[70] Phil., 31 ff.; cf. Gorg., 495 f.; Rep., ix. 585.
[71] Cf. Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, I. iv. 2, 3d ed., p. 44.
[72] Herbart, Psychologie als Wissenschaft, § 104, Werke, vi. 74; cf. Waitz, Lehrbuch der Psychologie als Naturwissenschaft, § 40, p. 418: "It is not difficult to recognise the basis of desire in the presentations brought forward by reproduction, and, at the same time, held back by an inhibition."
[73] With Herbart's doctrine may be compared Mr H. Spencer's view of the genesis of feeling and voluntary action, Principles of Psychology, 2d ed., part iv. chaps. viii. and ix.
[74] Cf. note to James Mill's Analysis, ii. 383 f.
[75] The Senses and the Intellect, 3d ed., p. 344; cf. Mental and Moral Science, pp. 90, 91.
[76] "If there be any principles or affections in the mind of man distinct from self-love, that the things those principles tend towards, or the objects of those affections are, each of them in themselves eligible to be pursued upon its own account, and to be rested in as an end, is implied in the very idea of such principle or affection."—Butler, Sermons, Pref.
[77] Inquiry concerning Virtue, II. i. 3.
[78] Ibid., II. ii., conclusion.
[79] System of Moral Philosophy, i. 99.