The view of the fighting from the actual front was, of necessity, local. But here a much broader outlook was possible. Looking down Mametz valley—“Death Valley” as it was colloquially known—towards Montauban on the left and Trones Wood on the right centre, a mile away, the immense superiority of our guns in the first place struck the observer. The guns were everywhere, “ubique” indeed. They were literally wheel to wheel. Recalling those dark days of 1915, when we asked for support, and asked in vain, it made one’s heart rejoice, with a strange exultation to see those inexhaustible stacks of shells and to hear the incessant roaring of the guns.
And then one could not fail to be impressed with our mastery of the air. How effectively the enemy had been blinded became daily more obvious. The hum of aircraft rung in the ears as the guns slackened. All day long the droning battleplane wheeled over the scene of carnage. Reconnoitring planes flew backwards and forwards with information of enemy masses, train movements and gun positions. The more humble contact planes hung a few hundred feet over the advancing troops and reported progress to the artillery. They flew unperturbed over the avalanche of our own shells. Whenever an objective was attained by our infantry coloured flares ascended and the contact aeroplane immediately conveyed the intelligence to the gunners, who lengthened their range and prepared the ground for further advance.
Not only in aeroplanes were we seemingly supreme. Observational work by aircraft was necessarily hasty and brief. It was the captive balloon that supplied the more detailed and continuous information. These balloons were connected to earth by telephone. As many as twenty-five could be counted swinging lazily in the breeze. Indeed, the increasing salient of our battle-front, as we bit deeper and deeper into the German defences, could be gauged by the wide crescent of these aerial outposts.
Not only above, but underneath, had this amazing tornado passed. Our human moles had burrowed with an uncanny sense of direction right underneath those ingeniously contrived German subterranean passages. They had prepared—with an immense amount of patience, self-sacrifice and danger, daring not only detection by the enemy, but the far more insidious peril of poison gas—mines beside which those at La Boisselle shrunk into pettiness. And then, in a moment, by the mere pressure of an electric button, in a mighty convulsion they had overwhelmed all those galleries and caverns where the enemy was cowering under the avalanche of our shells.
“Death Valley” then was now the centre of this hellish activity. Blinded as they were the Germans poured a prodigal amount of ammunition into it, and they had their own old positions ranged to a nicety. And it is easy to understand how effective such a mass of fire could be, when this was the only avenue by which rations could be brought up to the infantry or ammunition for the guns. One would see a G.S. waggon, pair of horses and driver, careering down this Satanic road with ammunition, a stray shell, and blankness—nothing to mark the event but an additional shell-hole, which the devoted labour corps hurried out like solicitous ants to investigate and repair. In spite of the frightful punishment the enemy were undergoing at our hands, inaction could never be laid to their charge. Each day saw their defences, so seriously threatened, grow more formidable. Their pioneers were tireless. Their “Betontruppen,” specialists in the erection of concrete machine gun emplacements, or “strong points,” and their “Hollenbankommandos,” for the construction of dugouts, were organizing a newly-formed system of trenches on a scale of great magnitude, and with the invaluable accessories of strong points. Trenches, wired and traversed, emerged in a single night. The favourable features of the ground were everywhere transformed into miniature fortresses of amazing strength, from whose loop-holed bastions machine guns in countless numbers pushed their deadly muzzles.
August, 1916
The sector of trenches occupied by us lay on the extreme right of the British position, before Guillemont. On our right were the 156th Regiment of Infantry, 10th Corps, French Army, and on our left the 8th Liverpools. Guillemont was marked for early attack, but the time was not yet. Artillery activity on both sides was continuous. The enemy appeared to be nervous. At 8.30 p.m. on 1st August “B” Company attacked an advanced German strong point with one platoon. This platoon was hung up and forced to retire, owing to enemy barrage, which was very severe. At 8.45 p.m. another platoon went forward under Second-Lieut. A. J. Brockman and was completely successful. We had previously dislodged the enemy with Stokes Mortar bombs, and as they were retreating in large numbers (apparently the enemy was massing for an attack) our artillery barrage caught them and inflicted very severe casualties on them. Our casualties were slight, Second-Lieut. Rudduck being wounded. In this brisk encounter communication by telephone lasted for exactly an hour under a most severe and accurate enemy shelling. In the early morning of 3rd August the Battalion was relieved by the 4th Loyals and moved into Brigade Reserve, in Dublin and Casement trenches, in front of Maricourt, that is, to the rear of the Mametz valley.
August, 1916
The enemy shelled the left of our trenches but did not cause any damage. We found some fatigue parties, including two for the front line. On the night of the 4th we were relieved by the 5th Liverpools, of the 165th Brigade, and proceeded to bivouacs south of Carnoy and west of Bronfay Farm. The weather was very hot and the next three days were spent quietly with bayonet fighting, physical drill and bathing parades. At 6 p.m. on the 7th sudden orders were received, and at 8.15 p.m. the Battalion left bivouacs and proceeded to trenches near Arrow Head Copse, in sector south of Trones Wood and Guillemont Road. There was an awful congestion of troops in the Sunken Road, but, fortunately, no shelling, and the Battalion did not have a single casualty during the relief, which was completed by 1 a.m., when preparations were made for the attack on Guillemont.
The order of battle from right to left was “D,” “A,” “B” and “C” Companies. At 3.45 a.m. on 8th August the first line, consisting of two platoons of each Company, crept out in front of the advanced trench, at the same time the remainder of the Battalion occupied the advanced trench. At 4.10 the first line advanced a short way and waited four minutes. Second line left the trench and took up a position twenty yards in rear of the first line. The second line was closely followed by two platoons of the 4th Loyals as carrying party. At 4.15 the enemy placed a very violent barrage of artillery fire (shrapnel) on the fire trench. The first and second lines crept forward closer to our own barrage to escape enemy fire. At 4.20 the Battalion went forward again and the first line immediately came under heavy bomb fire. This was absolutely unexpected, caused heavy casualties, and the attack was arrested. The enemy then opened very heavy machine gun and rifle fire, which caught the second line as it came up to reinforce the first line.