As it was not until the 11th of May, 1812, that Mr. Barlow received “FOR THE FIRST TIME”[297] a copy of the decree of the 28th of April, 1811, by which the Berlin and Milan Decrees were revoked, it is clear that this fact affords a complete justification for the course pursued by the English government; the United States choosing to rely and to insist upon the verbal assurances of Napoleon that the decrees were revoked, when at the very moment new seizures and confiscations were being made by his orders.[298] It was not until the 21st of May that the American minister in London produced a copy, or what purported to be a copy, of an instrument which professed to bear date the 28th of April, 1811. This decree, by which the American vessels were protected, recites “that whereas Congress has established a non-intercourse with England, and excluded her vessels, merchandise, and those of her colonies from entering the ports of the United States, therefore we decree,” etc. It is self-evident that the moment relations were renewed between the United States and England, Napoleon reserved to himself the right to take ulterior measures. But his object was now effected, war had been declared, and, as the French said triumphantly, “England had a new enemy.”

England revokes her Orders in Council.

The English ministers, although they considered the document produced most unsatisfactory, decided on revoking the Orders in Council, conditional upon the Non-intercourse Act being also rescinded; but, the Americans having pre-determined on war, frustrated the pacific measures which had previously been taken by England. To crown the unwarrantable conduct of the American government, it afterwards was shown that when they proclaimed the declaration of war, and the extreme measure of issuing “letters of marque,” they were actually in possession of the report of the French Minister for Foreign Affairs of the 12th of March, 1812, promulgating anew the Berlin and Milan Decrees, as fundamental laws of the French empire, under the false pretext that their monstrous principles were found in the treaty of Utrecht, and were therefore binding upon all nations.[299] Indeed the whole intrigue seems to have been a masterpiece of perfidy, and their reasons for war were so untenable that the Americans, in their speeches and diatribes, were compelled to make the most of the English impressment system and the original blockade of 1806, which they denounced as a paper blockade, perhaps conscious that if they had made a treaty with Napoleon, the blockade of the French coasts might have proved a fresh obstacle to their monopolizing the whole trade of the continent, under the colour of a neutral flag.

Condemnation of the conduct of the United States.

An impartial perusal of all the documents relating to this rupture makes the inimical disposition of the government of the United States, their complete subserviency to the ruler of France, and their hostile temper against Great Britain conspicuous in every page of their official correspondence with the French government. England might well say that she looked for a different result. From their common origin, from their common interest, from their professed principles of freedom and independence, the United States was the last power in which Great Britain could have expected to find a willing instrument and abettor of French tyranny and despotism. The Americans, however, seem to have been blinded by a short-sighted view of European affairs, not anticipating that a few months would produce a complete revolution in the whole aspect of continental affairs, and that the power of Napoleon would in so short a period have passed away.

Impressment of American seamen.

When the English Parliament re-assembled in February 1813, the House of Commons unanimously carried the address approving the war with the United States, on the ground of maintaining the maritime rights of Great Britain. The Americans had industriously circulated a report that the British had impressed fifteen thousand to twenty thousand American seamen. The absurdity of such a statement must be apparent to every reflecting person; the report, however, was not addressed to such parties, but to the demagogues of both countries, who alone desired war. By the Admiralty records it was plainly proved that out of one hundred and forty-five thousand seamen then employed in the British navy, the whole number who claimed to be American subjects, a claim, too, the justice of which rested upon their simple declaration, was but three thousand five hundred, and that out of every four individuals who claimed their discharge in right of being citizens of the United States, only one established his claim on any tolerable ground whatever. Supposing, however, one-half of the claimants to have had a rational ground for demanding their liberation, the whole number of Americans in the British navy could not have exceeded from sixteen to seventeen hundred, and it cannot be supposed that England should have involved herself in a new war with a view to retain the services of such an inconsiderable number of reluctant hands.

Fraudulent certificates.

Indeed the fact cannot be questioned that the English government had invariably given directions to the officers of her navy not to press seamen, professing to be American born, who were found on board American vessels with certificates signed by the collector of customs of an American port, even though it was well known that these certificates were easily obtained in the United States, the American government making no effort to check their fraudulent emission. In the port of New York the system of obtaining false certificates had become so disgracefully open, that in one day, ludicrous as it may appear, an old woman was allowed by the collector to qualify a whole host of seamen by swearing she knew them to be American citizens; and when the clerk remonstrated against its impropriety, and appealed to the collector with regard to the credibility of the witness, he was told by his superior that it was no business of his, for that he only acted ministerially in the affair; so that this old woman continued during the entire day to receive her two dollars for every seaman who, through the oath administered to her, obtained his certificate.[300] The same system prevailed at Philadelphia; certificates were also frequently transferred from one individual to another, and became as much a matter of bargain and sale as any other description of chattel property; the most ridiculous part of the system being, that after a transfer of this description it was no unusual thing to see produced by a sailor of colour a certificate for his protection, in which he was described to be of “a fair complexion, light hair and blue eyes!”

In all these indefensible proceedings the Americans held that a British subject, who by a false oath converted himself into an American citizen, or who naturalised himself in the United States, in conformity with their laws, ceased to owe allegiance to the king of his native country, and was entitled to their protection; and, in support of this strange doctrine, whenever this view was impeached, the American envoy merely replied that he had no instructions on that point. In the parliamentary discussions which took place upon the subject, Mr. A. Baring, with all his Whig tendencies and strong American predilections, while affecting to believe that the Russian campaign and Napoleon’s intrigues had nothing to do with the declaration of war by the Americans, strongly maintained the English right of impressment, adding “that if there were sixteen hundred American seamen in our navy, there were more than sixteen thousand British seamen in the American navy;”[301] and he condemned ministers for not carrying on the war against the United States with greater vigour: at that moment, however, every effort was concentrated to strike down Napoleon.