“They have made it easy at any time to alter their cantonal or federal constitutions—that is, to change, even radically, the organization of society, the social contract, and thus to permit a peaceful revolution at the will of the majority. They have as well cleared from the way of majority rule every obstacle—privilege of ruler, fetter of ancient law, power of legislator. They have simplified the structure of government, held their officials as servants, rendered bureaucracy impossible, converted their representatives to simple committeemen, and shown the parliamentary system not essential to law-making. They have written their laws in language so plain that a layman may be judge in the highest court. They have forestalled monopolies, improved and reduced taxation, avoided incurring heavy public debts, and made a better distribution of their land than any other European country. They have practically given home rule in local affairs to every community. They have calmed disturbing political elements; the press is purified, the politician disarmed, the civil service well regulated. Hurtful partisanship is passing away. Since the people as a whole will never willingly surrender their sovereignty, reactionary movement is possible only in case the nation should go backward. But the way is open forward. Social ideals may be realized in act and institution. Even now the liberty-loving Swiss citizen can discern in the future a freedom in which every individual—independent, possessed of rights in nature’s resources and in command of the fruits of his toil—may, at his will, on the sole condition that he respect the like aim of other men, pursue his happiness.”

Proportional Representation.

The term proportional representation has come to be generally applied to a method of electing representatives whereby the representation shall be in proportion to the votes polled by the several parties, or groups of voters, as against the present method of electing them from single districts by a plurality vote. To effect this end numerous plans have been put forth.

The cumulative vote allows the voter as many votes as there are representatives to be elected and permits him to distribute them as he pleases among the candidates. This method is applied in a limited degree to the choice of members of the lower house of the Illinois legislature. Each district elects three members, and the voter can cast three votes for one candidate, one and a half votes for two, or one vote each for three.

With the limited or restricted vote the voter has a less number of votes than the number of representatives to be elected. Thus in the city of Boston the new law allows the voter to vote for only seven aldermen on one ticket, and declares the twelve candidates receiving the highest vote elected.

The preferential, or, as it is commonly known, the Hare vote, allows the voter to cast one ballot upon which he has named as many candidates as he sees fit, the candidates named being understood to represent the first, second, third, etc., choice. The whole number of ballots cast is divided by the number of representatives to be chosen, and the quotient is the quota, or number of votes required to elect one candidate. In counting the ballots the first choices are read first; the candidate who receives a quota is declared elected, and the remaining votes cast for him are counted for the next name on the ballot who is the second choice of the voter.

The free list, or Swiss vote, allows the voter to vote for a list or ticket, as we do in this country, and to designate preferences on the list. The total vote is divided as in the Hare system to get the quota, and the several parties are apportioned representatives according to the number of quotas they have. The successful candidates are those standing highest on their respective lists. This method is now in use in Switzerland for the election of representatives.

The Gove system is a modified form of the Hare method. Instead of the voter naming the candidates whom he prefers, the candidates themselves before election announce to whom they will give their surplus vote.

The proxy vote is simply an introduction of the corporation vote into legislative bodies. The candidates who are elected in the legislative assembly cast, not their individual votes, as at present, but the number of proxies they hold.

It will be seen that there are three principles involved in these several methods, the election by cumulation of votes, the election by quotas, and the vote by proxies. The cumulative vote was the first to be put into actual service, being used in England for the election of members of school boards, etc., and in this country in the so-called three-cornered districts for the election of members of the legislature. It still has the support of quite a number of persons, but its limitations are now coming to be recognized. John Stuart Mill, who was an advocate of the cumulative vote, declared it to be merely a makeshift in comparison with the quota system of Hare. The objection to the cumulative vote lies in the fact that if the districts are small only two parties can obtain representation, and these in an arbitrary way, while if the districts be larger, that is, if the number of representatives in the district be made greater, the waste and uncertainty is apparent. A party may decide to vote for four candidates when it has votes enough to elect six; or it may try for six when it has votes for only four. In either case it is deprived of a part of its just share in the representation. The proxy system contains some theoretical merits, but it is feared that in practice it would not work well at present. The tendency to hero-worship would prompt so many voters to give their proxies to a few favorites that the real voting strength of the assembly would be in the hands of two or three men, thus destroying its value as a deliberative body.