[110] It would seem that the transmission of mental qualities only takes place in the form of modified physical structure (cf. G. H. Lewes, Problems of Life and Mind, 1st series, i. 164). But, if we regard it as established that every mental change has a structural modification corresponding to it, the possibility of mental evolution and inheritance presents no new difficulty.
[111] Ælian, V. H., xiii. 30.
[112] If conscience has no other function than that assigned to it by Clifford, Lectures and Essay, ii. 169, "the preservation of society in the struggle for existence," then it can never reach universal benevolence or prescribe "duties towards all mankind."
[113] A difficulty of another kind is suggested by Professor Bain, who holds that the "pleasure of malevolence" is not only a real element in the human constitution, but greater than would be naturally called forth by the conditions and course of development. "It is remarked by Mr Spencer," he says, "that it was necessary for the progress of the race that destructive activity should not be painful, but on the whole pleasurable. In point of fact, however, the pleasure of destruction has gone much beyond what these words express, and much beyond what is advantageous to the collective interest of animals and of human beings alike. The positive delight in suffering has been at all stages too great."—The Emotions and the Will, p. 66. So far from adopting this argument, however, I must confess myself still amongst the unconvinced regarding the "pleasure of malevolence."
[114] This subject is carefully discussed in Mr Stephen's 'Science of Ethics.'
[115] Cf. Miss Cobbe, in 'Darwinism in Morals, and other Essays' (1872), p. 5.
[116] Methods of Ethics, III. i. 4, 3d ed., p. 211.
[117] Cf. Professor F. Pollock, "Evolution and Ethics"—Mind, i. pp. 335 ff. Apart from the bearing of a utilitarian test on inherited instincts, to which Mr Pollock refers, I have tried to show what meaning they will have for the evolutionist who judges them solely from the point of view of his theory.
[118] Traité des sensations, Œuvres (1798), vol. iii.
[119] It is to a condition of this sort that a phrase such as Clifford's "tribal self" (Lectures and Essays, ii. 111) would apply.