“During the war which ended in 1815, we had,” remarked the admiral, “800 pennants flying, and even so many as 900 ships were in commission for a considerable time. Great exertions were necessary on the part of the shipwrights to keep up the repairs of such a fleet, and to build new ships to supply the decay and the casualties constantly going on. But numerous as our fleet was then, it was likely to be on a much larger scale hereafter; for, in addition to our usual fleets, there must, of necessity, be an immense number of steamers in a great measure as an addition, though not as a substitute for sailing ships.”[87]
The number of shipwrights in the King’s yards throughout the war, he estimated, might be taken at an average of 3714 and 875 apprentices, making a total of 4589 working shipwrights, besides 550 in the colonial yards. Notwithstanding this great shipwright strength, and the efforts exacted from them, the Admiralty was obliged to seek every possible assistance from the private shipbuilders,[88] and to these persons Admiral Martin maintained protection was due, considering how much they had done for the country when we had enemies to deal with in every quarter.
I need not dwell upon all the other points of Admiral Martin’s evidence; but that which relates to the merchant service and manning the navy must not be omitted.
Importance of keeping up the merchant navy.
Arguments from his personal experience as to its value as a nursery for seamen.
If the Navigation Laws were done away, Admiral Martin believed, the shipowner who would go to foreign countries for cheap ships would, from the same motive, take foreign seamen, such as Danes, Swedes, Norwegians, or Dutchmen, who would be content with small wages and a cheap scale of dietary. In this way, a large number of British seamen would be deprived of the employment they now enjoyed owing mainly to the Navigation Laws; and, in such a case, the naval service must suffer in proportion, especially, when, in time of war, seamen are most urgently required. It had been said, and it was a “marvellous assertion,” that the merchant service contributes so little towards the supply of the navy—that, so far as concerned this point, there need be no hesitation in abandoning the Navigation Laws. An assertion more completely contradicted by all experience, Admiral Martin confidently stated, had never been uttered. The merchant service, he held, was everything to the navy, while the navy, he was convinced, could not exist without it. He was unable, adequately, to express his surprise at these loose assertions, for every person who remembered the muster of the navy immediately preceding the war in 1793, could not fail to know that the glorious victory of the 1st of June, 1794, under Lord Howe, was gained by the merchant seamen of the kingdom. We had not then, he said, 20,000 men, and these were scattered over the globe when the war broke out; it was, therefore, the merchant service that enabled us rapidly to man some sixty sail of the line, and double that number of frigates and smaller vessels. By promptly bringing together about 35,000 or 40,000 seamen of the mercantile marine, Admiral Gardner was able at once to proceed to the West Indies with seven sail of the line, nine frigates and sloops of war; Lord Hood to man twenty-two sail of the line, and a large number of frigates and sloops, with which he occupied Toulon and took Corsica; while, by its aid, other squadrons were sent to America and to the East Indies to protect our interests in those quarters. The command of seamen from the merchant service also enabled Lord Howe to occupy the Channel with twenty-seven sail of the line and numerous frigates, thereby affording security to our own homes, and the means of protecting our colonies and commerce by detached squadrons.
Working of the system of apprenticeship,
Notwithstanding these proofs of naval energy on the first outburst of the late war, and of the important help derived from the merchant service, the number of men obtained was, after all, inadequate to the wants of the country. The merchant service, suddenly drained of so many thousands, could, afterwards, give only a comparatively small and occasional supply as ships arrived from foreign ports, or as apprentices grew out of their time. Now this continued, though insufficient succour to the navy, Admiral Martin thought, could never have been maintained throughout so long a war but for the provident provisions of the Navigation Laws in making it compulsory on shipowners to take a certain number of apprentices, and thus to keep up a constant replenishment of seafaring men.[89]
He expressed himself of quite a different opinion to those who were sanguine in believing the abrogation of the Navigation Laws would increase our shipping; and stoutly combated the notion that we could retain the same quantity of tonnage after we had entered on a system of rivalry with foreign countries in cheap carrying. But, assuming that we retained 4,000,000 tons[90] of shipping, it might be well to see how the comparison stood with respect to the supply of men derived from the 1,500,000 in 1793, and what might be expected from the present 4,000,000 tons. In 1793, and up to 1835, the Act of Queen Anne secured a replenishment of seafaring men by apprentices of more than double the number, when we had only 1,500,000, to what the Act of 1835 did in 1848 with 4,000,000. Consequently, in that respect, nothing was gained by the increased tonnage. By the Act of Queen Anne, vessels of 30 tons were obliged to take an apprentice; whereas under the Act of 1835 a vessel of 200 tons takes only one apprentice. Under the Act of Queen Anne, vessels of 400 tons took five apprentices; under the Act of 1835, only two. Formerly ships of 1400 tons were obliged to take fifteen apprentices; whereas, under the present Act, the largest ship built was only required to take five: so that the lesser amount of tonnage in 1793 gave a larger supply of fresh hands than the 4,000,000 tons.
The admiral did not fail to point out, in comparing the two periods, that the increase to 4,000,000 exhibited a noble proof of our commercial growth under the protection of the Navigation Laws, and seemed to warn us of what we hazarded in giving up 4,000,000 of shipping tonnage to be scrambled for by all the nations of the world.