These gentlemen must not, therefore, be considered as acting in concert with Draper, Markley and others, but must, in justice to them and to their action in the premises, and to their said affidavits, be regarded as honest and candid objectors to the petition and to the action of the Court thereon.
These three gentlemen stood before the court below on the hearing of the motion to set aside its illegal order and made known these facts and verified them by their affidavits, and asked the court to revoke and set aside its order. And they, with Minor and Gunn, now stand before this court in the person of their counsel and ask that said order may be set aside. And in this they simply ask that that justice may be done to them which was strangely and wrongfully denied by the court below.
Here we have the strange spectacle of three men, on whose petition this order seems to have been made, coming in and disclaiming the whole thing and asking this court to set it aside.
As a legal proposition I maintain: First, that in this country the widest latitude is given by law to religious sentiment; and second, that the temporal courts have no jurisdiction over churches or church judicatories or church members, as such, except simply to protect them, to protect the civil rights of others, and to preserve the public peace.
In the case of the Baptist Church in Hartford vs. Witherell, in the Court of Chancery in the State of New York, Chancellor Walworth, in delivering the opinion of the court, says:
“Over the Church, as such, the legal or temporal tribunals of this country do not profess to have any jurisdiction whatever, except so far as is necessary to protect the civil rights of others and to preserve the public peace.” (See 3 Paige Reports, 301.)
So in the case of Lawyer vs. Cepperly, the same court decides substantially the same thing. (7 Paige Chancery Reports, 281; see also Angel & Ames on Corporations, sec. 58, page 28, note 1, page 29; Stebbins vs. Jennings, 10 Pickering Rep., 172; Gable vs. Miller, 10 Paige Rep., 627.)
I am fully aware that courts of chancery have ample jurisdiction to determine questions touching the legal title to church property, real or personal; and that in order to protect a Church in the enjoyment of its corporate property that court might appoint trustees.
But even this is to be understood with some limitation. Suppose, for example, that a church has full and ample power by its own church laws, church courts and judicatories to protect itself or to put itself in a condition where it will not need the action of the temporal court, ought the temporal court to interfere? Most clearly not.
And more particularly the temporal court ought not to interfere in this case, for the following six plain and sufficient reasons: First, because there is no contest in this case about property; second, because no title is involved; third, because no possession is asked for; fourth, because no obedience to rightful authority or authority of any kind is sought to be enforced; fifth, because no wrong is sought to be prevented; and sixth, because no injury to the church is sought to be avoided.