(1.) Christ's Resurrection; not incredible, for we have no experience to judge by.
(2.) Man's resurrection; not incredible, for the same body need not involve the same molecules.
(E.) Conclusion.
Three considerations which show that the Christian Religion, though improbable, is certainly not incredible.
We pass on now to the Christian Religion, by which we mean the facts and doctrines contained in the Three Creeds, commonly, though perhaps incorrectly, called the Apostles', the Nicene, and the Athanasian. And, as these doctrines are of such vast importance, and of so wonderful a character, we must first consider whether they are credible. Is it conceivable that such doctrines should be true, no matter what evidence they may have in their favour? In this chapter, therefore, we shall deal chiefly with the difficulties of Christianity. Now its four great and characteristic doctrines are those of the Trinity, the Incarnation, the Atonement, and the Resurrection. We will examine each in turn, and then conclude with a few general remarks.
(A.) The Trinity.
To begin with, the Christian religion differs from all others in its idea of the nature of God. According to Christianity, the Deity exists in some mysterious manner as a Trinity of Persons in a Unity of Nature; so we will first consider the meaning of this doctrine, then its credibility, and lastly its probability. It is not, as some people suppose, a kind of intellectual puzzle, but a statement which, whether true or false, is fairly intelligible, provided, of course, due attention is given to the meaning of the words employed.
(1.) Its meaning.
In the first place, we must carefully distinguish between Person and Substance; this is the key to the whole question. The former has been already considered in [Chapters III.] and [IV.], though it must be remembered that this term, like all others, when applied to God, cannot mean exactly the same as it does when applied to man. All we can say is that, on the whole, it seems the least inappropriate word. The latter is a little misleading, since it is not the modern English word substance, but a Latin translation of a Greek word, which would be better rendered by nature or essence.
But though difficult to explain, its meaning is tolerably clear. Take, for instance, though the analogy must not be pressed too far, the case of three men; each is a distinct human person, but they all have a common human nature. This human nature, which may also be called human substance (in its old sense), humanity, or manhood, has of course no existence apart from the men whose nature it is; it is merely that which they each possess in common, and the possession of which makes each of them a man. And hence, any attribute belonging to human nature would belong to each of the three men, so that each would be mortal, each subject to growth, etc. Each would in fact possess the complete human nature, yet together there would not be three human natures, but only one.