On the Ethics of Naturalism

by W. R. Sorley

FOOTNOTES:

[1] Werke, ed. Hartenstein (1867), iii. 532.

[2] Cf. Kant, Werke, iv. 237.

[3] Sermons, v., towards the end.

[4] Essay on the Passions and Affections, p. iv.

[5] W. H. Rolph, Biologische Probleme, zugleich als Versuch zur Entwicklung einer rationellen Ethik, 2d ed., p. 21.

[6] Not to mention Kant, the consistent opponent of every eudæmonistic principle, or the doctrines of a political idealist such as Mazzini (see Life and Writings (1867), iv. 223), reference may be made to a writer like W. K. Clifford, who looks from the scientific point of view, and yet holds that "happiness is not to be desired for its own sake."—Lectures and Essays (1879), ii. 121, 173.

[7] "Auch dieser Begriff [Glückseligkeit] ist an sich ein bloss formaler, der jede beliebige materiale Bestimmung zulässt."—Zeller, Ueber Begriff und Begründung der sittlichen Gesetze (1883), p. 23.

[8] Methods of Ethics, book i. chap. i. § 5, 3d ed., p. 11.

[9] "The rule, 'Let every one care for me,' is quite as simple, and, in a logical point of view, defines conduct as consistently and reasonably as the rule, 'Love your neighbour as yourself.'"—Leslie Stephen, Science of Ethics (1882), p. 73.