Such were the principles then hurled at England by Catherine of Russia, who placed herself at the head of an armed neutrality, consisting of Denmark, Sweden, and Russia. Lord North, for a while, evaded any direct reply to them; but the northern powers naturally found zealous supporters in the nations now at war with Great Britain. Thus the contemporary declarations of France, Spain, and the United States lauded the moderation and public spirit which Catherine had displayed, while England maintained her principles inviolate. But it was only at the close of the century that the northern confederacy attempted to enforce their principles. Bonaparte had then concluded peace with Germany and Naples, had compelled Spain to coerce the Portuguese so as to destroy all English trade on the coast of Portugal, and had stimulated the action of the northern powers, by inspiring the Emperor Paul with an infatuation which could only succeed in men of weak minds like himself. The avowed aim of Bonaparte was to close every port in Europe against the merchant shipping of England, to combine the naval forces of Spain, Holland and France so as to make them act in concert, and, thus, if possible, to rescue the army he had left in Egypt.
Capture of merchant vessels.
England’s position had already become sufficiently perilous, owing to the order of the National Convention of France, issued in May 1793, to their ships of war and privateers not to respect British property in neutral vessels—an exception, however, being promptly made in favour of American vessels: a resolution which continued in force till the seizure by the English of the fleet of United States vessels, laden with provisions for France, forced the Convention to rescind their order.
American vessels thus became liable to capture on both sides, and continued so till the French government, hearing that Mr. Jay had been sent to London to remonstrate against the capture by English cruisers of American vessels, renewed the order in favour of the United States’ ships. When, however, the National Convention found that Mr. Jay’s remonstrances, so far from producing the effect anticipated, had led to the conclusion of a treaty of amity and commerce between the two countries adverse to France, they again decreed that their conduct to neutral flags would be regulated by that of their enemies. The French did not conceal their displeasure against the Americans, whom they accused of base ingratitude; although it was evident to the whole world that the assistance France had previously rendered to the revolted colonists was simply prompted by a desire to check the power of England, and not from any real sympathy with the American cause.
Do “free ships make free goods?”
In this instance the enforcement of the paper treaties pre-existing between France and America threatened a rupture between the two countries. The French ambassador to the United States presented a remonstrance in September 1795 wherein he insisted upon the mutual duties of neutrality. Not having received any answer, he made further applications in the ensuing year, which were equally disregarded. In his last note (27th of October, 1796) he observed, “that neutrality no longer exists when, in the course of war, the neutral nation grants to one of the belligerent powers advantages not stipulated by treaties anterior to the war, or suffers that power to seize upon them.” Mr. Pickering, the United States Secretary of State, replied (3rd of November, 1796), that by the treaty of 1778 with France it was expressly stipulated that free ships should make free goods;[242] that the Americans, being now at peace, have the right of carrying the property of the enemies of France; and that the French could not expect them to renounce that privilege because it happened to operate to the disadvantage of one of the parties engaged in the war. He maintained that the captures made by the British of American vessels having French property on board were warranted by the law of nations; that the operation of this law was contemplated by France and the United States when they formed their treaty of commerce, and that their special stipulation on this point was meant as an exception to an universal rule.[243] The Americans, moreover, saw the advantage of preserving amicable commercial relations with Great Britain, and this “perfidious condescension,” as the French stigmatised it, “to the tyrannical and homicidal rage of the English government concurred to plunge the people of France into the horrors of famine.”[244] This violent correspondence thus threatened to embroil France and the United States, and in about three weeks afterwards (15th of November, 1796) M. Adet, the French Minister at Philadelphia, gave notice that his diplomatic functions were suspended, and, at the same time, the Directory of France refused to receive Mr. Pinckney, the accredited ambassador from the United States.
It was at this period, while French armies, under the generals of the Republic, were pursuing their victorious career by land, that England, on her natural element, the sea, sought to secure a compensating balance by the monopoly of the carrying trade of the world. Desperate measures were considered necessary to counteract the sweeping conquests of the French and to save herself from what then appeared to be impending annihilation. In 1794 and 1795 the conquest of Belgium and Holland had been achieved by the arms of France; and in the following year Napoleon began his victorious campaign in Italy, his first battle having been gained at Montenotte on the 11th of April, 1796.[245]
But while the French were triumphant by land, the English soon became equally predominant on the ocean. Their fleets swept the seas of all their enemies. Through their vigilance, and the indomitable courage of their crews, the merchant vessels of England had never in any former war been so thoroughly protected. The premium of insurance which had, in 1782, been fifteen guineas per cent. on those of her ships engaged in the trade with India and China, did not exceed half that rate at any period between the spring of 1793 and the close of this terrible struggle. Nelson and his brave fellow-commanders were the only, but they were a complete, barrier to Napoleon’s conquests. The fleets of France were either destroyed or shut up in her ports, and, to use Napoleon’s own expression, he could not send a cockle boat to sea without the risk of its being captured. The loyalty and courage of the English nation had, amid all their sufferings, risen with the emergency. In Mr. Pitt the merchants, shipowners, and agriculturists had found a most able and truly loyal, though a cold, proud, disdainful champion; his extraordinary administrative talents and unswerving love of his country rendering him the idol of the mercantile and shipping classes. But though he had weathered the storm during seventeen years, he now felt it prudent to withdraw for a while from office; his retirement being, no doubt, greatly induced by the differences between him and the King respecting Catholic Emancipation. His influence, however, and the policy he had unflinchingly pursued, continued to guide the councils of the Addington administration which succeeded him.
Neutral nations repudiate the English views.
It was then that the question of neutral rights, originally promulgated by Catherine of Russia in 1780, first seriously attracted the attention of those nations of Europe who were not directly involved in the war, and especially of the United States of America, now fast becoming a power of no mean importance, and one, even then, prepared to assert her rights. These powers indignantly repudiated the claims which England, under Pitt, had enforced. They alleged that the accidents of war ought not to interfere with the trade of those not engaged in it; and that they were justified in possessing themselves of such carrying trade as the belligerents had been obliged to relinquish. Holding these views, they claimed the right of frequenting freely all the ports of the world, and of passing to and fro between those of the belligerent nations; thus traversing from France and Spain to England, from England to Spain and France, and (what was still more disputable) of going from the colonies to the mother-countries, as for instance, from Mexico to Spain. They resolutely maintained the principle that “the flag covers the merchandise;” that the flag of neutrals sheltered from search the merchandise transported in their vessels; that in such vessels French merchandise could not be seized by the English, nor English merchandise by the French; in short, that the ships of neutrals were as sacred as the soil of the country to which they belonged. On the other hand, they admitted that they ought not to carry goods unquestionably contraband of war, it being incompatible with any notion of neutrality that the neutral should supply one of the belligerent nations with arms against the other. They, however, sought to limit their admission solely to articles fabricated for war, such as muskets, cannon, powder, projectiles, and materials for accoutrements of every kind; nor did they consider provisions interdicted, except such as were prepared for military and naval armaments, as, for example, biscuits.