(5.) Man's responsibility for his acts.
(6.) Man's moral sense of right and wrong; which enables him to distinguish the quality of acts, and makes him a moral being.
(7.) Man's conscience, by which he can judge of this quality in some cases.
(C.) Difference between Animals and Men.
There is a great mental difference, though probably only of degree; and entire moral difference, since animals, even if free, do not possess a known freedom, and are hence not personal beings.
(D.) Conclusion.
Man consists of three parts, body, mind, and spirit: his unique position.
Having decided on the Existence of God, which is the great truth of Natural Religion, the question now arises whether, if nature can lead us so far, there is no means of getting further. No one will deny that further knowledge is desirable, both as to God, ourselves, and our future destiny, and is there no means of obtaining it? And this brings us to the subject of Revealed Religion, that is to say, of God's making some Revelation to man. And the probability of this will depend partly on the character of man—is he a being at all worthy of a revelation; and partly on the Character of God—is He a Being at all likely to make one? The former question alone will be discussed in this chapter, and we will consider man's mental and moral attributes separately. Nothing need be said about his bodily or physical characteristics, as they have no bearing on the present argument.
(A.) Man's Mental Attributes.
By these are meant man's thoughts and feelings, and that they are different from the matter composing his body seems self-evident. Matter possesses size, weight, colour, shape, and hardness. Mind does not possess any of these. They have no conceivable meaning when applied to thoughts and feelings. Yet both mind and matter exist in man. We each feel conscious that we have something which thinks, and which we call mind; as well as something which moves, and which we call matter (i.e., our bodies); and that these are absolutely distinct from one another. And from the nature of the case this inherent conviction is all we can appeal to. For mind, if it exists at all, being different from matter, is beyond the reach of ordinary scientific discovery. We cannot however be more certain of anything than of these inherent convictions, which form the basis of all our knowledge. Even the propositions of Euclid are only deductions from some other of our convictions, such as that the whole is greater than its part.