[20] Thus Jonathan Edwards says: "When I say that the Will is as the greatest apparent good, or (as I have explained it) that volition has always for its object the thing which appears most agreeable, it must be carefully observed, to avoid confusion and needless objection, that I speak of the direct and immediate object of the act of volition, and not some object to which the act of will has only an indirect and remote respect."—On the Freedom of the Will, part i. § 2; Works, i. 133. The matter is put still more clearly by the late Alfred Barratt: "Action does not always follow knowledge. Of course not: but the doctrine [Hedonism] does not require that it should; for it says, not that we follow what is our greatest possible pleasure, or what we know or 'think' to be so, but what at the moment of action is most desired."—Mind, vol. ii. 173; cf. Physical Ethics, p. 52 ff. So Mr Stephen, Science of Ethics, p. 47: "It is more accurate to say that my conduct is determined by the pleasantest judgment, than to say that it is determined by my judgment of what is pleasantest." The negative side of the same view was expressed by Locke in his doctrine that action is moved by the most pressing uneasiness (Essay, II. xxi. 29, 31), and distinguished by him from the former view (b), that the "greater visible good" is the motive (II. xxi. 35, 44).
[21] Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, 3d ed., p. 40.
[22] Bentham, Principles of Morals and Legislation, chap. i., Works, i. 1. With this statement may be compared the assertion of Helvétius: "Il semble que, dans l'univers moral comme dans l'univers physique, Dieu n'est mis qu'un seul principe dans tous ce qui a été.... Il semble qu'il ait dit pareillement à l'homme: ... Je te mets sous la garde du plaisir et de la douleur: l'un et l'autre veilleront à tes pensées, à tes actions; engendreront tes passions, exciteront tes aversions, tes amitiés, tes tendresses, tes fureurs; allumeront tes désirs, tes craintes, tes espérances, te dévoileront des vérités; te plongeront dans des erreurs; et après t'avoir fait enfanter mille systèmes absurdes et différens de morale et de législation, te decouvriront un jour les principes simples, au développement desquels est attaché l'ordre et le bonheur du monde moral."—De l'esprit, III. ix, Œuvres (ed. of 1818), i. 293.
[23] De l'homme, concl. gén., Œuvres, ii. 608.
[24] Cf. Système de la nature, i. 120: "La politique devrait être l'art de régler les passions des hommes et de les diriger vers le bien de la société."
[25] Bentham, op. cit., chap. xix. (xvii. in the reprint of 1879), § 20; Works, i. 148.
[26] Cf. Bentham, Works, ix. 5.
[27] Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, I. iv. 1, 3d ed., p. 41; cf. Green, Prolegomena to Ethics, p. 9: "To a being who is simply a result of natural forces, an injunction to conform to their laws is unmeaning."
[28] Cf. The Emotions and the Will, 3d ed., p. 293 ff.
[29] Cf. Sully, Outlines of Psychology, p. 577.