A.D. 83-86.
Three years’ war north of the Forth.
Having crossed the former in the beginning of the sixth summer to explore the harbours on the coast of Fife, he appears to have had his army conveyed across the Bodotria, or Firth of Forth, into the rough peninsula of Fife on the north side of it, and to have gradually, but thoroughly, acquired possession of the country between the Firths of Forth and Tay, while his fleet encircled the coast of Fife, and penetrated into the latter estuary. The appearance of the Roman fleet in the Firth of Tay, making their way, as it were, into the recesses of the country, naturally caused great alarm among the natives; and in order to compel Agricola to abandon his attack on this quarter, they took up arms and assailed the forts which had been placed by him in the country west of the Tay in the third year of his campaigns.
That this movement was well devised appears from the proposal of many in Agricola’s army to abandon the country they had just subdued, and fall back upon the line of forts between the Firths of Forth and Clyde. Agricola was at this time probably near the entrance of the river Tay into its estuary, and the large temporary camp on the east bank of the Tay opposite Perth, termed Grassy Walls, may have been his position. Instead of adopting this course, he resolved, trusting to the security of the forts against any attack, to meet the manœuvre of the natives by prosecuting his attack upon the country extending from the east coast north of the Tay to the range of the so-called Grampians; and in order to prevent his army from being surrounded in a difficult country by overwhelming numbers, he marched forward in three divisions.
His course, judging from the view his biographer Tacitus gives of his tactics, must have been nearly in a parallel line with the river Tay—his march being on the east side of it, and the enemy rapidly returning from the west to oppose him. The position of the army in its forward march in three divisions is very apparent in the remains of the Roman camps in this district of the country. There is a group of three in a situation remarkably applicable to his design and his position. The camp at Cupar-Angus, which is farthest to the north of the three, probably contained the main division of the army. Within little more than two miles to the south-east is the camp at Lintrose, termed Campmuir, to cover the country to the east; and as the enemy, he immediately apprehended, were not in that quarter, in it he placed the ninth legion, which was the weakest. At an equal distance on the south-west, and overlooking the river Tay, was another camp, of which a strong post still remains, and which obviously guarded the passage of the river.
The enemy, having learnt this disposition of the Roman army, resolved to make a night attack upon its weakest division, and appear to have crossed the river, passed the main body in the night, and suddenly fallen upon the ninth legion. The camp at Lintrose has only one gate on the side towards the larger camp at Cupar-Angus. On the opposite side the rampart is broken in the centre by the remains of a morass. The enemy forced their way through the gate, having taken the Romans by surprise, and an engagement commenced in the very camp itself, when Agricola, having received information of their march, followed closely upon their track with the swiftest of the horse and foot from the main division of the army, overtook them about daybreak, and attacked them in the rear. The natives were now between two enemies, and a furious engagement ensued, till they forced their way through the morass, and took refuge in the woods and marshes.[[50]]
The Romans were now as much elated by this successful contact with the enemy as they had before been alarmed, and demanded to be led into the heart of Caledonia. The natives attributed their defeat to the fortunate chance for the Romans of their being hemmed in between two forces, and prepared for a more vigorous struggle the following year. A general confederacy of the northern tribes was formed, and ratified by solemn assemblies and sacrifices, and the two contending parties separated for the winter, prepared for a vital contest when they resumed operations next year. This campaign had lasted for two seasons, and Agricola probably returned to the camp at Grassy Walls for winter quarters.[[51]]
The third season was destined to determine whether the Romans were to obtain possession of the whole island, or whether the physical difficulties of the mountain regions of the north, and the superior bravery of its inhabitants, were at last to oppose an obstacle to the further advance of the Roman dominion. Agricola commenced the operations of this year by sending his fleet, as soon as summer arrived, down the coast to the north, to operate a diversion by creating alarm and ravaging the country within reach of the ships. He then marched forward with his army nearly on the track of the preceding year, and crossed the river Isla till he reached a hill, called by Tacitus ‘Mons Granpius,’[[52]] on which the assembled forces of the natives were already encamped under the command of a native chief, Calgacus, whose name is indelibly associated with the great battle which followed.
A.D. 86.
Battle of ‘Mons Granpius.’
On the peninsula formed by the junction of the Isla with the Tay are the remains of a strong and massive vallum, called Cleaven Dyke, extending from the one river to the other, with a small Roman fort at one end, and enclosing a large triangular space capable of containing Agricola’s whole troops, guarded by the rampart in front and by a river on each side. Before the rampart a plain of some size extends to the foot of the Blair Hill, or the mount of battle, the lowest of a succession of elevations which rise from the plain till they attain the full height of the great mountain range of the so-called Grampians; and on the heights above the plain are the remains of a large native encampment, called Buzzard Dykes, capable of containing upwards of 30,000 men.
Certainly no position in Scotland presents features which correspond so remarkably with Tacitus’s description as this, and we may suppose the Roman army to have occupied the peninsula protected by the rampart of the Cleaven Dyke in front, and Calgacus’s native forces to have encamped at Buzzard Dykes. These two great armies would thus remain opposed to each other at the distance of about three miles, the one containing the whole strength of the native tribes still unsubdued, collected from every quarter, and amounting to upwards of 30,000 men in arms, while the youth of the country, and even men in years, were still pouring in, and resolved to stake the fortunes of their wild and barren country upon the issue of one great battle; the other, the Roman army of veteran troops, flushed with past conquests, and confident in the well-proved military talent of their general;—the one on the verge of their mountain country, and defending its recesses, as it were, their last refuge; the other at the termination of the extensive regions they had already won from the Britons, and burning with desire to penetrate still farther, even to the end of the island. Between them lay the Muir of Blair, extending from the rampart at Meikleour to the Hill of Blair. On the east both armies were prevented from extending in that direction, or from outflanking each other, by the river Isla. On the west a succession of morasses, moors, and small lochs extends towards the hills, and in this direction the battle eventually carried itself.[[53]]