Rumour, always busy, had for some days prevailed that the 154th Brigade to which we belonged was to be entrusted with an operation more ambitious than usual, and for once rumour was correct. A conference was held at Brigade Headquarters at Locon on the 13th June, and at 7 p.m. the following day the Battalion left billets at Le Cornet Malo, and moved by Companies along the familiar Route C, to take over trenches at Festubert. The transport also moved nearer to the line at Le Touret. By 10 p.m. the Battalion commenced to arrive in the old British trench, and were all in by 11.30. Contrary to arrangements this trench was already occupied by the 1/6th Scottish Rifles, and room was made in the reserve trench. The intended operation was an attack by the 7th Division, Canadian Division, and our own (the 51st) on the enemy position on the line Chapelle St. Roch-Rue d’Ouvert. After a 48 hours’ continuous bombardment our mine at Duck’s Bill was fired. At 6 p.m. on the 15th our attack commenced under heavy artillery fire from the enemy. It was led by the 1/4th Loyal North Lancs, on the right, and the 1/6th Scottish Rifles, with the 1/4th King’s Own and 1/8th Liverpool (Irish) in support.
“A” Company (less party selected from two platoons under Command of Lieut. R. Gardner for Brigade Relay Posts and less other details) were ordered to occupy and hold Sap L. 8.
“B” Company moved to the old fire trench, and “C” Company moved forward to take their place in support. “D” Company moved into support trench, and it was reported that two lines of German trenches had been occupied by 6.20 p.m. “D” Company were in position at 6.50 when a number of wounded of the 6th Scottish Rifles passed through. At 7.20 all reports from the front were satisfactory. At 8 p.m. “B” and “C” Companies were ordered to push on in support of the Loyals and Scottish Rifles, who asked for reinforcements. “D” were ordered to the fire trench and arrived at 8.25 p.m.
The progress of “A” Company (less detachment) to Sap L. 8 was delayed by blocks ahead, and bridges broken by shell fire, but they reached their position and performed their allotted duty. “D” Company moved forward to support the Loyals, and threw back their right flank whilst trying to get into touch with the Grenadier Guards. At 9 p.m. the last platoon of “D” Company was sent from the reserve trench to rejoin their Company in front. The 8th Liverpools commenced to arrive and moved two Companies to the old fire trench, and one to support. Battalion Headquarters got into touch with the firing line through Lieut. Taylor, the Bombing Officer. Lieut. A. A. Wright, in charge of the Machine Gun Section, was ordered to reinforce the firing line. This move commenced, but could not be completed and the machine guns were buried as the result of enemy shell fire. All the Companies concerned exhibited great gallantry and performed their duties with devotion, and showed fine discipline and steadiness, and excellent fighting qualities. Between 10 and 11 p.m. a retirement was ordered. “D” Company still tried to establish contact with the Grenadier Guards on our right, but this was not effected until some two hours later.
An Officer of the Loyals reported at Battalion Headquarters about midnight, but could give no clear information of conditions in front. At 12.30 a.m. on the 16th, the German counter-attack was delivered, artillery support was impracticable, heavy casualties had occurred amongst the Officers of the attacking battalions, no supports came up on our right, and our right flank was therefore in peril. Enemy pressure increased, and retirement along the line was effected in good order.
At 1.45 a.m. an order was received to re-form the Battalion in the reserve trench, and a Battalion from the 152nd Brigade moved up in support, the 8th Liverpools taking over the old fire trench. On relief the Battalion assembled at Le Touret at 10 a.m. on the 16th.
Such is the bare outline of events on this memorable night. Let us examine them a little more closely and see what they reveal. It would be natural to assume that the result of the encounter was negative, seeing that the relative positions of the opposing forces now remained as before. It had been rumoured that this Action was to synchronise with an attack on a large scale by the French between Arras and La Bassée, but this idea was dispelled when it was found that the troops on our right did not co-operate.
The educational effect on the Battalion was profound, and the young soldier, who less than twelve months before had stepped out along Dalton Road, Barrow, or Market Street, Ulverston, etc., with the gay irresponsibility of Saturday night, and was now thrown into this cauldron of war, recognized its realities in a way he would never forget. He had seen death in battle at close quarters, and was to look at things in a different light thenceforward.
Of course there were the inevitable casualties, matters that went astray, and bad luck. Five minutes after the attack commenced, the telephone line to Brigade Headquarters broke down, and messages had to be transmitted by the relay posts previously referred to. This part of the work was very well carried out under Lieut. R. Gardner of “A” Company. Lieut. Hewitt of “A” Company, the Assistant Adjutant, a most able Officer, was killed and his loss was severely felt. Lieut. Bigland of “B” Company was killed in the fire trench before the advance commenced, and it was never clearly known how Lieut. Walker met his fate. Captain W. G. Pearson with “B” Company followed up the Loyals in attack, and the Company was well inside the German lines when he was hit by shrapnel and went down. Unfortunately he could not be found when the retirement took place. He was eventually picked up by the Germans and made prisoner. Almost as trying, after the retirement was ordered, was the finding and evacuation of wounded and stragglers. Sergeant Bell did good work, returning again and again to the front so long as any could be found. Lance-Corporal “Tommy” Dixon also was prominent in this connection. The notorious “L. 8,” a sap following the line of a natural ditch twining away from our trenches to the German lines, and in “peace time” one of the plague spots from enemy fire, was occupied by “A” Company (less detachments) and was most valuable as a defence post, and also as a covered way for getting our wounded back into our lines.
The element of surprise in this attack was lacking. The enemy seemed to be well-informed of our intentions. He held his reply to our bombardment until almost the very moment of our attack and then opened a heavy artillery fire on our troops in their assembly positions, and caused many early casualties. In the fighting in the German trenches the enemy had the advantage of an adequate supply of bombs, whereas our supply became exhausted and the bombers were handicapped owing to forward ammunition dumps having been destroyed by the enemy’s artillery. The deciding factor, however, appeared to be the withering cross fire which the enemy was able to bring to bear upon our troops when crossing no man’s land.