Glimpses of the Past: History of the River St. John, A.D. 1604-1784

by W. O. Raymond

In the autumn of the year 1750 Captain Rous, while cruising in the “Albany,” fell in with a French man-of-war and a schooner off Cape Sable. The schooner had been sent from Quebec with provisions and warlike stores for the Indians on the River St. John. Rous fired several guns to bring the enemy to, but in response the ship cleared for action and when the “Albany” ran up alongside of her, poured in a broadside. A spirited engagement ensued, which resulted in the capture of the French ship, but the schooner got safely into St. John. One midshipman and two sailors were killed on board the “Albany,” and five men on board the Frenchman.

Governor Cornwallis reported this as the second instance in which the governor of Canada had sent a vessel into a British port with arms, etc., for the Indian enemy. The governor of Canada, the Marquis de la Jonquiere, however, viewed the matter from a different standpoint and demanded of Cornwallis an explanation in regard to the vessel captured. He again asserted the right of the French king to the lands occupied by his troops, and by his orders four Boston schooners were seized at Louisbourg as a reprisal for the brigantine taken by the “Albany.”

The correspondence between the Governor of Quebec and the French colonial minister supplies some interesting details of the sea-fight in the Bay of Fundy in the autumn of 1750. It seems that Boishebert and the missionary Germain had sent an urgent request to the Quebec authorities for provisions for the women and children of the Indian families, during the absence of the men in their winter hunting, and for supplies needed by the French garrison on the St. John. Accordingly Bigot, the intendant, fitted out the St. Francis, a brigantine of 130 to 140 tons, to escort a schooner laden with the required articles to the mouth of the 101 St. John river. The St. Francis carried 10 guns and had a crew or 70 men, including 32 soldiers, under command of the sieur de Vergor.

On the 16th of October, as the brigantine and schooner were entering the Bay of Fundy, Captain Vergor noticed, at 11 in the morning, an English frigate, which put on all sail and came after him. A quarter of an hour afterwards the frigate fired a cannon shot and displayed her flag. Vergor immediately hoisted his own flag and responded with a cannon shot, continuing on his way. The English frigate continued the chase and a half hour later fired a second shot followed by a third, which went through the little top-mast of the St. Francis. Vergor then made preparations for the combat, the frigate continuing to approach and firing four cannon shots at his sails. When within speaking distance Vergor called through his trumpet that he was in command of a ship of the King of France carrying provisions and munitions to the troops of his majesty. The English captain in reply ordered him to lay to or he would sink him. Vergor repeated his announcement in English, but, for answer the frigate discharged a volley of all her guns damaging the ship and killing two of his men. He in turn now fell upon the frigate, discharging all his guns and musketry. The fight lasted nearly five hours, at the expiration of which the St. Francis was so crippled by the loss of her mainmast and injuries to her sails and rigging that Vergor was obliged to surrender. His long boat having been rendered unserviceable, the English captain sent his own to convey him on board. Vergor found the frigate to be the Albany, of 14 guns and 28 swivel guns and a crew of 120 men, commanded by Captain Rous. The Albany did not pursue the schooner, which proceeded to St. John, but sailed for Halifax with her prize, where she arrived three days later.

Vergor was sent on shore and confined to a room in the house of Governor Cornwallis. The governor treated him courteously, heard his version of the affair and called a council meeting the next day to inquire into the circumstances of the case.

Vergor’s official report conveys the idea that Cornwallis was rather doubtful as to whether Rous had acted in a legitimate manner. The council held five or six meetings without coming to any decision. Meanwhile, with the governor’s approval, Vergor had a new main-mast cut and drawn from the woods by the crew of the St. Francis and arrangements were made to repair the damaged sails and shrouds. However the matter was soon afterwards taken out of Cornwallis’ hands by Captain Rous, who brought the case before the Admiralty Court, where the St. Francis was confiscated for engaging in illicit commerce in the province of his Britannic Majesty.

The French authorities took up the matter and sent a spirited remonstrance to the British ambassador, claiming that the transaction was opposed to every kind of law and demanding the restoration of the captured vessel with exemplary punishment of Captain Rous and the admiralty officers at Halifax, as well as orders on the part of his Britannic Majesty to all officers in his ships and colonies to observe the peace and to undertake nothing contrary thereto. A demand was also made that the English should in no way hinder the migration of the Acadians from the peninsula of Nova Scotia to the mainland or elsewhere. 102 It is needless to say that the British government did not comply with these demands and here was one of the many grievances that led to a renewal of the war a little later.

The Sieur de Vergor and the crew of the St. Francis were sent to Louisbourg, and the brigantine retained at Halifax as a prize on the ground that she was engaged in furnishing warlike munitions to the Indian enemy and interfering with British rights on the River St. John.

Cornwallis evidently felt the difficulties of his position very keenly. Halifax was yet in its infancy and in a comparatively defenceless state; Louisbourg and Quebec were supporting the French on the St. John and he had neither the men nor the money to oppose their proceedings. It seems, too, that he had been called to account for the large expenditure he had made in Nova Scotia. In his letters to the Lords of Trade he expresses himself as distracted between his desire to lessen expenses and his fears of losing the province. He was doubtful if, with the forces at his disposal, he could prevent the French from fortifying St. John and Beausejour, and he observes, with some irritation, that it has been said, “What has he to contend with? Three or four hundred Indians: it is a time of peace and no other enemy to fear.” So far from this being an adequate representation of the situation, he claimed the facts were that the French had taken possession of all Nova Scotia north of the Bay of Fundy, and had obliged many of the Acadians of the peninsula to remove thither and swear allegiance to the king of France; that the governor of Canada, through his emissary le Loutre, had offered a premium for every prisoner, head, or scalp of an Englishman; that the French had sent a ship of thirty-six guns and 300 men to the Bay of Fundy and had not only incited the Indians to hostilities but had behaved as if there were open war.

The French at Quebec, in view of the difficulty of keeping in touch with their posts on the north side of the Bay of Fundy, endeavored to improve the route of communication via the River St. John. During the previous war they had made a road from Riviere du Loup to Lake Temisquata, but the woods were growing up again and deep holes began to render it impracticable. Bigot, the intendant, therefore spent 600 or 700 livres in improving it, and in consequence couriers were able to come to Quebec in ten or twelve days from Shediac, and in eight from the River St. John. For the convenience of travelers three magazines of supplies were established, one at Riviere du Loup, one at Temisquata and one at the head of Madawaska river. The Marquis de la Jonquiere anticipated great advantages from the overland route of communication. He says in a letter to France, dated May 1, 1751: “We have made a road and are going to make some flat-bottomed conveyances so that in winter we will be able to transport by hauling over the snow the things most needed for the River St. John, and in summer we shall be able to make the transport by means of carts and flat-bottomed batteaux. These arrangements will be very useful supposing that the English continue to stop the vessels we send there.”