Never was there a shorter, and never a bloodier conflict. Though it lasted scarcely an hour and a quarter, out of the handful of British troops engaged, a loss was sustained of fifty officers, sixty sergeants, and eleven hundred rank and file. The French, besides two thousand killed and wounded, lost six guns, an eagle, and two generals, with nearly five hundred prisoners.
Nothing could exceed the dastardly duplicity with which the Spanish general abandoned his gallant ally. La Pena never made a movement towards the succour of the British—and although the French cavalry scarcely exceeded two hundred men, and the Spanish, under Whittingham, amounted to more than six, the latter never drew a sabre. Never was there a finer field for cavalry to act upon with effect—Ruffin’s left was perfectly open—and even a demonstration of attack must have turned defeat to ruin. Three troops of German hussars, under Ponsonby, reached the field at the close of the battle, just as the beaten divisions were attempting to unite. They charged through the French squadrons, overthrew them, captured two guns, and sabred many of Ruffin’s grenadiers, while endeavouring to regain their ranks.
To paint the character of Barosa in a few words, Napier’s will best describe it. “The contemptible feebleness of La Pena furnished a surprising contrast to the heroic vigour of Graham,[132] whose attack was an inspiration rather than a resolution—so wise, so sudden was the decision, so swift, so conclusive was the execution.”
BATTLE OF FUENTES D’ONORO.
Massena takes the field.—Attempts to relieve Almeida.—Lord Wellington prevents it.—Battle of Fuentes d’Onoro.
The army of Portugal, reinforced by that of the north, and two divisions of the ninth corps, mustering forty thousand infantry, and nearly four thousand horse, quitted their cantonments; while Wellington, apprised of this concentration, hastened from the south to Formosa, and resumed the command of the allies, whose force might be computed at thirty-two thousand infantry, and one thousand five hundred cavalry.
Massena’s great object in taking the field again, was to raise the blockade of Almeida, then closely invested by Lord Wellington; while the English commander, determined that this important fortress should not be relieved, resolved, even on unfavourable ground and with an inferior force, to risk a battle.
The river Coa flows past Almeida—its banks are dangerous and steep, and its points of passage few. Beside the bridge of the city, there is a second, seven miles up the stream, at Castello Bom; and a third, twenty miles farther still, at Sabugal. To fight with the river in his rear was hazardous; but Wellington had decided on his course of action, and accordingly he selected the best position which a country of no great military strength would afford.
The Duas Casas runs in a northerly course and nearly parallel with the Coa, having on its left bank the village of Fuentes d’Onoro. It is a sweet hamlet, and prettily situated in front of a sloping hill of easy access, here and there intersprinkled with woods of cork and ilex. The village was a feature of considerable military importance, the channel of the Duas Casas being rocky and broken, and its banks generally steep. Fuentes was occupied by the light troops—the third division were posted on a ridge crossing the road to Villa Formosa—the brigades of Craufurd and Campbell had formed behind the village of Alameda, to observe the bridge over the Duas Casas—Pack’s division observed Almeida closely, and shut in the garrison—Erskine held the great road that crosses the Duas Casas by a ford—while the guerilla cavalry were placed in observation, two miles on the right, at the village of Nava-de-Aver. The position was very extensive, covering, from flank to flank, a surface of nearly six miles.