But the redemption system, like everything else that was susceptible of abuse, was turned aside from its legitimate purpose and made to answer a mischievous end. The low rate at which the bills were taken in New York accelerated their return in bulk, as a basis of exchange, or for credit in account. Thus their distinctive character as circulation was in a great measure destroyed. The cheap redemption, so desirable in a common state of the market, became virtually a premium on the currency of New York. The tendency, then, was to take it out of a healthful circulation and throw it back to its source, whereby it profited nobody so much as the stockholders of the express companies. The country banks might keep their own bills in a perpetual circulation, by exchanging them with each other, and thus creating a trade in them. The same packages were not unfrequently kept unopened in the circuit, and reissued in bulk, as often as they were needed to supply balances.
In a panicky time such redeeming banks must either put more capital into the service or reject the bills. In 1857, in spite of the best management, the currency circuit was kept up; the bills of one bank were paid for the bills of all the others.
Another evil arose from these banks. The credit given to an unsecured currency by their indorsement gave it a wide circulation, to the displacement of bills that were based upon State and United States stocks. It was now seen that this credit had no other basis than a current deposit by the issuing bank, which deposit was in very small proportion to its outstanding bills; and that the redeeming bank was prompt to the hour in repudiating those bills if the deposit was not maintained. This was a fallacious credit, entirely independent of the separate ability of the issuing banks. The general result was that bills were likely to fail in transit, and they would not then be admitted as a deposit, which would involve the rejection of others. And so the row of bricks began to tumble in both directions.
There was no incident of that panic that spread its terrors abroad with such sure and rapid steps as the rejection, by the redemption banks, of bills which they had been accustomed to receive on deposit. If it had been possible to remove all other causes of excitement, that alone would probably have involved the suspension of specie payments. It filled all the shops of the country with alarm. It created mobs in the savings banks, and pushed forward the panic, by exciting the fears of the multitude.
The Example of France.
Professor Laughlin has the gall, as few of his confreres have, to appeal to “the example of France,” after the Prussian war of 1871, in not “interfering with her media of exchange.” It is hard to tell whether his statement is based upon impudence or ignorance. She interfered with all the ideas of propriety entertained by his clique in a way that has been secretly their despair ever since. Yet hear his glorification of a scheme that cuts all the ground from under him. He says:
“France borrowed largely, collected large amounts of capital by the creation of her national debt, and, on the other hand, retained her circulating medium in so perfect a condition that the moment the war was over she slipped along smoothly upon the wheels of industrial success and prosperity, without any derangement of her business. And, during that time, she carried through one of the most magnificent schemes of exchange, in the form of the payment of indemnity, that has ever taken place in history. She actually paid that foreign indemnity of the war to Germany practically without deranging the rate of exchange in France.”
He don’t tell how. Don’t tell that she flooded all the avenues of trade with her paper money, and thus made her goods so plenty and cheap that Germany bought them instead of her own, and was then in turn nearly bankrupted; so that France paid three quarters of the “milliard” in French goods!
But hear the true story from Wendell Phillips, an all-round, up-to-date reformer, whose motto was,[was,] “Act in the living present.” When the monopolizers of black men were beaten he turned to face the monopolizers of all men and women. Here is his eloquent picture:
“France has just paid Germany one billion dollars. Her chief cities have been sacked and plundered. Humiliated by defeat, torn by civil dissensions, she laughs, while all the rest of Christendom wade through the mire of bankruptcy. Her ships are full busy, and what little other nations do is in carrying to and fro her manufactures. Her homes are happy, her streets crowded with passing trains loaded with goods; all her mills hurrying night and day to get even with her demand upon them. Labor walks rejoicing and capital sleeps easy, fat with its gains. What magician has done this? Paper money. Like the rest of the nations, she ran to its protection during the stress and strain of her German war. Unlike and wiser than the rest of us, she has not hurried back to coin. Wiser than we, she received the paper she offered to others. This honesty has its reward. Her paper is, to-day, more valuable than gold.”