The Deed of Foundation of the Shaw Fellowship provides that "it shall be in the power of the Senatus Academicus of the University of Edinburgh to require the holder of the Shaw Philosophical Fellowship, during the fourth or fifth year of his tenure of it, to deliver in the University of Edinburgh a course of Lectures, not exceeding four, on any of the subjects for the encouragement of the study of which the Fellowship has been founded." The following pages consist of four lectures delivered in the University of Edinburgh, in accordance with this provision, in the month of January 1884.

Since their delivery, the argument of the lectures has been revised, and in some places enlarged. I have also thought it better to modify their original form by dividing the discussion into chapters.

W. R. S.

CONTENTS.

CHAPTER I.
ETHICS AND ITS PROBLEMS.
PAGE
1. Connection of ethics with theoretical philosophy,[1]
(a) Dependence of ethical on theoretical points of view,[1]
(b) Ethics necessary to complete philosophy,[3]
2. The inquiry into the ethical end,[5]
(a) Fundamental,[5]
(b) Implies a new point of view,[7]
(c) Distinct from other ethical questions,[9]
(α) From the inquiry into the methods of ethics,[10]
(β) From moral psychology and sociology,[13]
3. Scope of the present inquiry,[14]
PART I.
THE INDIVIDUALISTIC THEORY.
CHAPTER II.
EGOISM.
Definition of Naturalism,[20]
Psychological hedonism,[21]
1. Its theory of action ambiguous,[22]
Referring to—
(a) Actual consequences of action,[23]
(b) Or its expected consequences,[23]
(c) Or its present characteristics,[24]
2. Ethical inferences from this theory,[25]
3. Transition from psychological to ethical hedonism,[31]
4. Possible objections considered,[37]
CHAPTER III.
THE TRANSITION TO UTILITARIANISM.
1. Difference of the standpoints of individual and State,[41]
2. Connection between egoism and utilitarianism according to Bentham,[45]
(a) Utilitarianism not a political duty,[46]
(b) Nor a moral duty,[47]
(c) Nor insisted on as a religious duty,[49]
(d) Nor sufficiently motived in private ethics,[50]
3. Exhaustive character of Bentham's treatment from his point of view,[51]
(a) The religious sanction (Paley),[53]
(b) Limits of the political sanction,[54]
(c) Uncertainty of the social sanction,[55]
(d) And of the internal sanction so far as a result of the social,[56]
4. Mill's logical defence of utilitarianism,[57]
(a) Distinction of kinds of pleasure,[58]
(b) Ambiguities in his proof,[60]
5. Actual transition to utilitarianism,[62]
(a) Recognition of sympathy,[64]
(b) The idea of equality,[69]
6. The two sides of utilitarian theory without logical connection,[73]
7. Summary of the ethical consequences of psychological hedonism,[75]
CHAPTER IV.
MORAL SENTIMENT.
1. A uniform psychological theory not supplied by the opponents of ethical hedonism,[78]
2. The non-hedonistic theory of action,[84]
3. Ethics made to depend on the moral sense,[89]
(a) As harmony of impulses,[90]
(b) As a separate sensitive faculty,[92]
(c) As an internal law,[100]
4. The ethics of moral sentiment a mediating theory,[105]
PART II.
THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION.
CHAPTER V.
THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF MORALITY.
1. General characteristics of the theory of evolution,[107]
An assertion of the unity of life,[109]
Primarily historical, but capable of ethical application,[110]
2. The development of morality,[116]
(a) Historical psychology,[116]
Its difficulties,[117]
Its result,[123]
(b) Development of society,[124]
CHAPTER VI.
EVOLUTION AND ETHICAL THEORIES.
Bearing of the theory of evolution,[126]
1. On theories depending on moral sentiment or intuition,[127]
(a) Ethical value of moral sentiments affected by their origin,[130]
(b) Organic character of moral sentiments,[132]
Resultant attitude of evolutionism to intuitionism,[133]
2. On egoism: relation of egoism to altruism,[134]
(a) Social nature of the individual,[135]
(b) Limits to conciliation of egoism and altruism,[141]
(α) Continued existence of competition,[142]
(β) Different and conflicting degrees of altruism,[143]
(γ) Altruism of interest and altruism of motive,[143]
(δ) Weakness of altruistic feelings,[146]
(c) Tendency of evolution opposed to egoism,[148]
Evolution not the basis of psychological hedonism,[148]
Nor of ethical hedonism,[150]
3. On utilitarianism,[152]
Modification of the utilitarian method,[153]
And of its principle,[155]
Evolutionist objections to utilitarianism,[155]
(a) As prescribing an unprogressive ideal,[156]
(b) As a theory of consequences,[160]
(c) As related solely to sensibility,[161]
CHAPTER VII.
HEDONISM AND EVOLUTIONISM.
1. Alliance of evolutionism and hedonism,[164]
(a) From interpreting greatest happiness by the laws of life,[164]
(b) From interpreting life by pleasure,[165]
2. Evolutionist argument for concomitance of life and pleasure,[167]
3. Objections to this argument,[168]
(a) That life cannot bring more pleasure than pain,[169]
(α) From the negative nature of pleasure,[171]
(β) From the facts of human life,[172]
(b) That the evolution of life does not uniformly tend to pleasure,[172]
(α) Incompleteness of the evolutionist argument,[173]
(β) The pessimist doctrine that life tends to misery,[175]
(aa) The hypothesis of the unconscious,[176]
(bb) The nature of volition,[177]
(cc) The facts of human progress,[179]
Individual progress,[179]
Social progress,[181]
4. The psychological analysis of pleasure and pain in relation to evolutionist ethics,[186]
(a) The subjective nature of pleasure and pain,[187]
(b) The conditions of pleasure and pain,[190]
(c) Application of the theory of evolution,[197]
CHAPTER VIII.
THE EVOLUTIONIST END.
Necessity of inquiring into the ethical end suggested by the theory of evolution,[201]
1. Adaptation to environment,[203]
(a) As the end for present conduct,[207]
Opposed to progress,[207]
Does not fully represent evolution,[209]
(b) As describing the ultimate condition of life,[210]
Resultant absolute code,[211]
(α) Abstract principles of social relation,[212]
(β) Personal end only defined as adaptation,[213]
(γ) Cannot be shown to lead to happiness,[213]
(c) Insufficiency of adaptation as evolutionist end,[217]
2. End suggested by the tendency to variation,[221]
(a) Prescribes self-development rather than self-preservation,[222]
(b) Standard for measuring development found in complexity of act and motive,[227]
(α) Antinomy between social and individual ends,[231]
(β) Psychological defects,[232]
3. Development or increase of life as the end,[236]
(a) Subjective standard: most persistent impulses,[242]
Cannot define life without an objective standard,[244]
(b) Objective standard: defined in two ways,[247]
(α) Conformity to the type,[248]
Which can be reduced to—
(β) Abundance and variety of vital power,[251]
That is, to the subjective standard,[253]
Summary as to the evolutionist end,[256]
(a) Difficulty of reconciling individual and social ends,[256]
(b) Hedonistic interpretation of evolution not possible,[257]
(c) No independent ethical ideal,[259]
CHAPTER IX.
ON THE BASIS OF ETHICS.
1. Principles involved in theory of evolution,[263]
2. Unsuccessful application of these principles to ethics,[264]
(a) The principles being treated empirically,[265]
(b) No logical transition having been effected from efficient to final cause,[267]
3. Difference between causality and teleology,[269]
4. Reference to self-consciousness implied in evolution,[277]
(a) Attempt to trace the genesis of self-consciousness,[278]
(b) Attempt to trace morality from reflex action,[283]
5. The unity of self-consciousness,[284]
(a) As making possible the transition from knowledge to morality,[284]
(b) As determining the character of the ethical end,[286]
(c) As showing that the realisation of the end must be progressive,[291]

THE ETHICS OF NATURALISM.