In the month of January, 1754, Lieut.-Governor Lawrence informed the Lords of Trade that the French were hard at work making settlements on the St. John and were offering great inducements to the Acadians of the peninsula to join them. He could not prevent some families from going, but the greater part were too much attached to their lands to leave them. In the opinion of Lawrence it was absolutely necessary, for the development and control of Acadia as an English colony, that the forts of Beausejour and the mouth of the River St. John should be destroyed, and the French driven from the settlements they were establishing north of the Bay of Fundy. Although the Indians had committed no hostilities for two years, he believed no dependence could be placed on their quietude so long as the French were allowed to exercise their disturbing influence among them.
Lawrence now began to consult with the Governor of Massachusetts, Sir William Shirley, about the removal of the Acadians from Chignecto and the River St. John. He proposed that two thousand troops should be raised in New England, which with the regular troops already in Nova Scotia would be sufficient for the business, the command of the expedition to be given to Colonel Robert Monckton. It was intended the expedition should sail from Boston about the 20th of April, but it was delayed more than a month awaiting the arrival of arms from England, and it was not until early in June that it arrived at Chignecto. To aid the expedition Captain Rous[32] was sent with a small squadron to the Bay of Fundy. The details of the seige of Fort Beausejour need not here be given, suffice it to say that after four days’ bombardment the Sieur de Vergor was obliged, on the 16th June, to surrender to Colonel Monckton.
Captain Rous, with three twenty-gun ships and a sloop, immediately sailed for St. John, where it was reported the French had two ships of thirty-six guns each. He anchored outside the harbor and sent his boats to reconnoitre. They found no 116 French ships and on their appearance Boishebert, the officer in command of the fort, burst his cannon, blew up his magazine, burned everything he could and marched off. The next morning the Indians invited Captain Rous ashore and gave him the strongest assurances of their desire to make peace with the English, saying that they had refused to assist the French.
A few weeks after Boishebert had been thus obliged to abandon Fort Menagouche there occurred the tragic event known as the “Acadian Expulsion.” The active agents employed by Lawrence and Shirley in this transaction were Colonel Monckton and his subordinates, of whom Lieut.-Colonel John Winslow and Capt. Murray were the most actively engaged. These officers evidently had little relish for the task imposed on them. Winslow in his proclamation to the inhabitants of Grand Pre, Minas, etc., says: “The duty I am now upon, though necessary, is very disagreeable to my natural make and temper.” The hostility of the New England troops to the Acadians added to the difficulties of their officers. Murray wrote to Winslow: “You know our soldiers hate them, and if they can find a pretence to kill them they will.”
Of recent years there has been much controversy concerning the expulsion of the Acadians and widely differing opinions have been expressed on the one hand by Parkman, Murdoch, Hannay, Hind and Aikins and on the other by Casgrain, Richard, Porier, Gaudet and Savary. Upon the merits of this controversy it is not necessary to enter, and it will be more in keeping with our present subject to refer to the Acadian Expulsion only as it concerns the history of events on the River St. John.
The position of the Sieur de Boishebert after the capture of Beausejour and the fort at St. John was a very embarassing one. His letter to the Chevalier de Drucour, who commanded at Louisbourg, is of interest in this connection.
“At the River St. John, 10 October, 1755.
“Monsieur,—As the enemy has constantly occupied the route of communication since the fall of Beausejour, I have not had the honor of informing you of the state of affairs at this place.
“I was compelled to abandon the fort—or rather the buildings—that I occupied on the lower part of the river in accordance with orders that I had received in case of being attacked. I have beaten a retreat as far as the narrows (detroits) of the river, from which the enemy has retired, not seeing any advantage sufficient to warrant an attempt to drive me from thence.
“I have succeeded, sir, in preventing the inhabitants of this place from falling under the domination of the English.
“Monsieur de Vaudreuil, approving this manoeuvre, has directed me to establish a temporary camp (camp volant) sit such place as I may deem most suitable. Even were I now to go to Quebec he could not give me any assistance, all the troops and militia being in the field.
“I received on the 16th of August a letter from the principal inhabitants living in the vicinity of Beausejour beseeching me to come to their assistance. I set out the 20th with a detachment of 125 men, French and Indians.”
Shortly after his arrival at the French settlements on the Petitcodiac, Boishebert had a sharp engagement with a party of New England troops who had been sent there to burn the houses of the Acadians and who were about to set fire to their chapel. The conflict occurred near Hillsboro, the shiretown of Albert county, 117 and resulted in a loss to the English of one officer and five or six soldiers killed, and a lieutenant and ten soldiers wounded, while Boishebert’s loss was one Indian killed and three wounded. He returned shortly afterwards to the River St. John accompanied by thirty destitute families with whom he was obliged to share the provisions sent him from Quebec.
Evidently the Marquis de Vaudreuil relied much upon the sagacity and courage of his lieutenant on the St. John river in the crisis that had arisen in Acadia. In his letter to the French colonial minister, dated the 18th October, 1755, he writes that the English were now masters of Fort Beausejour and that Boishebert, the commander of the River St. John, had burnt his fort, not being able to oppose the descent of the enemy. He had given him orders to hold his position on the river and supplies had been sent him for the winter. He hoped that Father Germain, then at Quebec, would return without delay to his Indian mission and act in concert with Boishebert. The marquis summarises his reasons for wishing to maintain the post on the River St. John as follows:—
“1. As long as I hold this river and have a detachment of troops there I retain some hold upon Acadia for the King, and the English cannot say that they have forced the French to abandon it.
2. I am assured of the fidelity of the Acadians and the Indians, who otherwise might think themselves abandoned and might yield to the English.
3. Mon. de Boishebert will rally the Acadians from far and near and will try to unite them and their families in one body. These Acadians, so reunited, will be compelled for their own security actively to resist the enemy if he presents himself.
4. Mon. de Boishebert will in like manner be engaged rallying the savages and forming of them a body equally important, and by corresponding with M. Manach, the missionary at Miramichi, will be able, in case of necessity, to unite the savages of that mission to his own in opposing the advance of the enemy.
5. He will be able constantly to have spies at Beausejour and Halifax, and to take some prisoners who will inform him of the situation and strength of the English.
6. He will be able to organize parties of Acadians and savages to harras the enemy continually and hinder his obtaining firewood for the garrison at Beausejour (Fort Cumberland).
7. By holding the River St. John I can at all times have news from Louisbourg.”