Corpl. J. T. Templeman. Our strength at this period was so small that for some time Companies had to be organised in three platoons instead of four. About the same time, much to the regret of all those who had been privileged to serve under him at any time, during the long period in which he so successfully commanded the Brigade, both in England and France, General Shipley left for a tour of duty at home, and was succeeded by Brigadier-General G. G. S. Carey, C.B., R.A.