Glimpses of the Past: History of the River St. John, A.D. 1604-1784

by W. O. Raymond

So far as the French and English colonies were concerned the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle scarcely deserved the name of a truce. It was merely a breathing time in which preparations were being made for the final struggle. The treaty was so indefinite that a vast amount of territory was claimed by both parties. The English were naturally the most aggressive for the population of the English colonies was 1,200,000 while Canada had but 60,000 people.

Count de la Galissonniere, the governor-general of Canada, though diminutive in stature and slightly deformed, was resolute and energetic; moreover he was a statesman, and had his policy been followed it might have been better for France. He advised the government to send out ten thousand peasants from the rural districts and settle them along the frontiers of the disputed territory, but the French court thought it unadvisable to depopulate France in order to people the wilds of Canada. Failing in this design, the Count determined vigorously to assert the sovereignty of France over the immense territory in dispute. Accordingly he claimed for his royal master the country north of the Bay of Fundy and west to the Kennebec, and his officers established fortified posts on the River St. John and at the Isthmus of Chignecto. He at the same time stirred up the Indians to 96 hostilities in order to render the position of the English in Nova Scotia and New England as uncomfortable as possible, and further to strengthen his hands he endeavored to get the Acadians in the peninsula of Nova Scotia to remove to the St. John river and other parts of “the debatable territory.” His policy led to a counter policy on the part of Shirley and Lawrence (governors respectively of Massachusetts and Nova Scotia) namely, that the Acadians should not be allowed to go where they liked and to do as they pleased but must remain on their lands and take the oath of allegiance to the English sovereign or be removed to situations where they could do no harm to the interests of the British colonies in the then critical condition of affairs.

Ostensibly there was peace from the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle until war was declared between the rival powers in 1756. But in the meantime there was a collision between them on the Ohio river, where the French built Fort Duquesne on the site now occupied by Pittsburg. The governors of the English colonies held a conference and decided on rather a startling programme for a time of peace. Gen. Braddock was to march on Fort Duquesne and drive the French from the Ohio valley; Shirley, of Massachusetts, was to lead an expedition against Niagara; William Johnson, was to take Crown Point and secure control of Lake Champlain; while, in Acadia, Colonel Monckton was to attack the French position at Fort Beausejour. In every instance the English were the aggressors but they justified their action on the ground that the places to be attacked were on British territory. This the French as emphatically denied. Braddock’s attempt resulted in a most disastrous failure, Shirley’s expedition was abandoned, William Johnson won a brilliant victory at Lake George and Colonel Monckton captured Beausejour.

The course of events on the River St. John and in other parts of Acadia harmonizes with the general situation of affairs in America at this time.

As the period under consideration is one of which comparatively little has been written, it may be well to make use of the information contained in the voluminous correspondence of the French ministers and their subordinates in America.

Early in the summer of 1749 the Count de la Galissonniere sent the Sieur de Boishebert to the lower part of the River St. John with a small detachment to secure the French inhabitants against the threats of Capt. Gorham, who had been sent by the Governor of Nova Scotia to make the inhabitants renew the oath of allegiance to the English sovereign, which de la Galissonniere says “they ought never to have taken.” The Count expresses his views on the situation with terseness and vigor: “The River St. John is not the only place the English wish to invade. They claim the entire coast, from that river to Beaubassin, and from Canso to Gaspe, in order to render themselves sovereigns of all the territory of the Abenakis, Catholics and subjects of the king, a nation that has never acknowledged nor wishes to acknowledge their domination and which is the most faithful to us in Canada. If we abandon to England this land, which comprises more than 180 leagues of seacoast, that is to say almost as much as from Bayonne to Dunkirk, we must renounce all communication by land from Canada with Acadia and Isle Royal, together with the means of succoring the one and retaking the other.” 97 The Count further argues that to renounce the territory in dispute will deprive the Acadians of all hope of a place of refuge on French soil and reduce them to despair, and he apprehends that the English, having no reason to care for them, will suffer them to have no missionaries and will destroy at their leisure their religion. “It is very easy,” he adds, “to hinder the English establishing themselves on these lands. They will have to proceed through the woods and along narrow rivers, and as long as the French are masters of the Abenakis and the Acadians are provided with arms and supplies from France the English will not expose themselves to their attacks.”

Both sides began to consider the advisability of taking forcible possession of the disputed territory, but the French were the first to take action. In June, 1749, Mascarene reported two French officers with twenty or thirty men from Canada and a number of Indians had come to erect a fort and make a settlement at the mouth of the river, and that two vessels with stores and materials were coming to them from Quebec. On receipt of this information, Cornwallis, who had just arrived at Halifax, sent Captain Rous in the sloop “Albany” to St. John to ascertain what works were in course of erection by the French, and to demand the authority for their action. He also issued a proclamation in French prohibiting the Acadians from making a settlement on the St. John.

When the “Albany” arrived no one was found at the old fort and for some time no inhabitants, either French or Indian, were seen. At last a French schooner entered the harbor, laden with provisions. Captain Rous took her, but offered to release her provided the master would go up the river and bring down the French officers. The master accordingly went up the river in a canoe, and the next day a French officer with thirty men and 150 Indians came down and took position, with their colors flying, at a point on the shore within musket shot of the “Albany.” The commander of the French was Pierre Boishebert. He had fixed his headquarters ten miles up the river at the place now known as Woodman’s Point, just above the mouth of the Nerepis, where in Governor Villebon’s time there had been an Indian fortress.

Captain Rous ordered the French to strike their colors; their commander demurred, and asked to be allowed to march back with his colors flying, promising to return the next day without them. Rous ordered the colors to be struck immediately, which being done, the officers were invited on board the “Albany.” They showed their instructions from the governor of Canada, Count de la Galissonniere, by which it appeared they had at first been ordered to establish a fortified post, but afterwards the order had been countermanded and they were required merely to prevent the English from establishing themselves till the right of possession should be settled between the two crowns.

The letter of Captain Rous to Boishebert, upon the arrival of the former at St. John harbor, is rather quaint reading. The original is in French.