Old Mackinaw; Or, The Fortress of the Lakes and its Surroundings

by W. P. Strickland

We set out, then, with the proposition that the bulky products of the West must be carried by water and not by rail, and will state a few facts that in our humble opinion will place this proposition beyond all cavil. So for as figures can be obtained, and correct calculations made, it has been demonstrated that freight cannot be moved on American railroads for less than one cent per ton per mile. This is actually the first cost, even in the coal regions of Pennsylvania. It is therefore fair to presume that the Grand Trunk, with conceded advantages of superior and economical management, cannot move freight at a less cost, and that the figure named will yield nothing to the stockholders in the shape of dividend. It is true that freight has been carried at an actual loss, and, as we are about to show, the same thing will to some extent be done again, but if persevered in this can only result in ruin, and no one will assert that it ought to be taken as a legitimate basis for future calculations. It follows, then, that $8,80 is the lowest sum for which a ton can be moved from Detroit to Portland, the distance between the two cities being eight hundred and eighty miles. This showing may not be relished by those most immediately interested in the Grand Trunk Railway, nor may it be palatable to the producers of the West, who have built high hopes on this road as an outlet to the Atlantic, but it is useless to attempt to shut our eyes to obvious facts. The West has for years possessed shorter and consequently cheaper routes to the seaboard, and in winter the cost of reaching-the Atlantic cities has always been and now is from 100 to 200 per cent, greater by rail than during the navigation season by the cheaper mode. This is easily proved. Let us look at the distance by the old route by the way of Suspension Bridge:

Detroit to Suspension Bridge, is 232 miles; the Bridge to Albany, 300; Albany to Boston 200; total 732.

Thus we see that the whole distance from Detroit to Boston is seven hundred and thirty-two miles, or one hundred and forty-eight less than from Detroit to Portland. As regards shipments from Detroit to Boston, via the Grand Trunk, the matter is worse, for we have to add one hundred and three miles from Portland to Boston, making the old route two hundred and fifty-three miles shorter to that point than by the newly opened road. It is evident therefore, that the West is not likely to gain anything permanently by the new route, except in so far as it may open up some local trade, which, inconsiderable at first, may eventually assume considerable importance. Of course, what is true regarding Detroit, is also true with respect to every point west of us.

Every one conversant with trade must admit that goods can be carried as cheap from any port in Europe to New York as to Portland. The distance from New York to Detroit, via Albany and Suspension Bridge, is six hundred and eighty-two miles, or one hundred and ninety-eight miles less than from Portland to Detroit. Goods ought certainly to be carried cheaper from New York to Detroit than by a route near two hundred miles further.

We learn that the New York Central Railroad Company are now perfecting a plan for ticketing passengers and goods from any point in the Western, Southern, and Southwestern States, and vice versa. Thus at least one important advantage to the West is already apparent, growing out of the comprehensive action of the Grand Trunk managers, while the action of the New York Central is the sure precursor of a momentous era in railroad annals. The present year is likely to witness the first battle in a war for the European and domestic trade of the West, that may in the end turn the entire current into other channels. It will be a strife of giants, and the prize the most magnificent ever battled for, either in the tented field or in the nobler contests of nations for commercial supremacy. That prize is the carrying trade of an empire fast rising into manly vigor, and destined to attain to a point during the present generation that will dazzle the world with its vastness and grandeur. On one side will be arrayed the Grand Trunk Railway, with its sixty million dollars of capital, backed by the government of Canada, and sustained by every merchant of the British North American colonies, aided by powerful friends in Europe—men of character, standing and capital, who will strain every nerve to supply their darling road with business, in which they will have the sympathy of the whole English people—for in both England and Canada the Grand Trunk is looked upon as a great triumph of national engineering skill, while at the same time it gratifies the national pride, as it gives the world one more convincing proof of that indomitable pluck that is the chief secret of the great celebrity attained by the merchants of the "fast anchored isle" for commercial enterprise.

On the other side will be marshaled the forces of the "Grand Trunk" lines of railroad leading to the Western States from the Atlantic seaboard. The most prominent on the list is the New York Central Railroad, with her natural allies, the Great Western of Canada, the Hudson River Railroad, and the Western Railroad of Massachusetts. Next in order, as parties in the struggle, are the New York and Erie, the Pennsylvania Central, and the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, not to speak of the local roads in Ohio, Indiana, and Michigan, that will be affected more or less in the contest for supremacy.

The Grand Trunk will fight under one banner, and that banner will carry on its broad folds the commercial prestige of the British Empire, and will have the sympathy of the British people. This, which will probably carry with it, as a coincident, plenty of the "sinews of war," will be decidedly a vantage ground to stand upon.

The American interests will come into the field under different leaders, having no unity of action, and hating and fearing each other; who have never had confidence in each others' words or actions; who have never displayed any generosity toward each other; whose dealings with each other have been marked by cheating and bad faith, as the breaking of all convention treaties has proved. Under such a load of demoralization, all of them combined are perhaps not more than a match for the Grand Trunk. One of the American roads will have to stand in the van and sustain the first onset, and the elected one will be the New York Central. In every point of view it is the one best able to do so. It is managed and controlled by men of large experience and iron will—men who do not know what defeat is, and who, come what may, will show that their metal has the true ring.

The result of such a contest none can foresee; albeit after the smoke of the battle is cleared away, the wreck will only show that it has been a costly and useless fight for the stockholders, and the conviction that God's highways are superior to man's will gain strength, insomuch as to assume far more practical importance than it has hitherto attained. The only method of carrying on a successful trade between the Western States and the seaports of Europe, is by water, and to this conclusion all must come, in the end, on both sides of the Atlantic.

In order to make the trade productive of substantial benefit to all interested in it, the West must have free course down the St. Lawrence, and an enlargement of the Canadian canals, so that vessels of say eighteen hundred tons can pass down to the ports of Montreal and Quebec without unloading, and continue on their way to Europe without breaking bulk. A depth of fourteen feet water, with locks of corresponding capacity on the canals would accomplish this important end. The multifarious and rapidly increasing products of the Great West, her timber, flour, wheat, corn, oats, rye, barley, pork, beef, butter, lard, cheese, meal, and every description of agricultural produce could then be laid down in the ports of England so cheaply that it would greatly reduce the cost of the necessaries of life, and give a new impetus to the manufacturing interest of Great Britain. At the same time it would directly tend to cheapen every article that the West requires to import, thus proving of double advantage to our producers. In both cases the producer and consumer would be brought face to face, to the obvious advantage of all concerned. The manufacturing prosperity of England depends upon an unlimited supply of cheap labor, and that supply cannot be had unless she can supply such laborers with an unlimited supply of cheap food. The West has the capacity not only to furnish an inexhaustible quantity of cheap food, but it can purchase and consume a larger amount of the productions of English skill and labor than any other section of the world. Why, then, cannot both parties hit on some scheme that will bring them more closely into the fellowship of trade? It can be done, if both will unite to obtain an unimpeded outlet via the St. Lawrence for vessels and steamers of heavy burden. So far as Quebec and Montreal are concerned, it is very difficult to say whether the consummation of the proposed enlargement would redound most to their benefit, or to that of our Western lake cities. In both cases the gain would be beyond computation. The two important Canadian cities named would become at once important seaports. They would become two of the depots for the vast commerce of two continents, and would derive great benefits from the opening up of a local traffic with the West, which at present amounts to but very little, so far as they are concerned. Our lake cities would all become large commercial centres, and would supply the population of the region tributary to them, respectively, with dry goods, crockery, hardware, paints, oils, and all kinds of imported merchandise, at a cheaper rate by a considerable per centage, than they could be purchased at New York, or any city on the Atlantic. Detroit would be much nearer Liverpool than Buffalo now is by the usual route, and Chicago and Milwaukee would be almost as near, practically.