[475] E.g., Matt. 7. 13, 23; 8. 12; 10. 33; 12. 32; 13. 42, 50, etc.
Yet everyone must admit that there are great difficulties in accepting it. For the endless misery of the wicked appears to be inconsistent with the great attributes of God, especially His power, His justice, and His mercy; as well as with the endless happiness of the righteous. We will consider these points in turn.
And first as to God's power. The eternal existence of sinners against God means, it is said, a never-ending conflict between good and evil; and this is most improbable. No doubt it seems so, but then the existence of evil at all is a difficulty; yet as shown in [Chapter V.] it is essential for free will. And the final state of the wicked is but one out of many difficulties connected with human freedom. That God could create a free man at all; that He could foresee how he would use his freedom; that He should allow him to use it wrongly, thus involving himself and others in misery; and that this misery should last for ever; are all to a great extent beyond our comprehension. But as the first three must be admitted, the last is certainly not incredible.
The second and commonest objection refers to God's justice. The suffering, it is said, would be out of all proportion to the offence. Man's life is brief at the most, and every sin in this world cannot deserve countless years of misery in the next. In short, a man's sin here must anyhow be finite, while endless misery, however slight, would be infinite. But very possibly, being sinners ourselves, we do not realise the magnitude of sin, more especially its far-reaching and permanent effect on the character of others, who in their turn may influence others also, and so on indefinitely. In this way the consequences of even a single sin may be endless, and therefore infinite, and if so its guilt may be infinite too. And this also agrees with the analogy of nature. For in nature nothing is forgotten, and even a small act, like planting a flower has (almost) endless consequences, since the ground will never be exactly the same as if it had not been planted.
Moreover, we need not assume that endless misery is for a man's sins here only. Why may not the wicked go on sinning for ever? They must certainly have the power of doing so, for the option of acting, or at all events of thinking right or wrong, is essential to free will; and if we deny them their free will, they are no longer men but mere machines. And it even seems probable that they would do so; for all our experience of human character is that it tends to a final permanence, of good or bad, which nothing can alter. By doing good, men become good—evil gradually loses its influence over them. And then, when their character is fixed, they will cease to be attracted by evil; and they will in consequence remain (and this without any effort or struggle on their part) for ever good, and therefore for ever happy. Similarly with regard to the wicked. By committing sin men become sinful, and then, when their character is fixed, they may remain for ever sinful, and therefore for ever miserable. In each case the man's conduct will be always free; but his character, and therefore the use which he makes of his freedom, will have become fixed. And perhaps one of the strongest motives for leading a good life here, and thus forming a good character, is the knowledge that, whether good or bad, it will be our character for all eternity.
No doubt it is an overwhelming thought that a man's endless happiness, or misery should depend on his short probation in this world; yet as he is given free will with the option of choosing one or the other, there is nothing unjust in the results being so permanent. And it entirely agrees with God's methods in nature, where, for instance, the shape of a tree for centuries is fixed during the short time it is growing.
Nor does the fact of God's foreknowledge as to how each man will act alter the case or cause any injustice, since, as said in [Chapter II.], it does not interfere with man's freedom. God merely foreknows the use man will make of his freedom. Therefore His knowing beforehand that a man will commit a murder does not make it unjust to punish him for doing so. And the same rule applies universally; so that although God foreknows that the wicked will be lost, they will not be lost because God foreknows it. They will be lost because of their own wilful abuse of their own free will; and God foreknows both this, and its consequences.
The third objection refers to God's mercy. Surely, it is said, God would never punish men unless there were a chance of improving them; so it is incredible that He should go on punishing them for ever. But perhaps the future misery of the wicked may not be a punishment at all, in the sense of being inflicted by God; it may be the necessary result of their own acts,—the consequence rather than the punishment of sin. Or if we still use the word punishment, we may say that they will be punished, not so much for doing what they have done, as by being what they have become. It will be according to their works rather than because of them.[476]
[476] Matt. 16. 27; Rom. 2. 6.