Pickett or Pettigrew? An Historical Essay

by W. R. Bond

The thing of most interest to readers of history is the question to which of the troops engaged on that ill-starred field is to be awarded the palm for heroic endurance and courageous endeavor. To know the per centage of killed and wounded of the different troops engaged in this assault, is to know which are entitled to most honor. Some of the troops in Pettigrew’s division met with a loss of over 60 per cent. The per centage for Pickett’s division was not quite 28. The 11th Mississippi, as said elsewhere, was the only regiment in Pettigrew’s or Trimble’s divisions, which entered the assault fresh. Most of the other troops of these commands had been badly cut up in the first day’s battle, and the exact number they carried into the assault is not known, but entering fresh the number taken in by the Eleventh is known, and the number it lost in killed and wounded is reported by Dr. Guild. Consequently there cannot be the slightest doubt that its per centage of loss for the assault was at least 60. It is fair to presume that the per centage in the other regiments of its brigade was equally great. It is also fair to presume that the brigade immediately on its right, which went somewhat farther and stayed somewhat longer under the same terrific fire, lost as heavily.

If the charge of the Light Brigade at Balaklava in which it lost 35 per cent. has rendered it famous, why should not the charge of Davis’ brigade in which it lost 60 per cent. render it equally famous? And if the blundering stupidity of the order to charge has excited our sympathy in behalf of the British cavalry, is there not enough of that element in the order to the infantry brigade to satisfy the most exacting? And if Davis’ brigade deserves fame why do not all the brigades—with one exception—of Pettigrew and Trimble also deserve it?

Col. W. E. Potter, of the 12th New Jersey, Smyth’s brigade, Hay’s division, in an address delivered several years ago, after speaking in very complimentary terms of the conduct of the North Carolina and Mississippi brigades of Pettigrew’s division, says: “Again a larger number of the enemy was killed and wounded in front of Smyth than in front of Webb. Of this, besides the general recollection of all of us who were then present, I have special evidence. I rode over the field covered by the fire of these two brigades on the morning of Sunday, July 5th, in company with Lt. Col. Chas. H. Morgan, the chief of staff of Gen. Hancock, and Capt. Hazard. As we were passing the front of Smyth’s brigade, Col. Morgan said to Hazard: ‘They may talk as they please about the hard fighting in front of Gibbon, but there are more dead men here than anywhere in our front.’ To this conclusion Hazard assented.”

After the frightful ordeal they had been through it is not to the discredit of any of the troops engaged to say that when they reached the breastworks, or their vicinity, there was no fight left in them, for there is a limit to human endurance. This limit had been reached, and this is shown by the fact that there was not an organization upon the field which, when an attack was made on its flank, made the slightest attempt to change front to meet it, but either surrendered or fled. This being the case the only thing of interest is to decide which brigades received the most punishment before this limit was reached.

During the recent discussion in the Richmond newspapers as to whether any of the North Carolina troops reached a point at or near the enemy’s works, the most prominent writer on the negative side of the question gives extracts from the reports of certain participants in the charge to corroborate his opinion, and by a singular oversight gives one from the report of Major John Jones, then commanding Pettigrew’s own brigade, who says: “The brigade dashed on, and many had reached the wall when we received a deadly volley from the left.” To have reached the stone wall on the left of the salient, they must necessarily have advanced considerably farther than any troops on the field. And yet the above writer in the face of Major Jones’ testimony, thinks that neither his nor any North Carolina troops were there. But then he quotes from the Federal Col. Hall, “who,” he says, “gives a list of the flags captured by his command when the charge was made.” Amongst them he mentions that of the 22nd North Carolina, and says: “If this can be accepted as true it of course ends all controversy.” Col. Hall reports that at the close of the assault his brigade captured the flags of the 14th, 18th, 19th and 57th Virginia, and that of the 22nd North Carolina. Webb reports that his command captured six flags, but does not name the regiments to which they belonged. Heth captured those of the 1st, 7th and 28th Virginia. Carroll’s brigade those of the 34th North Carolina and 38th Virginia. Smyth’s brigade those of 1st and 14th Tennessee, 16th and 52nd North Carolina and five others, the names not given, and Sherrill’s brigade captured three, the names not given. Thus we have the names of eight Virginia, four North Carolina and two Tennessee and fourteen reported captured, names not given. In all twenty-eight, which accounts for Pickett’s fifteen, Scales’ five, Pettigrew’s own three and Archer’s four. One of Pettigrew’s and one of Archer’s having been carried back, some of the other troops must have lost one. If official reports which say that the flags of the 1st and 14th Tennessee, and of the 16th, 22nd, 34th and 52nd North Carolina were captured, cannot be accepted as true and thus “end all controversy,” perhaps a re-statement of the fact that twenty-eight colors were taken at the close of the assault may do so, for as said above the Virginia division had only fifteen flags.

To show the disproportion that existed at the close of the fight between the numbers of men and flags, one officer reports that his regiment charged upon the retreating rebels and captured five regimental battle-flags and over forty prisoners, and a brigade commander speaking of the ground at and in front of the abandoned works, says: “Twenty battle-flags were captured in a space of 100 yards square.”

There is one fact that should be remembered in connection with this assault, namely: That of all breastworks a stone wall inspires most confidence and its defenders will generally fire deliberately and accurately and cling to it tenaciously.

The stone wall ran from the left and in front of Lane’s, Davis’ and Pettigrew’s North Carolina brigades and ended where the right of the last named rested at the close of the assault. At this point works made of rails covered with earth began and ran straight to the front for some distance and then made a sharp turn to the left in the direction of Round Top, continuing in nearly a straight line beyond Pickett’s right. It was a short distance to the right of the outer corner of these works when Webb’s men gave way.

Several years ago there was published in the Philadelphia “Times,” an article by Col. W. W. Wood, of Armistead’s brigade, giving his recollections of this affair. As the writer had very naively made several confessions, which I had never seen made by any other of Pickett’s men, and had evidently intended to speak truthfully, I put the paper aside for future reference. I shall now make several selections from it and endeavor to criticise them fairly. Our artillery crowned the ridge, and behind it sheltered by the hills lay our infantry: “The order to go forward was obeyed with alacrity and cheerfulness, for we believed that the battle was practically over, and that we had nothing to do but to march unopposed to Cemetery Heights and occupy them. While making the ascent it was seen that the supports to our right and left flanks were not coming forward as we had been told they would. Mounted officers were seen dashing frantically up and down their lines, apparently endeavoring to get them to move forward, but we could see that they would not move. Their failure to support us was discouraging, but it did not dishearten us. Some of our men cursed them for cowards, etc.” So far no great courage had been required. But what troops were they that Pickett’s people were cursing for cowards? On the right they were Perry’s Florida and Wilcox’s Alabama, under the command of the latter General. Their orders were that when twenty minutes had elapsed after the line had started they were to march straight ahead and repel any body of flankers who should attack the right. This order was obeyed to the letter. At the required time they moved forward and kept moving. About where Pickett should have been (Pickett’s line had previously obliqued to the left) not a Confederate was to be seen. They kept on and single handed and alone attacked the whole Federal army, then exulting in victory. Of course they were repulsed, but when they knew they were beaten did they surrender that they might be sheltered in Northern prisons from Northern bullets? Not they. They simply fell back and made their way, as best they could, to the Confederate lines. Is there any significance in the facts that shortly after this battle Gen. Wilcox was promoted and Gen. Pickett and his men were sent out of the army? What other troops were they whom these men were cursing for being cowards? Some of them were the choice troops of A. P. Hill’s old division, ever famous for its fighting qualities, others were the survivors of Archer’s brigade of gallant Tennesseans, Mississippians, brave and impetuous, North Carolinians, always steady, always true. These men were cursed as cowards, and by Pickett’s Virginians! Achilles cursed by Thersites! A lion barked at by a cur.

But there was one brigade, and only one, in Pettigrew’s division which failed in the hour of trial. It was from their own State, and had once been an efficient body of soldiers, and even on this occasion something might be said in its defense. But had this not been the case, to the men of Armistead’s brigade (who were doing the cursing) the memory of their own behavior at Sharpsburg and Shepherdstown should have had the effect of making them charitable towards the shortcomings of others.