Map To Illustrate Operations Near Lens: April-July. 1917.
The Higher Authorities were now more convinced than ever that the Germans opposite us were completely demoralised, and that with a small push we should capture Lens itself. Hasty plans were accordingly devised, and, although we were now lamentably weak in numbers, it was resolved to put the whole Division into a final effort on the morning of July 1st. The 137th and 138th Brigades were to attack South of the Lens-Liévin Road and the 139th Brigade North of it. For this attack the 2nd Sherwood Foresters and the 9th Norfolks from the 6th Division on our left were attached to our Brigade. The assaulting Battalions were the 2nd, 5th and 6th Sherwood Foresters. We were in support and late on June 30th moved into St. Pierre. A and D Companies were attached to the 6th Battalion, A being now commanded by Capt. Andrews, who had recently succeeded Capt. A. Hacking on the latter's appointment as Second-in-Command of the 5th Battalion. This Company held the 6th Battalion left Company front, whilst D Company remained in support. B Company were attached to the 2nd Battalion, but were not required until the following afternoon, when they were taken up to "Crook Redoubt." Owing to casualties this Company came under the command of Sergt. Cobb, who carried out his duties and looked after the Company during a rather trying time in a most excellent manner. C Company were attached to the 5th Battalion and were in support in "Cowden" Trench.
The attack was launched at dawn on July 1st and part of the objective taken, but an enemy-counter attack found our men too weak to hold the position, and apart from a small portion in the neighbourhood of Crocodile Trench, the ground gained had to be evacuated. The 137th and 138th Brigades on the right met with no greater success and Lens remained in the hands of the enemy. July 1st is not a lucky day in the history of the 46th Division.
We remained in St. Pierre, with some Companies still detached, until the night of July 3/4th, when we were relieved by the 23rd and 27th Canadian Battalions, and went back to the Square at Bully Grenay, where 'buses picked us up soon after dawn on July 4th, and took us back to the delightful little village of Chelers.
In spite of considerable shelling our casualties during the last few days had only been two Officers (Day and Hammond) and four men wounded. Our total casualties during the Lens operations amounted to five Officers wounded, three missing, 42 other ranks killed, 180 wounded, and 72 missing.
The whole history of the Lens operations proves, if proof were needed, how important a part intelligence plays in modern operations. Intelligence is gained by reconnaissance by land or from the air, and from information from prisoners and captured documents. The responsibility of the Officer, who must judge the truth from what must often be conflicting reports from these sources, is serious indeed. On his appreciation of the position depends to an extent not always recognised the success or failure of active operations. The Infantry in the line unfortunately take the hard consequences of faulty information or false appreciation.
In reviewing the short history of these operations we are inclined to forget other occasions in which the credit of successes was due not only to the dash and courage of the Infantry but to the information sifted from one source or another, weighed in the balance, and finally put forward as the premises on which operations have been based. In our humble judgment the Army of the future should take care that this branch of technical training receives a greater measure of attention than it had received up to the commencement of the Great War.
CHAPTER XI
ST. ELIE AND HILL 70
July 4th, 1917.— January 21st, 1918.