A study of regimental actions shows clearly that the battalions which faced musketry the steadiest, the longest and the oftenest, were the ones whose aggregate loss during the war was greatest. Fighting regiments leave a bloody wake behind them; retreating regiments lose few men. At Chancellorsville the heaviest losses were in the corps that stood—not in the one that broke.—Fox.
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W. R. B., in Wilmington Messenger:
I write you a letter, as I wish to tell you about certain conversations I lately had with an old Confederate—an officer of high rank, and one who, after the war, was on intimate terms with Gen. Lee. It will also contain a copy of a letter received by me some two months ago from a member of Gen. Lee’s staff, and some other things which I think will interest your old soldier readers. In one of the conversations referred to mention was made of the letters of General Cobb (who was killed at Fredericksburg) which have lately been published. In one of these letters General Cobb says that Mr. Davis and General Lee thought there was only one State in the Confederacy, and that was Virginia. In referring to it I remarked that, allowing a little for exaggeration, I did not think he was very far wrong; that I supposed it was much the same in the other States, and that I knew of the persistent injustice, and sometimes even cruelty, with which North Carolina and her troops were treated. He at once came to the defence of General Lee, and said he knew positively that he was not responsible for much of the injustice of which I complained; that in the matter of appointing and promoting officers General Lee often had very little influence. For instance, after Jackson’s death, when the army was reorganized and the two corps made into three, he was bitterly opposed to having A. P. Hill and Ewell for corps commanders. He wished to have Rodes—an Alabamian—to command one of them, and also wished to give a division to Pettigrew and he always said if his divisions and corps had been commanded at Gettysburg by officers of his choice he would have gained that battle. But, said General ——, as the secretary of war was a Virginian, and the influence of Virginia politicians was so all-powerful, both in the executive mansion and the halls of our congress, his wishes were not considered. Though a Virginian, he spoke at length of this baneful influence which festered for four years in Richmond. And just here it may be remarked that probably the most humiliating thing connected with our struggle for independence—more humiliating even than defeat—was the fact that North Carolinians and other free born men should ever have allowed themselves to be at all dominated by a public opinion, which was made by a sorry lot of ignoble bomb-proof hunters. On one occasion I told General —— about the letter I had received from Col. Venable, and how lie happened to write it. That I had heard reports as to General Pickett, while the assault was being made, which reflected upon his courage, and was disposed to doubt them, as I had heard that he had acted very bravely in his vain attempt to rally his division when routed at Five Forks. I do not think I succeeded in convincing him of this, for I think he believes yet that General Pickett never went near his troops on this the day of their last battle.
Wishing to know if there were any grounds for these reports, I wrote to Colonel Venable, asking him how far into the field General Pickett advanced with his division, and how near he was to it when it was repulsed, and the following is his answer:
“Remington, Fauquier County, Va.
“Dear Sir:—It has been settled by officers of the United States army, that both Pettigrew’s and Pickett’s men went to high water mark—that is, equally far in the charge at Gettysburg. The Federal government has caused marks to be placed at different points on the field with great care.
“The charge should even be called the charge of Pettigrew’s and Pickett’s men.
“Yours respectfully,
“Chas. S. Venable.“General Pettigrew was every inch a soldier and a very great loss to the grand old army of northern Virginia.
C. S. V.”
It will be seen that no attention is paid to my question, as there is no connection between it and the intended answer. This may signify something or it may not. My letter may have been mislaid and contents forgotten. The time has been when the reception of this letter would have greatly gratified me, but since I have made a study of the records and other authorities I have become convinced that, with one exception, there was not a brigade in Trimble’s or Pettigrew’s divisions which did not only equal but really surpass any of General Pickett’s in all soldierly qualities on that occasion.
And now for a few of the figures you some time ago expressed the wish to see. For the whole battle the fifteen Virginia regiments on the right had in killed and wounded 1,360. Amongst those on the left were the five North Carolina and three Mississippi regiments, which constituted Pettigrew’s and Davis’ brigades, and their loss in killed and wounded was 2,002.
What part of this latter loss was incurred on the third day will never be accurately known; but we know from the Federals that the artillery fire was largely concentrated upon these two brigades, and we also know from the testimony of Federal officers, one of whom was Colonel Morgan, General Hancock’s chief of staff, that the dead lay thicker on the ground over which these troops had passed than upon any other part of the field, and if we did not know these two facts the case of one regiment furnishes a key to the per centage of killed and wounded in its own brigade and that of the one immediately on its right. This regiment, the Eleventh Mississippi, did no fighting on the first day, as it was on detached service and consequently met with all its loss in the fight of the third. We know how many it carried in, and Dr. Guild’s report informs us of the loss, and, knowing these numbers, we know that its per centage of killed and wounded was more than sixty—a per centage so high that not one Virginia regiment ever made it, and not a great many others. This and its companion regiment—the Second Mississippi—were old troops—veterans in fact as well as in name—had fought often and always well. By referring to the Sharpsburg Campaign Series 1, Vol. xix. of the records, a comparison can be readily drawn between the conduct of these two regiments in this campaign and that of several which were afterwards at Gettysburg with Pickett. A comparison that were it not so pitiful would be amusing.
If Pickett’s troops carried in no more than claimed their per centage of killed and wounded was twenty-eight. But in order that their per centage might appear as high as possible, it is probable their numbers were always represented as smaller than they were. Their fifteen regiments probably averaged 400. If they did not, they should have done so, for they did not often have anybody hurt—that is, compared with the troops in the army from the other States. In the period from the close of the Richmond fighting to Gettysburg—one year—twelve battles were fought by the whole or part of the army, and in these battles Archer’s Tennessee, Lane’s North Carolina and Scales’ North Carolina had 3,610 killed and wounded. Kemper’s Virginia, Armistead’s Virginia and Garnett’s Virginia had 772. We can understand why these people were handled so tenderly, for were they not made of better clay than the fighters of the army? Fine porcelain from the province of Quang Tong were they—things of beauty, but fragile.